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ABSTRACT
The online recruitment efforts of ISIS have raised questions about the new role of
the internet in the spread of terrorism. However, the use of the mass media by terrorist
groups to recruit and spread is not unique to ISIS or the digital age and has been an aspect
of terrorism since its modern conception. To explain the spread of terrorism historically
and understand the unique dimensions of terrorism and the internet, a cultural explanation
is proposed to explain the process through terrorism spreads as well as the content that
inspires violence. This study includes two major parts: a virtual ethnography of ISIS; and
a comparative-historical study of the prior international waves of terrorism. The first part
examines the presence of ISIS online, with the goal of understanding the virtual
environment in which people become radicalized. The second part is a comparativehistorical study examines the shared cultural aspects of terrorist groups involved in the
anarchist, anticolonial, and New Left waves, as well as constructing a social network of
the ideological and influential connections between the groups. The final analysis of the
dissertation examines ISIS in the historical context of other international waves of
terrorism, and the insights gained from the in-depth examination of the media
environment of ISIS. This research describes the characteristics of the virtual caliphate,
and finds that it largely reflects general trends observed in historical groups. Specifically,
terrorist groups possess a consistent set of cultural elements, exhibiting all of the criteria
of subcultures. Furthermore, these cultural elements can be traced across time and space,
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demonstrating that groups draw from cultural sources to adopt and apply terrorism to
address collective problems.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria [ISIS] may have been defeated, but its
international reach serves as an example of the changing face of terrorism in an internet
age. ISIS is unique not in its use of the internet, but its proficiency in its use through
social media platforms. ISIS’s use of the internet has prompted several studies examining
the group’s ideology, the structure of its social network across Twitter, the discourse on
its videos on Arabic language Youtube, and analyses of the group’s propaganda
magazine (Andersen and Sandberg 2018; Bloom, Tiflati, and Horgan 2017; Uberman and
Shay 2016; Klausen 2015). The ability of ISIS to attract foreign recruits and inspire
domestic acts of terrorism demands explanation, and the group’s notorious social media
presence and the unclear ramifications of the internet for society make the group’s virtual
recruitment campaign an obvious suspect. However, the internet alone cannot explain the
international spread of ISIS. Just as ISIS is not unique in using the internet, it is also not
the first terrorist group or ideology to spread internationally.
The international diffusion of terrorism has occurred since its modern conception
(Parker and Sitter 2016; Sedgwick 2007; Rapoport 2004). Examining the prior cases of
terrorism spreading internationally demonstrates that the spread of ISIS is the newest
manifestation of a consistent aspect of terrorism, and that the internet’s responsibility for
this spread is limited to the degree to which it differs from the previous preferred medium
of terrorist groups, papers, pamphlets, books, and manifestos. As forms of the mass
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media, the internet and print are merely vessels for the spread of terrorist groups
internationally. The content that is transmitted and inspires terrorist behavior is as
important to understand as the mechanisms through which it spreads.
The spread of terrorism beyond national boundaries suggests a factor that is
beyond the scope of the local social structure of independent nations. This dissertation
proposes that the international diffusion of terrorism can be explained through cultural
factors. This cultural explanation of the international diffusion of terrorism focuses on
two specific aspects. First, it is argued here that cultural elements, such as norms, values,
beliefs, knowledge, and symbols, contribute to the adoption of terrorism. Second, these
cultural elements are argued to have spread internationally and inspired other groups
primarily through the mass media, and the characteristics of this spread has been
impacted by the development in communication technologies.
Specifically, this research found a common set of cultural elements present across
ISIS and terrorist groups historically. Furthermore, mass media sources that contain these
cultural elements have been consistently observed within the context of national terrorist
movements, as cited influences of terrorist groups within international waves of terrorism
and connect the international waves of terrorism through several central sources. The
common cultural elements of terrorism include the Role of the Revolutionist, an identity
to which terrorists aspire to that is characterized as romantic and heroic, is defined by
sacrifice, and describes the terrorist as an expert in all dimensions of revolutionary
warfare, from espionage to weaponry. In addition to this role, terrorist groups often
ascribe a value to their violence that extends beyond its utility in achieving social change.
Violence is viewed as necessary, obligatory, inherently good, and even therapeutic. This
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violence is supported by a set of interrelated beliefs and values that constitute the
morality of terrorism, which divides society into a battle between good and evil,
dehumanizes enemies, and defines violence as altruistic. The last cultural element of
terrorism is the pursuit and possession of The Truth – terrorists’ understanding of society,
its problems, and solutions.
In order to explain the cultural factors of terrorism, subculture theory is proposed
to explain the international spread of terrorism, including the recruitment of foreign
nationals and the development of groups within other nations. This topic is interesting
theoretically not only as a specific aspect of terrorism, but as an aspect that
fundamentally challenges many of the dominant theories of terrorism. A cultural
explanation, drawing from subculture theory, not only provides an explanation of
international diffusion of terrorism, but also provides an important mediating link
between the two dominant explanations of terrorism, strain and grievance theories and
rational choice models.
The role of culture in the adoption of terrorism and its international diffusion is
examined here using a mixed methods approach. This approach provides a robust
analysis of terrorism at multiple levels of analysis, addresses the shortcomings of each
individual part of the study, as well as enhancing them with additional context and
insights (Small 2011). Furthermore, adopting different methods is necessary to
understand the context and environment in which individuals adopt terrorism. The
radicalization of foreign nationals cannot be understood through their individual
characteristics alone, but requires an understanding of the environment that led to that
radicalization. The international spread of terrorism is not unique to the internet age or

3

Islamic fundamentalism, but is a historical trend, of which ISIS is merely the largest
contemporary example (Rapaport 2004). A virtual ethnography of ISIS’s online presence
will be undertaken to describe the environment of self-radicalization. The findings of this
study are contextualized by a comparative-historical analysis is proposed to examine the
linkages between and across the historical waves of terrorism.
Focusing specifically on the international diffusion of terrorism has several
distinct benefits. Within the literature on terrorism, the mechanisms through which it
spreads across nations has not been the focus of studies. Research has instead focused on
the national and individual characteristics, implicitly assuming that groups across nations
connected by an overarching ideology are independent of each other in their causes
(Krieger and Meierricks 2011; Victoroff 2005). Furthermore, the subject matter is
inherently important and timely. Self-radicalization, the internet, and so-called “lone
wolf” attacks are some of the defining features of contemporary terrorism, from ISIS to
the Neo-Nazi movement (Mueller 2006). Academically, this aspect of terrorism provides
a significant challenge to the dominant theoretical explanations. These explanations tend
to explain terrorism as arising out of societal and institutional conditions, but do not
readily explain the involvement of individuals outside those conditions. Theoretically,
providing an explanation that addresses this aspect of terrorism connects and reinforces
the major theories using culture as a mediating variable, as well as expanding and
updating subculture theory to this end.
1.1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY
This dissertation examines the role of culture in the adoption of terrorism and how
the spread of these cultural elements has contributed to the international diffusion of
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terrorism. This is undertaken to understand the contemporary issue of the international
threat posed by ISIS, as well as placing this modern problem in a larger socio-historical
context. ISIS has achieved a global reach, inspiring attacks internationally and attracting
recruits from around the world. The spread of ISIS has been facilitated through the
group’s use of the internet to broadcast its message and indoctrinate recruits. Research on
ISIS’s use of the internet to recruit and gain support has focused on narrowly on the
group’s use of Twitter, Telegram, or Youtube and the details of its doctrine, providing
detailed analyses of specific dimensions of the group (Andersen and Sandberg 2018;
Bloom, Tiflati, and Horgan 2017; Uberman and Shay 2016; Klausen 2015). This research
includes a specific analysis of the group’s official propaganda, which has highlighted the
framing done by the group to gain support as well as the subcultural style portrayed in its
depiction of the mujahidin (Andersen and Sandberg 2018). The attraction of foreign
support for ISIS is a part of a larger aspect of terrorism, its international diffusion.
ISIS is not the only terrorist group to spread internationally. The international
spread of terrorism has been a reoccurring characteristic of the phenomenon since its
modern inception. The anarchists spread from Russia at the turn of the 20th century,
followed by anticolonial movements in the wake of World War I, the global uprising of
the New Left, communist groups of the 1960’s, and the current era of terrorism that is
generally defined by religious goals (Rappaport 2004). These waves represent the
dominant periods of the international diffusion of terrorism, although they do not
encompass all terrorist groups that have existed or spread internationally (Park and Sitter
2016; Sedgwick 2007). Alternative conceptions of the spread of terrorism have proposed

5

a lineage approach, examining the spread of terrorism of different types, such as socialist
or nationalist, geographically and temporally (Park and Sitter 2016).
This dissertation focuses upon explaining the international diffusion of terrorism,
the spread of a terrorist group’s influence beyond its national origins, either by attracting
foreign support and recruits or inspiring groups and individuals to engage in terrorism.
Subculture theory provides an explanation of the international diffusion of terrorism as
the spread of cultural elements conducive to violence through communication interlocks,
mechanisms through which culture is transmitted. This explanation also provides a
mediating link between the dominant explanations of terrorism, but also provides a
means to understand the spread of terrorism in a digital age.
1.2 METHODOLOGY
To study role of culture in the international diffusion of terrorism, and the spread
of ISIS online specifically, this dissertation uses a mixed methods approach. First, a
virtual ethnography of ISIS was conducted, examining the group’s online presence and
the virtual environment in which individuals become radicalized. In order to provide the
necessary context to this virtual ethnography, a historical-comparative study was also
conducted. This allows this dissertation to compare the spread of ISIS through the
internet to the prior historical waves of international terrorism, discerning the unique
aspects of ISIS’s spread and the degree to which ISIS reflects the general patterns of how
terrorism spreads internationally. The use of the mixed methods approach provides a
useful means to ground the virtual ethnography of ISIS in its historical context, but it also
provides greater insights into how the previous waves of terrorism spread through the
detailed observations provided through the virtual ethnography. Taken together, these
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two studies, and the cross-analysis between them, provide robust, multi-dimensional
evidence supporting a subcultural explanation of terrorism.
In order to understand the role of the internet in the ISIS’s foreign recruitment and
inspired attacks, a virtual ethnography of the group’s online presence was engaged in
over the course of 2018 and 2019. This ethnography specifically focused on ISIS’s
presence on the traditional internet with the explicit goal of describing the groups
presentation of itself and the environment in which individuals are allegedly becoming
radicalized. The virtual ethnography of ISIS is limited in its generalizability, and alone it
is unclear what significant role the internet plays in the international spread of the group.
To address this, the second part of this study examines the prior waves of terrorism.
The second part of this dissertation is a comparative-historical study of terrorist
groups involved in the anarchist, anticolonial, and New Left waves of international
terrorism. Using secondary sources, a list of terrorist groups participating in these waves
is developed, after which detailed information about each group was collected.
Specifically, this research focused on information regarding the grievance and rational
choice explanations of terrorism, subcultural indicators, and the relationships between
groups and their influences. This data was then examined for overarching themes and
used to construct a social network of terrorist groups and their influences. As a result of
this data, the general support for a subcultural explanation of terrorism is demonstrated,
and the cultural elements that accompany these groups are traced across and between the
international waves of terrorism.
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1.3 FINDINGS
The purpose of this study was to determine the role of culture in the adoption of
terrorism and explain its international diffusion through the mechanisms that transmit
these cultural elements. Overall, this research has supported a cultural explanation of the
international diffusion of terrorism. The virtual ethnography of ISIS and the comparativehistorical study of the anarchist, anticolonial, and New Left waves of international
terrorism demonstrate a set of common cultural elements present across terrorist groups.
These elements include an identity in the Role of the Revolutionist, a Value of Violence,
the Morality of Terrorism, and a belief in the possession of The Truth. Both studies
illustrate the importance of the mass media as a means for the transmission of these
cultural elements. The virtual ethnography of ISIS illustrates how the internet has
facilitated the transmission of these cultural elements, as well as how this differs from
previous waves. The comparative-historical study demonstrates the consistent role of the
media in national contexts, as well as its role in the international spread of terrorism
throughout the waves. Furthermore, these cultural elements are represented in several
common sources that connect the international waves of terrorism.
The virtual ethnography of ISIS provides a holistic overview of the group’s online
existence to complement the prior detailed studies on specific dimensions of it. The
process of navigating ISIS’s online presence in the time period after the group has been
largely deplatformed relies on an understanding of the group’s language, the platforms on
which it still has a presence, and the tools that can be used to find its content. The actors
participating in the virtual caliphate are not uniform in their level of support or
engagement with the group, instead representing varying levels of supporters and

8

sympathizers, related social movements and communities, as well as critics and
antagonists. These various actors engage the material associated with ISIS to varying
degrees. These materials comprise the textual basis of ISIS online, including official
documents, videos, images, and music, which convey the narrative and doctrine of the
group. This narrative involves an account of history that revolves around conflict with the
West that is inevitably progressing towards an apocalyptic final conflict in which ISIS
will be victorious. Although essential to the group’s narrative, its apocalypticism is
among the aspects of ISIS that is shares with other Islamic and jihadist communities
(Filiu 2011). The unique aspects of ISIS’s doctrine are the group’s conception of Sharī’ah
and its implementation in the Islamic State, its emphasis on traveling to the Islamic State
as a fundamental part of the practice of Islam, and the group’s condemnation and
persecution of Muslims that do not subscribe to ISIS’s interpretation of Islam.
Several aspects of ISIS’s doctrine are reflected in the common cultural elements
found across the terrorist groups involved in the first international waves of terrorism.
These cultural elements include a terrorist identity that is glorified and defines members,
which is used to distinguish the groups from the larger social movements that they
emerge from. Terrorist groups also share a common set of beliefs and values that
comprise a moral justification of terrorism based on a criticism of state violence, the
altruistic motivations of terrorism, and a conception of their struggle as a battle between
good and evil. Furthermore, violence is rarely viewed purely in utilitarian terms, and is
often viewed as the necessary and sole means to achieve social change in addition to
providing therapeutic benefits for its perpetrator. These cultural elements are not limited
to the boundaries of terrorist groups and organizations but are distributed across larger
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national terrorist movements that include various individuals, groups, and organizations
including terrorists, supporters, and sympathizers. These national terrorist movements are
further connected to each other internationally through cooperation and their shared
influences and founding texts.
The elements that comprise the terrorist subculture are shared within the
individual waves of international terrorism through shared ideologies, texts, influences,
and examples. This has been observed through the frequent references by groups of their
influences, and the social network constructed on the basis of thee connections illustrates
that the first three international waves of terrorism are strongly interrelated in their
influences. This occurs primarily through the influence of Vladimir Lenin, who would be
influenced by, and participate in, the Russian populist movement that would contribute to
the anarchist wave. Marx and the Russian terrorists would influence the anticolonial and
New Left waves of terrorism through Lenin’s writings, and his influence on other
advocates of political violence. The shared cultural elements of terrorist groups and the
interrelatedness of their influences provides a strong basis for the explaining terrorism as
a product of cultural diffusion.
1.4 OUTLINE
In the next chapter, the research on the causes of international terrorism, its
diffusion, and the subcultural explanation for the phenomenon. Chapter Three provides
an overview of the methodology of this study, a mixed methods approach using a virtual
ethnography of ISIS in conjunction with a comparative-historical study of the
international waves of terrorism. In Chapter Four, the findings from the virtual
ethnography of ISIS are presented, describing the process of navigating the virtual
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caliphate, the online environment it exists in, and the doctrine of the group. Chapter Five
examines the common, overarching observations across terrorist groups involved in the
anarchist, anticolonial, and New Left waves of terrorism. These observations include the
fundamental characteristics common to terrorist groups in this sample, observations
related to the dominant explanations of terrorism, and a description of the common
cultural elements observed across terrorist groups. Chapter Six describes the connections
between the terrorist groups of the historical waves and their influences, tracing the
cultural elements discussed in the previous chapter to their origins in the Russian populist
movement. The findings of the virtual ethnography and comparative-historical study are
integrated in Chapter Seven, providing an examination of the evidence to support a
subcultural explanation of terrorism. The conclusions of this study are summarized in
Chapter Eight, as well as a discussion of the implications, limitations, and avenues of
future research.
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CHAPTER 2
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND SUBCULTURE THEORY
The international diffusion of terrorism has not been a major focus of research,
but is a defining characteristic of modern terrorism. The first part of this review examines
the international diffusion as it exists today, primarily in the form of foreign support for
ISIS, but also demonstrates that this is a part of a larger historical trend. After this
discussion, international terrorism and international diffusion are clearly defined within
this study. The major theoretical explanations of terrorism, the rational actor approach
and strain theory, are then examined, followed by a discussion of how subculture theory
can enhance and connect these theoretical perspectives.
This dissertation argues that international terrorism can be best understood using a
cultural framework that serves as a mediating factor between the major theoretical
explanations of the behavior, grievances and rationality. In defining international
terrorism, the primary focus of research has been on attacks occurring across national
boundaries, despite the history of global waves of terrorist groups inspired by an
overarching ideology (Krieger and Meierricks 2011; Victoroff 2005; Rapoport 2004). As
a consequence of this focus on transnational attacks, and the majority of terrorist groups
being domestic in nature, most of the current theories of terrorism are based on individual
and national level characteristics. The strain and grievance based theories argue that
problems rooted in the social structure motivate terrorist activities (Agnew 2010; LaFree
and Ackerman 2009; Krueger 2007). The rational choice models of terrorism, in contrast,
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focus on the adoption of terrorism as a response to the perceived costs and benefits of it
as a strategy (Alimi 2011; Oberschall 2004; Beck 2008; Brents and Mshigeni 2004). Both
perspectives offer incomplete explanations for the phenomenon that are made particularly
clear in the case of the international diffusion of terrorism. As a response, it is argued
here that a cultural explanation, building off of subculture theory, can connect these
approaches, provide a mediating link between the two, and provide an explanation of the
spread of terrorism across national borders.
2.1 DEFINING THE INTERNATIONAL DIFFUSION OF TERRORISM
The international diffusion of terrorism is an aspect of the phenomenon since its
modern conception. ISIS’s use of the internet to recruit globally is an evolution of this
general pattern of international terrorism, reflective of the changes in communications
technology. However, this is predominantly a change in form only, since several
international waves of terrorism have occurred throughout history. These historical
groups spread through older forms of the mass media, in addition to general migration,
using pamphlets and books to spread their message and inspire new groups in foreign
lands. Before examining this phenomenon in detail, it is first essential to define and
clarify terrorism and its international diffusion.
2.1.1 The Global Reach of ISIS
Terror attacks in the West are no longer characterized by the organizational
structure and extensive planning by foreign extremists that resulted in the 9/11 attacks.
Today, the perpetrators of terror attacks in the West are more likely to be citizens of those
nations, self-radicalized online through ISIS's social media campaign of propaganda,
alternate news, memes, and guides to facilitate communication with the group and carry
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out attacks (Frenkel 2016; Koerner 2016). From the shootings in San Bernardino,
California and the Pulse nightclub in Orlando to an attack on the London Bridge with a
van and knives, terror attacks in the West are now defined by the role of the internet in
the radicalization of the perpetrators (Frenkel 2016; Koerner 2016; Mueller 2006).
Attackers are only the tip of the iceberg, however, with ISIS attracting over
30,000 individuals to travel thousands of miles to Syria and Iraq to join the group
(Koerner 2016). In addition to those fighting directly, sympathizers further expand the
virtual impact of the group, adding to the group's online presence. ISIS has effectively
crowdsourced its online propaganda, giving up security and control over the message in
exchange for publicity and an effective social media presence (Koerner 2016). In 2016,
Google stated that over 50,000 users searched for the phrase 'join ISIS' every month 6
(Frenkel 2016).
The internet presence of ISIS is not limited to social media accounts and internet
memes. Literature and videos emphasize the group's 'utopian' aspects, and the group
attempts to present a positive image of itself to specific, targeted audiences across the
world (Frenkel 2016). The online presence is not even limited to explicit materials related
to the group. One source recounts a recruitment attempt through an online dating site
(Koerner 2016). The group's online presence is extensive, including both official sources
and support from sympathizers without a direct connection to the group, and has been
successful at inspiring attacks abroad and attracting foreign recruits.
A great deal of research focuses on understanding ISIS’s use of the internet. This
research is typically focused on particular ideological aspects of the group, a specific
publication of the group, or the group’s presence on specific platforms. Research
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examining one of ISIS’s official magazines, Dabiq, has found that it includes a range of
cultural elements and narratives to appeal and influence its audiences, while also
presenting a subcultural style the subcultural elements of provocation, violence,
machismo, and excitement seeking (Andersen and Sandberg 2018). Similarly, research
has focused on the group’s unique conception of the Islamic concept of hijrah, and the
implications this has for the group’s belief system (Uberman and Shay 2016). Other
research has focused on ISIS’s use of particular platforms. Klausen (2015) describes the
relationships between ISIS accounts on Twitter, examining how several central actors
significantly impact the distribution of ISIS materials. Bloom, Tiflati, and Horgan (2017)
focus on the Telegram app, examining the discussions among ISIS followers through the
apps and noting the dominance in discussion of doctrinal debate.
The spread of ISIS is consistent with larger societal changes in the wake of
advancements in communications technologies. The internet and social media have
produced an environment wherein there are few limitations in terms of space and time on
an individual’s access to information and exposure to other people, cultures, and ideas
(Kay 2018). This wide availability of content facilitates the aggregation of people around
common interests, narratives, and worldviews, resulting in homogenous and polarized
worldviews (Vicario et. al. 2016). As a result, one’s identity is arguably less shackled to
the limitations of one’s own immediate environment and social structure (Kay 2018).
Findings have shown that internet users tend to select and share content according to a
specific narrative and ignore other sources (Vicario et. al. 2016). Whether or not claims
are accepted is determined primarily by social norms and the claims’ adherence to an
individual’s belief system. In reference to terrorism, this suggests the importance of
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understanding the virtual environment in which individuals can find and adopt narratives
conducive to violence.
2.1.2 International Waves of Terrorism through History
This 'new' threat posed by terrorism is not without precedent. The history of
terrorism contains many examples of terrorist groups or ideologies expanding far beyond
their nation's borders. Of these, several epochs of international terrorism have been
observed. Over the course of almost two centuries the world has experienced four major
waves of terrorism, each characterized by the spread of a particular form of terrorist
ideology globally (Rapoport 2004). The anarchists originated in Russia and would spread
across Europe and beyond. A wave of separatist terrorism would fight against
colonialism in the following generation, and the communist groups would emerge all
around the world from the 1960s to the end of the century. Today, the current wave of
terrorism is characterized by religious ideologies, including Islamic fundamentalism but
also including cults and Christian fundamentalist groups (Rapoport 2004). According to
Parker and Sitter (2016), the wave theory of terrorism ignores a significant number of
terrorist groups that occur outside of the wave schema. They propose instead that four
variations of terrorism have developed and spread globally from a small number of
original innovators. Sedgwick (2007) argues for an alternative classification of the global
waves of terrorism, one that emphasizes a contagion based explanation of terrorism.
This history of terrorism includes many texts that each respective movement
would draw inspiration from, such as the infamous Mini-Manual of the Urban Guerilla of
the New Left terrorist groups from the 1970s (Carr 2007). Today, there are a cornucopia
of stories on individuals becoming self-radicalized online and aligning their actions to
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ISIS. This is a part of a larger phenomenon seen throughout the history of terrorism, a
change that is not unique to the Internet age and ISIS but an evolution of the relationship
between mass media and terrorist recruitment. Foreign recruitment, support, and the
adoption of terrorist ideologies have been hallmarks of terrorism since its modern
conception, albeit less studied than other aspects of larger phenomenon. Research on
terrorism has often focused instead on domestic terrorism or international terrorism in the
form of foreign based groups carrying out attacks in other nations or the international
cooperation of terrorist groups (Krieger and Meierrieks 2011).
2.1.3 Defining International Terrorism
There is considerable debate surrounding the definition of terrorism. Almost
every government, organization, and researcher has developed a unique definition of
terrorism (Beck and Miner 2013; Thomas 2004). Furthermore, international terrorism has
been defined in practice primarily by whether or not attacks are perpetrated by foreign
groups. As a consequence, other qualities of international terrorism have been excluded
from analysis, particularly the spread of groups and their ideologies as well as the
recruitment of foreigners to their cause.
Turk (2004) has argued for a definition of terrorism based on the randomness of
the victims and the intent to influence a third party, while also recognizing the politically
oriented social construction of acts as terrorism (Oliverio 2005). Organizational
differences in how terrorism is defined demonstrate the influence of group ideology,
targets and tactics (Beck and Miner 2013; Thomas 2004). An approach to studying
terrorism as a form of deviance and criminality is fruitful in moving beyond its political
nature. In comparing terrorism to crime, Lafree and Dugan (2004) observe that the two

17

are similar, with the major distinctions being the altruistic orientation of terrorists, their
motivations, and the absence of a specific crime of terrorism. For the purposes of this
discussion terrorism is defined as nonstate actors using actual or threatened violence
against persons or property in the pursuit of a political, social, or religious goal. This
definition benefits from a focus on the unique features of terrorism as agenda motivated,
non-state violence without including assumptions about a group’s tactics, strategy, goals,
or morality.
International terrorism denotes cooperation, support, attacks, movement and/or
recruitment across nation-state boundaries, or involving a collaboration between two
groups across national boundaries. Most research on international terrorism has focused
on attacks that originate from a group based in a foreign nation or national characteristics
that are the product of a nation’s international relations and position in the global order
(Krieger and Meierricks 2011). The spread of a terrorist ideology or groups across
national borders has largely been left unstudied. Despite the lack of attention that this
aspect of international terrorism has received, it has been a significant characteristic in
the history of international terrorism. In describing the international waves of terrorism,
Rapoport (2004) demonstrates that there have been major periods wherein a particular
terrorist ideology or group has spread globally. Furthermore, cases of foreign support and
the international diffusion of groups not associated with these major waves have also
been observed.
2.2 EXPLANATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
The dominant explanations of the causes of terrorism explain it as a product of
societal strains or as the result of rational actors in political situations where terrorism is
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seen as a productive strategy. The strain and rational choice theories of terrorism are not
incompatible with a subculture theory of terrorism. The cultural approach to
understanding terrorism provides a bridge between the two theories, as well as
strengthening these theories by providing a mediating factor in their impact on terrorism.
2.2.1 Rational Choice and Terrorism
Rational actor theories of terrorism argue that individuals and groups, typically
involved in a social movement, adopt terrorism in the course of pursuing a social,
political, or religious agenda when other means are ineffective or unavailable and the
costs of terrorism are low (Alimi 2011; Oberschall 2004; Beck 2008; Brents and
Mshigeni 2004). This approach is based on 3 core assumptions; 1) terrorists possess
stable political preferences, 2) they evaluate the expected political payoffs of their
available options, 3) they adopt terrorism only when the expected political return is
superior to alternative options (Abrahms 2008). Additional research has focused on
institutional factors that condition the costs and benefits of terrorism and the relational
dynamics between groups in society (Crenshaw 1981; Krieger and Meierrieks 2011;
Beck 2008; Brents and Mshigeni 2004; Alimi 2011; Goodwin 2009).
This theory lacks an explanation for the goals of terrorists, or their evaluation of
the feasibility or effectiveness of a terrorist campaign. Some researchers have
demonstrated that the rational actor model only applies to terrorism under particular
conditions (Abrahms 2008). Furthermore, the theory requires reduced assumptions when
applied to terrorism, in part due to the irrational beliefs associated with terrorist groups
(Caplan 2006). In addition to these direct criticisms, understanding the perceptions and
beliefs of terrorist groups is necessary to understand their decision calculus (Crenshaw
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1981). Perceptions, beliefs, and ideologies are cultural products, and are essential to a
complete explanation of terrorist groups since these factors structure their decisions
(Hamm 2004; Arena and Arrigo 2005; Beck 2008).
2.2.2 Strains and Grievances
The strain explanation of terrorism possesses mixed empirical support, but
remains an enduring theoretical explanation of terrorism (Agnew 2010). Strain theories
explain terrorism as the product of social grievances, collective problems, or negative
social conditions. Specifically, Agnew (2010) argues strains that are high in magnitude,
unjust, and inflicted by more powerful others are argued to increase the likelihood of
terrorism. The negative consequences of globalization, economic development, material
deprivation, inequality, lack of opportunity, education level, human rights offenses, and
feelings of alienation or humiliation have all been examined as potential determinants of
terrorism with varying levels of empirical support (Krieger and Daniel Meierricks 2011;
Agnew 2010; Krueger 2007; LaFree and Ackerman 2009; Nasser 2005; Krueger and
Maleckova 2003; Abadie 2006; Feldman and Perala 2004; Stern 2003). In a survey of
American terrorists, Smith (1994) noted considerable variability in socio-economic status
across individuals in various types of groups, despite homogeneity within the different
types of groups.
However, it appears that strains are not a sufficient or necessary cause of
terrorism (LaFree and Ackerman 2009). Many individuals experience collective strains,
but only a small proportion engage in terrorism. The adoption of terrorism as a coping
mechanism to a collective strain is influenced by additional factors including the
anticipated costs and benefits of terrorism as well as the beliefs and affiliations of the
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individual (Agnew 2010). Why a specific coping mechanism, such as terrorism, is chosen
over others, however, is often beyond the scope of the theory.
2.2.3 Rationality, Grievances, and International Terrorism
The rational actor and strain perspectives primarily focus on terrorism as a
product of national characteristics and processes. Most research does not directly address
international terrorism in the form of foreign diffusion and recruitment, instead implicitly
assuming all terrorist groups that develop emerge from the national socio-historical
context. Rational actor approaches focus on institutional factors that influence the
cost/benefit analysis of terrorism and the interactions between social movements and
other groups, both of which are unique to each nation. Strain and grievance explanations
are similarly rooted in socio-economic and demographic characteristics that are unique to
each nation. These theories do not address the diffusion of groups internationally or the
recruitment of foreign nationals. The major historical waves of terrorism have illustrated
that a group or ideology established in one nation can spread globally and in nations with
fundamentally different social and political conditions (Rapaport 2004). Foreign recruits
and supporters are embedded in societies with their own unique social and institutional
conditions distinct from those that produced the original group. An explanation finding
the root of terrorism in the social structure cannot readily explain its transplantation.
Furthermore, among the most supported determinants of international terrorism have
been contagion factors, such as geographic proximity to a country with a terrorist group
or a history of terrorism internally (Krieger and Meierricks 2011).
Applying subculture theory to terrorism addresses the theoretical gaps that exist in
these explanations of terrorism. Subcultures are theorized to be coping mechanisms to
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collectively experienced strain (Cohen 1955; Miller, Schreck, and Tewksbury 2006;
Einstadter and Henry 2006). Deviant behavior is the product of socialization into a
subculture, including beliefs, values, and ideologies. The theory is easily integrated into
the current approaches by providing a mediating link between strains and a coping
behavior as well as an explanation for the beliefs, values, and ideologies that condition
decisions. Furthermore, international diffusion and foreign recruitment of terrorism can
be explained by subculture theory by approaching terrorism as a cultural ‘tool’ that
provides a solution to the grievances of groups and individuals.
2.3 SUBCULTURE THEORY REFORMULATED
Ferracuti (1982) has perhaps been the first theorist to propose a subcultural
explanation of terrorism, but Hamm (1993) presents the first study specifically involving
terrorism and subcultures. In his study on neo-Nazis, Hamm (1993, 2004) found that the
neo-Nazi subculture was a major influence on individuals’ participation in terrorism, and
further demonstrated that the degree to which the individual was integrated into the neoNazi subculture was positively associated with terrorist actions (Hamm 1995). Further
research on hate crimes and their connection to terrorism has drawn attention to the
importance of group identities and normative behaviors (Mills, Freilich, and Chermak
2017). Although there is scant research particularly focused on a subcultural explanation
of terrorism, the concept has been frequently invoked in discussion on the topic as a
mediating factor.
Although subculture theory provides a theoretical answer to the gaps in the
current theoretical explanations, the theory has developed unevenly throughout its history
(Blackman 2014). This section reviews subculture theory and augments it with current
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research and theoretical perspectives. First, the history of the theory and its general
explanation for deviant behavior is reviewed. This is followed by examining the relevant
mechanisms of the theory at the individual, group, national, and historical levels.
2.3.1 Introducing Subculture Theory
Subculture theory argues that interacting individuals develop cultural adaptations
to address the strain that they collectively experience due to their position in the social
system (Cohen 1955; Miller, Schreck, and Tewksbury 2006; Einstadter and Henry 2006).
The consequent deviant behavior is a product of socialization into a subculture containing
norms, values, and beliefs that are considered deviant (Einstadter and Henry 2006). In
order to apply subculture theory to terrorism, a cohesive framework must first be
established, since its theoretical development has been uneven (Blackman 2014). This
dissertation integrates the current research and knowledge from the perspective of social
network analysis to organize the relevant research on subcultures and their relationship to
terrorism, provide a basis to understand the micro-, meso-, macro-, and historical level
links within the theory, and to elaborate on the theory’s relationship with the strain and
rational actor perspectives on terrorism.
Subcultures are defined as cultural systems, containing norms, roles, values,
beliefs, knowledge, and artifacts, that deviate from the parent culture and are distributed
through social networks, to which membership is claimed. According to Fine and
Kleinman (1979) the distinguishing characteristics of subcultures are: 1) the peculiar
cultural components; and 2) the social network as the referent for a subculture’s
boundaries. Although values are often the dominant focus of subculture studies, cultural
components may also refer to norms (Fine and Kleinman 1979), roles (Hunt 2008),
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specialized knowledge (Downing 2010), language (Holt 2009), style of dress and
mannerisms, beliefs, and artifacts (Williams 2007). Subcultures exist as these cultural
elements distributed and shared across social networks. Finally, the membership
component distinguishes individuals that know of the subculture from those that are a
part of it and distinguishes subcultures from other localized cultures.
Taking social networks as the basis of the theoretical framework provides
conception and understanding of society that the ideas of subculture theory can build
upon. Society is viewed as the totality of all the relationships between people. A group
exists as the relationships between its members. The nation-state exists as the
relationships and interactions between these groups, and the logic can extend further to
the global setting. A final element to add to this foundation of a framework is the
recognition of time and space in which the above relationships exist. Partially this
approach builds off of the work of Simmel (as described by Janowitz [1975]) and Mead
(1925) in its focus on group memberships and interactions as the basis of society and
subcultures (Fine and Kleinman 1979). Building off of this theory of society provides the
advantage of avoiding the tendency to reify subcultures and the mainstream, serving as a
means to organize the disparate works relevant to subculture theory, and modeling how
the levels of analysis are linked.
2.3.2 Individuals in Subcultures and Society
At the individual level, four elements determine participation in subcultures and
the consequent deviant behavior: 1) the social position in society, 2) the social position in
subculture, 3) degree of socialization into the subculture, and 4) behavior as a result of
that socialization. In this context, social position is referring to the socio-economic and
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demographic status of individuals, as well as their position within social networks. The
connection of individuals to larger societal factors of subcultures and the social structure
is therefore the product of their location within these larger entities.
Drawing a direct connection to strain theory, the motivating force in participation
in subcultures are problems or issues that the individual is facing. Subcultures are
theorized to provide a solution, or coping mechanism, to these problems. Furthermore, it
is specifically collectively experienced strains that produce subcultures, since collective
strains by definition produce problems that are shared by individuals occupying a similar
position within society. Alienation, desire to avoid gender and sexuality norms, and
technological fascination contributed to the attractiveness of the rave scene to individuals
(Anderson 2009). Similarly, Schafer, et al. (2013) describe four initial sources of impetus
in the pathways to becoming White supremacists: personal victimization, political
grievances, incremental involvement, and personal attachment to a member. Shared
experiences and collective problems are the initial basis of the individual motivation to
participate in a subculture, since they (sometimes ostensibly) provide a solution or a
means to cope with problems (Cohen 1955). This is consistent with the role of the
internet in theories of radicalization, which note the internet can provide ideological
support for isolated individuals, serve as an area where they can consume and contribute
to a discourse, provide networking opportunities to find and interact with others, and that
the internet is a ready source for informational and educational materials (King and
Taylor 2011).
Second, the individual’s position within social networks is a defining factor in
exposure to, and participation in, subcultures. Previous contacts have been noted as
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potential pathways into a subculture, such as the workplace, events (raves, concerts, gun
shows), family (Schafer, Mullins and Box 2013), and other relationships prior to
involvement. This illustrates the importance of social influence on entering a subculture,
which has support from the research on peers and delinquency that argue peers provide
delinquent definitions of situations that influence others (Sutherland 1955, Haynie 2002;
Haynie and Osgood 2005). Studies on subcultures around swinging, drug use and sexual
practices illustrate how behaviors and identities that are rare, risky, or stigmatized thrive
on the Internet, in part due to how it facilitates contact between isolated members
(Griffiths and Frobish 2013; Frederick and Perrone 2014). While many factors can
contribute to how individuals move across social networks or are influenced by their
peers (Pearson and West 2003), the importance of identity should be recognized. White
supremacists sometimes participate in several groups until they find one that best fits
their perspective (Schafer, et al. 2013). Moral orientations have been found to be
influential in the formation of the individual's' network of friends (Vaisey and Lizardo
2010).
In addition to the individual's social position, social influences, and identity, the
position in relation to the group must also be understood. Membership is not uniform, and
varies in regards to roles or statuses within the subculture as well as commitment and
involvement. Anderson (2009) finds several forms of membership, or status, in the rave
scene differentiated by the relation to the means of production, involvement in the scene,
and appreciation for the music. A study of a militia group uncovered similar diversity in
the roles and statuses within the group, ranging from “true believers” to “fellow
travelers” (Melder 2014). This should emphasize that all members are not involved or
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committed to the group to the same degree, and even within the group there may be
distinctions amongst members, and that influence within a subculture is connected to
these social positions. In noting understudied areas on terrorism, Waldman (2008)
specifically discusses the importance of “the radical milieu”, or the segment of the
population that sympathizes and supports terrorist groups morally and logistically.
Deviant behavior is argued to be a product of the degree to which deviant norms,
beliefs, and values have been internalized by the individual. Previous research has
demonstrated the influence of subcultural involvement on violence and delinquency
particularly, and deviant behavior more generally (Stewart and Simons 2010; Hunt 2008;
Bernburg and Thorlindsson 2005; Kennedy and Baron 1993; Heimer 1997; Hartnagel
1980; Austin 1980). This is mediated by an individual’s level of involvement with a
subculture (Hamm 1995; Smith 1979; Hunt 2008; Bernburg and Thorlindsson 2005).
This provides a basis of integration with the rational actor models, since culture and
social networks have been argued to be mediating factors in explaining the behavior of
rational actors (Pescolido 1992; Spickard 1998). This socialization aspect has been
observed in terrorism research before. In his work on the Red Brigades (BR), Orsini
(2011) discusses the ideology of the Italian terrorists as exhibiting a religious mindset,
and that the process of becoming a terrorist involved the learning how to dehumanize the
enemy, the evilness of the world, and the value of violence.
2.3.3 Scenes, Subcultures, and Social Networks
There are two distinct, interrelated levels that are important at the meso-level of
analysis. Subcultures are larger entities comprised of connections between local level
groupings, including friend groups, scenes, and idiocultures. The most important units of
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analysis here are the local groupings and scenes, their relationship to each other, and how
this comprises an overarching subculture, and how the relationships and overlapping
group memberships influence the spread of subcultures. With reference to international
terrorism, it is at this level that the internet and older forms of mass media become major
elements of analysis as the connecting links between various groups.
Fine and Kleinman (1979) argued to root the concept of subculture in
interactionist analysis, by recognizing its existence across a social network and the
conditions that enabled its spread or cohesion across geographical space. They first
recognize that people have multiple group memberships, and that these memberships
often overlap. From this point, they discuss “communication interlocks”, the mechanisms
of cultural diffusion that enable a subculture to spread beyond its locality. They list
multiple group memberships, weak ties, structural roles, and media diffusion as types of
communication interlocks, mechanisms that condition cultural transmission (Fine and
Kleinman 1979). The Internet represents a new form of mass media communication
interlock, distinct in that everyone has the means of mass communication and it allows
for greater interaction across geographical distances.
Anderson (2009) observed consistency and unity across rave scenes from
Philadelphia to London and Spain, as well as among participants coming from many
other nations. Schafer, et al. (2013) observed that White supremacists were frequently
exposed to racist ideologies through networks or through the Internet, and that members
often passed through several groups. Futrell, Simi, and Gottschalk (2006) as well as
Anderson (2009) have noted that local scenes of interaction are complemented with
online participation and attending large scale events uniting local groups from around a
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region can serve as a means to maintain unity across a diaspora of local groups. In
explaining the persistence of White Power activist in the US, Futrell and Simi (2004) find
the same form in the relationships between the local, virtual, and global, arguing that the
Internet is critical as a free space, an area where racial ideologies can be shared without
stigmatization, and that these free spaces contribute to the maintenance of a collective
identity.
2.3.4 The Macro-Level and Beyond
There are three distinct levels of analysis at the macro-level. The national level is
comprised of the relationships of organizations and subcultures, the distribution of
problems according to social class, racial and ethnic status, and other characteristics, and
the institutional environment, such as the form of government. The international level is
composed of the relationships and interactions between nations, including war,
colonization, trade, and migration. Within this dissertation, these macro-level factors are
important for their relationship to structuring the distribution of strains and grievances
within a society, and for placing the competing hypotheses of strain and rational actor
theories within the context of the current analysis.
The historical dimension is included as the history of interactions along the above
levels of analysis (i.e. a history of colonization, or a history of a social movement). With
reference to terrorism and social movements more generally, historical context has been
found to be a influential factor. For rational actor theories, the historical dimension is
important in understanding decisions that take into 19 account the previous actions by
governments and counter-movements. In social movements, historical events have taken
an important symbolic importance (Armstrong and Crage 2006). In addition to a
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symbolic importance of events, several terrorist groups have had long histories marked
by periodic revivals. The most known examples would be the Ku Klux Klan [KKK] and
the Irish Republican Army [IRA], both of which have had multiple incarnations in the
last century and can trace their histories to earlier social movements (Hart 2005; Coogan
2002; Trelease 1995).
The KKK and the IRA represent examples of how older movements can be
revived to deal with (at the time) modern problems. Within this cultural framework, this
is argued to be an example of a cultural tool, a strategy or technique that exists in the
collective consciousness that can be applied to a given situation (DiMaggio 1997). There
is considerable support for approaching culture not as a monolithic and coherent entity,
but as a collection of elements, such as techniques, strategies, and practices, that
individuals have a knowledge of and can apply to a given situation (DiMaggio 1997).
Integrating this concept with subculture theory, it is expected that individuals aware of
cultural elements represented in texts and examples that inspire terrorism can and will be
applied by individuals and groups to collective problems. Although the examples of the
KKK and IRA reflect the ideology and tactics as cultural tools adapted across generations
within a society (Hart 2005; Coogan 2002; Trelease 1995), this dissertation argues that
terrorism, in general, can be understood as a set of cultural tools that have been adapted
and transformed by various groups and movements over the course of the last two
centuries.
2.4 CONCLUSIONS
ISIS is the latest incarnation of the international diffusion of terrorism, and the
group’s proficient use of the internet to spread their message highlights the importance of
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understanding the unique role of the internet on terrorism. ISIS, however, is only a new
manifestation of a long running aspect of international terrorism, its spread beyond its
geographic and temporal origins. To fully understand the unique dimensions of ISIS and
the internet’s relationship to terrorism, this dissertation focuses on the development of a
virtual ethnography to understand the online environment in which radicalization occurs.
This ethnography requires the historical context of the international diffusion of terrorism
in order to accurately clarify the unique aspects of ISIS and its internet use, as well as the
degree to which this ethnography’s findings may be considered relevant to other groups.
In the next chapter, the methodology of this study is described.
This study examines the international diffusion of terrorism, both historical and
modern, using the framework of subculture theory to structure data collection and the
analysis. Subculture theory is uniquely suited to explaining the international diffusion of
terrorism given its focus on the mechanisms through which culture spreads, is adopted,
and adapted to local circumstances. As such, the international diffusion of terrorism
perfectly illustrates the unique contribution of the theory to the study of terrorism, in
addition to its potential as a mediating link between the two dominant explanations of
terrorism.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY
This dissertation proposes to use multiple methods to determine the support for
subculture theory in its application to terrorism. Mixed methods approaches provide
stronger empirical evidence by complementing research methods, studying a relationship
along multiple methods or contexts, or using different methods better inform another
methodological approach (Small 2011). The first part of this research will focus on a
virtual ethnography of ISIS, describing the virtual environment through which the group
allegedly attracts foreign members as well as examining the culture of the group as
presented through the internet to western audiences. In the second part of this study, a
comparative-historical methodology is used to examine the larger phenomenon of the
international diffusion of terrorism. This research provides an overview of how terrorism
has spread internationally historically by examining three major waves of terrorism. By
studying the present spread of terrorism through the internet in conjunction with the
historical approach, the current issue of terrorism and its spread through the internet is
placed in the context of other major terrorist epidemics. Conversely, the study of the
historical waves of terrorism benefits from the study of ISIS online by providing an
examination of how the spread of terrorism has changed with the advent of terrorism.
3.0.1 The Advantages of Mixed Methods
In addition to directly addressing the theoretical expectations at multiple levels of
analysis, examining evidence across multiple studies provides a more holistic overall
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analysis. The online presence of ISIS can be contrasted with the previous spread of other
terrorist groups through older forms of the mass media. This would provide necessary
context for understanding the unique aspects of terrorism in the internet age.
Additionally, comparing ISIS’s cultural and mass media aspects to those of previous
movements would demonstrate a pattern of cultural factors in the spread of terrorism
across these mediums.
The historical-comparative analysis can inform on the role of culture and mass
media on the spread of terrorism, but these findings are potentially invalid with the
development of the internet age. The continued validity of historical research on
terrorism can therefore be examined by comparing the historical experience with
terrorism to the present conditions. Similarly, historical observations on terrorism can
provide a point of comparison to provide a degree of generalizability to the present
research focused on ISIS.
Furthermore, comparing the evolution of terrorist groups’ historical use of the
mass media in the past to the internet age can illuminate how the present differs from the
past. ISIS has distinguished itself as the major terrorist innovator in the use of the internet
(Frenkel 2016; Koerner 2016). By comparing the observations of their online presence to
the mass media use of previous international terrorist movements the unique aspects of
the medium can be demonstrated, as well as how ISIS online parallels earlier forms of the
mass media. Overall, the comparative-historical analysis establishes the trend of terrorist
groups spreading internationally and provides context to examining contemporary
terrorism through the ethnography of ISIS.
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3.1 A VIRTUAL ETHNOGRAPHY OF ISIS
The first part of this dissertation is a virtual ethnography of ISIS’s online
presence. The central focus of this dissertation has been the influence of culture on the
adoption of terrorism, and the mass media mechanisms through which this culture is
transmitted. While the comparative-historical research can shed light on the historical
trends in the international diffusion of terrorism, the contemporary era has been defined
largely by ubiquity of the internet and the ramifications of this development in the mass
media (Aiken 2016). Although the increasing reach of terrorist groups to gain direct
exposure to possible recruits poses a significant issue, it also represents a unique
opportunity to study the radicalization process in its own environment. Therefore, a
virtual ethnography of ISIS was conducted to investigate its online presence, specifically
focused on describing the online environment in which individuals allegedly become
radicalized and the messages communicated within this environment. To accomplish an
ethnography on an amorphous entity like the virtual caliphate, several entry points to the
research field site are utilized. This ethnography provides the most direct and holistic
insights into the messages and texts that are consumed by those radicalized online, and,
when used in conjunction with the research from the comparative-historical study, can
give new insights into the role of the mass media in international terrorism.
The extant literature on ISIS’s online presence has focused narrowly on specific
aspects of the group’s ideology or its presence on specific platforms (Andersen and
Sandberg 2018; Bloom, Tiflati, and Horgan 2017; Uberman and Shay 2016; Klausen
2015). This research has examined the unique interpretation of hijrah (emigration) by
ISIS, its presence on Twitter, Arabic language Youtube, or one of the group’s propaganda
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magazines. These studies have provided invaluable insights on ISIS’s use of the internet,
but the focus on a single dimension or platform inhibits a holistic understanding of how
ISIS operates across virtual spaces. Prior research on online communities and virtual
worlds has demonstrated that participants rarely limit themselves to a single platform,
whether it is a video game, community forum, or content sharing platform (Boellstorff et.
al. 2012; Boellstorff 2008). Often, participants whose community is centered on one
platform or topic also engage with other community members across a series of
platforms, including but not limited to blogs, social media sites, forums, and other related
websites. An understanding of online communities therefore also necessitates an
understanding of how these communities exist across multiple virtual spaces.
Ethnographic methods are especially suited to establishing such an understanding, due to
their usefulness in collecting and analyzing unstructured data and focus on a holistic
understanding of specific social settings and locations (Reeves, Kuper, and Hodges 2008;
Boellstorff et. al. 2012).
The central aim of ethnographic research is to produce detailed, holistic insights
of the views and actions of individuals acting within particular social contexts
(Hammersly 2006; Reeves, Kuper, and Hodges 2008; Boellstorff et. al. 2012). This is
accomplished through first-hand observation of what participants say and do within these
natural settings by collecting detailed observations, typically through natural observation,
participant and non-participant observation, interviews, and the study of related
documents. Ethnographic methods are therefore the best suited to developing a holistic
understanding of ISIS Online and the worldview portrayed within it.
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However, the nature of this internet community precludes the use of interviews
and participant observation for the majority of actions involved. This does not invalidate
the ethnographic approach however, since the social context being studied is the virtual
environment presented by ISIS itself and this can be achieved primarily through nonparticipant observation used in other online ethnographies (Hammersly 2006; Reeves,
Kuper, and Hodges 2008; Williams 2008; Boellstorff et. al. 2012). Since the goal of this
study is to describe this virtual environment, non-participant observation approaches are
sufficient to chronicle the virtual caliphate. In addition to this, the researcher was also
engaged in participant observation to a limited degree, describing the process of
navigating, recognizing, and becoming immersed in the virtual caliphate. Describing ISIS
Online necessitates this degree of participating in the process of becoming radicalized
through ISIS’s virtual environment, even though it does not include complete
participation through interpersonal interaction with other participants or the production
and dissemination of content supportive of ISIS.
3.1.1 A Case Study of the Virtual Caliphate
This dissertation argues that individuals participate in ISIS as a result of
socialization into a subculture that is spread primarily through a single communication
interlock--the internet. ISIS’s online presence is argued to be a representation of a unique
subculture, and therefore it is expected that this ethnography will demonstrate that ISIS
online reflects a cohesive set of norms, beliefs, values, symbols, knowledge, and claim to
an identity. In addition to these core elements, subcultures frequently also involve a
unique social structure defined by participants commitment to the subcultural lifestyle
(Anderson 2009; Melder 2014).
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Within the literature studying the impact of the internet on society, the connection
between virtual engagement and offline behavior is subject of considerable debate (Aiken
2016). A growing literature is establishing the internet as not only a ubiquitous aspect of
modern life, but also impactful in offline behavior and the development of new social
problems involving crimes defined by the internet (Aiken 2016). For this dissertation, the
connection between behaviors supporting ISIS and online engagement has been a
defining feature. Foreign ISIS participants often have no direct contact to the
organization, and the direct contacts that do occur appear to happen primarily through the
use of the internet. Foreign recruitment through the internet is therefore an interesting
case study in the impact of the internet, since geographic distance, the clandestine nature
of the group, and the rarity of the behavior precludes the influence of offline contact.
ISIS presents an excellent case for this research, since it is a specific
manifestation of the religious wave of terrorism, connecting it to the proposed historical
research, as well as being the dominant example of how terrorism spreads internationally
through the internet. The previous historical waves of terrorism are argued here to have
spread, in part, through the mass media of the time, particularly in the form of texts and
pamphlets. The internet reflects a fundamental change in the characteristics of the mass
media and its dissemination, since the technology has enabled anyone to broadcast a
message to a wide audience (Jenkins 2008; Burgess and Green 2009). Major international
terrorist groups with a large internet presence are limited. Al-Qaeda, ISIS, and
Anonymous have been the most prevalent on the internet (Koerner 2016; Coleman 2015;
Mueller 2006). Al-Qaeda had a significant online presence, producing an online
magazine named Inspire in 2010 and utilizing the dark web (Larabee 2015). ISIS,
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however, has distinguished itself through its sophisticated use and understanding of social
media (Farwell 2014).
Anonymous, although defined by governments as a terrorist group, may be better
characterized as a social movement due to its methods revolving around hacking
primarily as well as legitimate social protests (Coleman 2015), Furthermore, the group
did not spread internationally in the traditional sense, but instead evolved directly out of
interactions and communities online (Coleman 2015). The focus of this research is on
how groups spread beyond their originating nation, so a group that emerged directly from
interactions online is distinct from the focus of this research, but also a further extension
of it.
The central question of why individuals from fundamentally different social
backgrounds adopt shared causes originating in different societies is highlighted in the
case of ISIS. The group has its ideological roots in a small, fundamentalist sect of Islam
that is largely maligned by the dominant sects of the religion (Warrick 2015; McCants
2015). In addition, ISIS has been extremely hostile to other Islamic sects within its
territories (Warrick 2015; McCants 2015), and has put effort into appearing as brutal as
possible, drawing criticisms from even al-Qaeda for its brutality and treatment of other
Muslims (Warrick 2015; McCants 2015). With ISIS, the question is not only why
individuals join foreign causes, but why do individuals join foreign causes that they likely
do not share a religion with and are largely depicted as brutal and inhumane (Warrick
2015; McCants 2015). Furthermore, ISIS has become known for its innovation in
attracting members online through a massive social media campaign comparable to
Western corporations (Koerner 2016).
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3.1.2 Field Site
The field site for this virtual ethnography is ISIS online, also referred to as the
virtual caliphate—the collection of accounts, communications (public posts, tweets, etc.),
images and memes, texts, and videos that are officially and unofficially supporting ISIS
and facilitating communications amongst its supporters across various internet platforms.
Taking a holistic approach to understanding ISIS online complements prior research
examining the group’s presence on specific platforms by examining how the group exists
across multiple platforms and virtual environments (Andersen and Sandberg 2018;
Bloom, Tiflati, and Horgan 2017; Uberman and Shay 2016; Klausen 2015). Although this
ethnography takes a more holistic approach to studying the virtual caliphate, this study is
limited to the virtual caliphate across the traditional internet, websites that are navigated
using a traditional internet browser. This excludes other, related platforms such as the
deep web and communication apps available on phones. The scope of this ethnography is
limited to the English language content and platforms of the virtual caliphate, and it is
unclear what differences exist between ISIS’s virtual environments across different
languages. Notably, the content and its translations used for this research are produced
officially by ISIS or unofficially by its supporters, and therefore this ethnography is based
on how the group itself presents itself to an English-speaking audience. Since the chaotic
nature of the internet and clandestine nature of the group contribute to ISIS online’s
amorphous nature, several entry points are utilized to gain a comprehensive
understanding of the entity.
The first point of entry was the official materials posted by ISIS. The most
infamous of these materials are their propaganda videos, but the group has also produced
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online magazines and other official materials. Official representations of ISIS provide the
characteristics, strategies, and position of the formal organization, prior to the creation
and dissemination of unofficial texts and materials in support of the organization. From
this initial point, additional platforms and materials referenced by the group will be
investigated, expanding the coverage of ISIS online.
The second point of entry was the discourse on ISIS online, based on news
coverage as well as statements and investigations by government organizations, private
companies, and research institutions. This entry point has three benefits. First, it provides
new search terms, platforms, and materials to investigate and increase the overall
coverage of ISIS online. Second, it provides an overview of ISIS online, its relationship
with platforms, materials that are no longer available, investigator experiences interacting
with ISIS online, and the efforts to combat it. Finally, examining the coverage of ISIS
online provides information on the history of the entity and how it has changed over time.
This is necessary since there have been significant efforts to disrupt ISIS online, and
consequently the field that is observed in the course of this research is not the one
engaged in by earlier participants.
Based on these points of entry, an initial understanding of the group, its symbols,
and the platforms through which it uses to communicate was established. This knowledge
was then used to find further content related to ISIS across the internet. Prior research has
shown that terrorist groups have used symbols and shared meanings in order to recognize
other adherents to their cause (Hegghammer 2013). Successful communication through
symbols or other marks are essential in recruitment for a clandestine organization and
also to prevent infiltration (Hegghammer 2013). In reference to ISIS, undercover
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documentarians were able to find and contact ISIS supporters through shared
understandings that indicated their support for the group (Potts 2015). In the same way,
ISIS online can be explored through the initial understanding established through the
primary and secondary sources on its online presence.
3.1.3 Data Collection
The goal of this ethnography is to describe the culture and environment of ISIS
online, and to understand it from the point of view of foreign recruits and supporters
(Berg 2007). Specifically, this ethnography is targeted at understanding why ISIS, despite
its brutality, niche religious beliefs, and embeddedness in foreign conflict, appeals to
Western audiences. Since the ISIS online as an entity is too large and amorphous to study
comprehensively, this ethnography takes a tiered approach to attempt to get the most
holistic understanding of the entity as possible.
The primary data to understand the worldview presented by ISIS online includes
the official materials published by the group and the unofficial content produced by
supporters and sympathizers. The official materials used in this analysis include two
books, four instructional manuals, three newsletters, twenty-five magazine issues across
two titles, a hour-long documentary, two music videos, several songs and videos, and
countless images valorizing the ISIS and it’s fighters. Unofficial materials primarily
included images promoting ISIS, republishing official ISIS content in different formats,
and occasionally unofficial statements on how to act in accordance with ISIS doctrine. In
addition to the content analyzed in this research, the data collected here include notes and
observations from over 100 hours of non-participant observation of ISIS online and the
process of finding ISIS content online over the course of a year. To understand the scale,
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history, and context of ISIS online, the secondary sources were used to construct a broad
understanding of the group, as well as find additional primary official and unofficial
sources and content.
The virtual caliphate exists on multiple platforms across the internet, from Twitter
and Youtube to dating websites (Koerner 2016). The non-participant observation
component of this ethnography focused on a examining the presence of ISIS across
different internet platforms, websites on which users can create accounts and post content
in different forms, and the process of finding, understanding, and navigating this content.
This was accomplished through by gaining the skills and knowledge of the group
necessary to follow the community, without engaging in any behavior or interaction
beyond observing the community in cyberspace. This immersion was conducted over the
course of a year, from March of 2018 until March of 2019, amounting to over 100 hours
of non-participant observation of the virtual caliphate. The present ethnography does not
include materials unique to communications apps, such as Telegram, or material from the
dark web, an area of the internet that is not indexed by search engines, requires a
specialized browser to navigate, and where various forms of illicit behavior is engaged in.
The collection of the two primary sources of data, ISIS content and the
observation of the virtual caliphate, was accomplished first by extracting keywords,
symbols, phrases, hashtags, and article, video, or document titles from the initial official
and secondary sources. The initial set of sources included the official magazines
produced by ISIS and publicly available through The Clarion Project’s website as well as
secondary sources including news and research reports on ISIS’s online presence. These
key terms were used in a series of internet searches to find further information and
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content related to ISIS. Notably, this required the use of multiple search engines (Google,
Bing, and DuckDuckGo), since the controversial nature of the content impacted the
likelihood that this material would appear on different search engines. This search based
on the initial keywords from primary and secondary sources provided a new set of
official and unofficial ISIS content. Additional key terms were extracted from these
sources, and additional searches were accomplished to gain access to more ISIS produced
and related content. Furthermore, this search highlighted the importance of examining
ISIS’s presence within specific internet platforms.
The second phase of exploring the virtual caliphate moved from the use of search
engines to searches within content sharing and social media platforms. Initially, this
research focused on the platforms containing content from the above search engine
process, and the key terms were searched for specifically within the platforms.
Independent of the previous set of search engine queries, various social media and
content sharing platforms were examined using the key terms derived from the primary
and secondary sources. A partial list of platforms examined in the course of this research
include Facebook, Youtube, Twitter, Instagram, Reddit, Instagram, Tumblr, MySpace,
JustPaste.it, Pastebin.com, Scribd, 4chan, LiveLeak, Soundcloud, and Slideshare. To
examine the presence of ISIS within forums and message boards, the search engine
BoardReader was used (Johnson et. al. 2016).
In many instances, there was a question as to the content’s relationship to ISIS.
Islamic religious and activist sites, as well as other jihadist groups, often produced
content that shared some aspects with ISIS content. To address this, research on Islamic
practices, beliefs, and sects was undertaken to distinguish the unique ISIS content. The
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best means to differentiate ISIS content from related Islamic and jihadist content were
statements related to hijrah (emigration) and takfir (the process of denouncing Muslims
and non-believers), since ISIS is unique in their interpretation of these concepts. In
instances where the connection between content and ISIS was unclear, the content was
not used in the final analysis except with reference to the virtual caliphate’s amorphous
online boundaries.
The largest and smallest platforms generally had the smallest ISIS presence, and
often content sharing platforms more frequently produced ISIS related material compared
to social media accounts. These observations may be the result of the policing of ISIS
across the internet, but this research can not definitively demonstrate this. Additional
platforms were also used, however these platforms are effectively unpoliced and include
a great deal of ISIS content that is difficult to find on other platforms. This content
includes sensitive information that can be used to carry out terror attacks, such as bomb
making, and are therefore treated within this study as confidential sources. As a result,
when referenced within this study, these sources do not include identifying information
that could be used to find them online. Instead they are described based on the type of
content within them, and their source generically described based on the type of platform
– social media platform, content sharing platform, website, or blog.
3.1.4 Analysis
The objective of this virtual ethnography was to describe the digital presence of
ISIS that is viewed as the catalyst for the self-radicalization of individuals around the
world. This description began with five major types of data collected. The first was the
navigation of ISIS online, since it is not limited to a single site, but exists as a set of
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websites, texts, images, and accounts that are connected through an overarching culture
that requires a degree of subterfuge. Navigating this content is therefore dependent on
understanding how members can find each other and avoid authorities (Hegghammer
2013). Second, the content of the group represents the information and worldview it is
trying to communicate, and is the core exposure to the culture of the group that
individuals without interpersonal contact have. Third, conversations, posts, and similar
interactional functions on websites present an opportunity to record direct observations
among participants. However, it is unclear to what extent these public interactions are
connected to offline behavior, or to what degree those communicating are involved with
ISIS. Furthermore, in practice this also involved groups and individuals antagonistic
towards the group. Fourth, the experience of pursuing and consuming ISIS content
online, as an interested but non-participating observer, will articulate the process of
searching for the group’s content, finding “like-minded” others, and consuming the
content of ISIS online. The last major component has been a historical and contextual
overview of the group, in order to provide a broader understanding of ISIS online than is
possible for a single, non-participant observer. This includes details on the scope of ISIS
online as well as its history as it developed and authorities responded to it.
This data was coded using sensitizing concepts and codes developed in the course
of this ethnography, subculture theory, and the comparative-historical component to this
study. Sensitizing concepts provide a set of general guidelines to organize relevant and
irrelevant information for analysis, connecting empirical instances to concepts that can be
tied to theoretical explanations (Elliot 2018; Bowen 2006; Blumer 1954). Two major
categories exist within this data; observations related to the process of navigating the
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virtual caliphate and the messages presented by the virtual caliphate. The process of
navigating the virtual caliphate included observations regarding the distribution of ISIS
online across different platforms, how to find ISIS content, and this content’s relationship
to related, but separate, communities.
The second, larger category of observations focused on the messages conveyed by
ISIS and its online supporters. The first category of concepts focus on the cultural
elements presented in ISIS content. The norms of the group were coded based on those
behaviors described as obligatory or expected of followers and descriptions of the ideal
ways of acting by the group. Related to this are the roles that the group describes,
specifically the behaviors, expectations, and descriptions of the mujahidin (fighters),
virtual mujahidin (online supporters), women, and leaders. The values of the group were
also coded according to those related to individual actions and characteristics or societal
goals. Symbols and language used by the group were also coded when they were unique
to ISIS and conveyed some meaning.
The most emphasized beliefs of ISIS are primarily religious and shared with other
Islamic communities, however two major categories of observations are related to the
group’s unique belief system. The first category is ISIS’s understanding of history,
observations of which were coded for those historical events viewed as important and
those related to the group’s conception of the apocalypse. The second category focuses
on the group’s beliefs about the contemporary world, with codes focused on the group’s
conception of the West, its goals and actions, the situation of Muslims globally,
perceptions of Middle Eastern governments and nations, and the perception of other
jihadist groups.
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In addition to these cultural concepts, observations were coded regarding ISIS’s
framing of their movement and their strategies for success. Based on the data, framing by
ISIS primarily involved the group’s justifications for violence, including codes for
religious, historical, and grievance-based justifications. The strategies of ISIS included
several separate codes for strategies of attrition, propaganda by deed, and triggering the
apocalypse. Once the initial codes and concepts were established, the data was reviewed
for a second time with the established set of concepts and codes.
3.2 A COMPARATIVE-HISTORICAL ANALYSIS
The second part of this dissertation is a comparative-historical analysis of the
previous historical waves of terrorism. This analysis provides the necessary context to
understand the unique aspects of ISIS and its global spread through the internet, by
establishing how prior groups similarly spread around the world. Furthermore, it also
addresses the existence of terrorism as a set cultural ‘tools’ that are adopted to cope with
the unique issues of groups within their respective nations. This was accomplished by
establishing a sample of terrorist groups from the major historical waves of terrorism,
examining the connections between them and their texts, and examining how this
influenced the adoption of terrorism. In addition to looking at the connections between
groups as a causal factor in the adoption of terrorism as a coping mechanism to societal
strain, this analysis also focuses explicitly on the unique role the mass media, particularly
books and pamphlets in this context, which are hypothesized to be influential in the
adoption of terrorism as a cultural tool.
According to DiMaggio (1997), culture can be studied as a collection of cultural
elements, including values, norms, beliefs, symbols, strategies, identities and narratives,
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that are inconsistently distributed and applied across a population. Furthermore,
individuals can apply the cultural elements, or tools, that they have knowledge of to new
situations. To demonstrate that terrorism is a cultural tool transmitted through
communication interlocks and adopted to cope with national social problems, this study
must demonstrate 1) that terrorist groups possess cultural elements, 2) that these cultural
elements are transmitted through communication interlocks, and 3) these cultural
elements are adapted to the local environment. The existence of cultural elements
possessed by terrorist groups, and their application of international elements to their local
situation will be demonstrated through a broad collection of data on groups from the
major waves of terrorism, and how the ideology of these major waves was applied in
different nations. The transmission of these cultural elements is illustrated through the
use of a social network including these groups and their relationships to each other, as
well as their relationships to various terrorist texts and manuals. Shared cultural elements
between groups only connected through foundational texts will further demonstrate the
importance of the mass media in the international diffusion of terrorism, and serve as a
precursor to the internet radicalization of the 21st century.
3.2.1 Theory and Hypotheses
At the historical and macro-level of analysis, several hypotheses can be
established based on the proposed theory. The first and most basic is that terrorism is
adopted as a result of the internalization of cultural elements that support its use. Second,
this dissertation argues that terrorism exists as a set of cultural ‘tools’ that can be
employed to different causes. Building upon this, it is expected that the waves of
terrorism will exhibit the characteristics of subcultures particularly, which establish
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terrorism as an appropriate coping mechanism to a collective problem. It is argued here
that whether or not terrorism is adopted as a coping strategy to a collective problem will
depend on a group’s relation to cultural interlocks, positions within a social network that
allow for the dissemination of information, including other terrorist groups or ideologies.
In describing the four international waves of terrorism, Rapoport (2004) observes
that the ideology proposing and legitimizing terrorism established by anarchist writers
was among two core factors in the creation of modern terrorism. The other, intimately
connected to the ideology, was the advancements in transportation and communications
technologies (Rapoport 2004). Contagion factors, such as histories of terrorism within a
nation or geographic proximity to a nation experiencing terrorism, are among the most
supported determinants of international terrorism (Krieger and Meierrieks 2011). The
anarchists therefore created the cultural innovation of terrorism, and at the same time
technology existed that allowed the spread of this innovation through migration and the
mass media. Therefore, terrorism is expected to be used as a cultural tool, adopted by
groups to address their own unique problems with local modifications. To demonstrate
this, it is expected to observe explicit and implicit connections between groups in their
strategies and justifications for the use of terrorism in their writings and statements. This
is expected to be observed historically and geographically, and can spread through two
primary means, immigration and the mass media.
If terrorism is a cultural tool, then there must be some explanation for why it is
chosen over other options. Here, it is proposed that terrorist groups reflect subcultures
that have adopted it as a coping strategy to address a local collective problem. Therefore,
it is expected that the ideology within waves will display local variations as the global
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ideology is applied to the local situation, that there will be a collective problem that
motivates the formation of national groups, and that these local groups will be connected
to each other through communication interlocks and ‘scenes’. The larger subculture of a
wave of terrorism may further be linked not just through a communication interlock, such
as a leader, author, or book, but also through meeting points, such as training camps.
Within subculture theory, local groups are connected to a subculture through
scenes and spaces, locations where many local groups gather and interact on a national or
international level (Anderson 2009; Melder 2014; Futrell and Simi 2004). These areas
can be geographic, such as music festivals or training camps, or virtual, such as internet
websites but including print media. Each wave of terrorism is therefore expected to have
these cultural interlocks that unify local groups and spread the ideology of the group,
including migration and diasporas, mass media, and training camps. Although they
occupy a theoretically equivalent position, there are significant differences between
interpersonal interaction and mass media consumption. Therefore, attention will be given
to discerning any significant patterns or themes related to these different forms of cultural
interlocks.
3.2.2 Sample
To determine the applicability of subculture theory and the conception of
terrorism as a cultural tool, this analysis examines groups that existed during the
historical waves of terrorism. This includes anarchist groups between 1880 and 1920, the
anticolonial groups between 1920 and 1960, and the New Left groups between 1960 and
2000 (Rapoport 2004). The religious wave is excluded, since the dominant focus of the
rest of this dissertation is focused on ISIS, a group that is a part of the current, religious
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wave. The waves of terrorism focus on periods of time that a particular form of ideology
spread globally, but it is important to note that this is not a comprehensive list of terrorist
groups, since many occur outside the timeframes of particular waves. This universe of
groups is large, but not comprehensive (Park and Sitter 2016; Sedgwick 2007). They are
selected specifically because they are a part of global movements of terrorism which are
the focus of the present research. There are groups that have spread internationally
outside of these timeframes and causes, but not to the degree as the movements within
these time frames.
There are several distinct categories of subjects included in this analysis. The
primary subjects of this analysis were the terrorist entities themselves, however these
were variable in their nature and the data available for them. Terrorist entities include
individual terrorists (so-called lone wolfs), groups, organizations, support organizations,
and overarching movements which include a combination of individuals, groups,
organizations, supporters, and sympathizers. The second category of subjects are the
authors and texts cited by terrorist groups, but were not always, or even often, involved in
terrorism themselves. In addition to terrorist entities and influences, information was
gathered on related groups, organizations, and social movements that terrorist groups
emerged from. This data was collected primarily to understand the context from which
terrorist entities emerged from, as well as gathering information related to organizational
and social movement-based explanations of terrorism (Alimi 2011; Oberschall 2004;
Beck 2008; Brents and Mshigeni 2004).
To construct a sample of these entities, several sources were utilized. At present,
there is no comprehensive database of terrorist groups that is publicly available. This is a
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product of different political and organizational definitions, the age of the phenomenon,
and the focus on current groups in research. In order to construct an accurate sample,
multiple independent sources will be consulted. The initial sample of terrorist groups,
influential authors/texts, and origin groups or movements was constructed using sources
that covered the international history of terrorism since the anarchist wave. These sources
include the Encyclopedia of Terrorism, Vol. 1, Blood & Rage: A Cultural History of
Terrorism, The History of Terrorism: From Antiquity to Al Qaeda, The Infernal Machine:
A History of Terrorism, A History of Terrorism, The Wrong Hands: Popular Weapons
Manuals and their Historic Challenges to a Democratic Society, and Globalization &
Terrorism: The Migration of Dreams and Nightmares.
These sources provide a broad overview of terrorism globally across the
international waves. The second set of sources for composing the sample were on the
specific international waves of terrorism, including Secessionism and Terrorism: Bombs,
Blood, and Independence in Europe and Eurasia, Bombs, Bullets, and Bread: The
Politics of Anarchist Terrorism Worldwide, 1866-1926, and “Terrorism and the
International Anarchist Movement of the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth
Centuries”. Finally, a snowball sampling approach will be adopted in the course of
researching the specific groups, incorporating any other groups not discussed in the
above sources that are included in group-specific sources. Based on this list, terrorist
entity-specific secondary and primary sources were collected, as well as the influential
texts cited within these sources. The snowball sampling step based on specific sources on
terrorist entities was reiterated until no new entities were referenced.
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There remains the issue of missing groups, and specifically what types of groups
would be absent from this sample. The major set of groups not within this sample are
those that do not conform to the ideological waves, and this is by design, as they are not
relevant to this analysis. Small groups, failed groups, short-lived groups, and unimpactful
groups are likely to be missed in this sampling, since there is unlikely to be much
discussion around them. Since the success or size of groups are not the focus of
explanation here, it is unlikely that this would skew the results of this research. In
practice, some accounts of these smaller groups were found, however these were often
limited to a group name, ideological inclination, and often their relationships to larger
groups or movements.
Missing groups as a product of bias in historical research represents a larger
concern. If these data sources possess a Western bias there is a chance of excluding or
missing important groups from Asia, Latin America, and Africa. This issue is greatest
regarding the anticolonial wave, where terrorist groups have sometimes become
inextricably intertwined with the larger social movements for independence, and they are
largely not discussed in the context of terrorism any longer. A similar issue exists for
groups that survived their initial conception in an international wave of terrorism, and
have changed significantly since their origins. This is frequently the case for larger South
American groups. For these groups, the existing information is largely contemporary,
rather than historical. This may reflect the degree to which these groups have come to be
considered by English speaking researchers, as several detailed sources were found in the
native languages of the groups. However, the final sample incorporates groups from
across the world, including Kenya, Japan, India, South America, Europe, and the Middle
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East, providing a significant degree of coverage for the areas where terrorism has been
most prevalent or influential to other nations.
3.2.3 Data Collection
Once a sample of groups was established primary and secondary data will be
collected for each group, in addition to the information on groups provided by the
overarching sources used to establish the sample. The primary data sources will be the
writings, manifestos, communiques, and guidebooks produced and/or cited by the groups.
Secondary sources provided contextual information and secondary analysis of the
terrorist entities. These include books, book chapters, and journal articles about specific
terrorist movements, groups, organizations, and individuals within this sample.
The units of data collected from these sources to be coded were broken up into
descriptions of characteristics of terrorist entities and/or statements from terrorists or
influential texts (Elliot 2008). These descriptions were recoded as observations of
indicator codes of the major categories of observations that were theorized to be
important based on the subcultural explanation of terrorism, fundamental characteristics
of the terrorist entities, alternative explanations, categories that emerged in the course of
the data collection process, and linkages between terrorist entities and their influences.
These codes represented specific examples of the larger sensitizing concepts derived
from the major theoretical explanations of terrorism and inferred in the course of the
research. Sensitizing concepts are general guidelines of relevant characteristics of a
phenomenon that serve to connect empirical instances to more abstract theoretical
explanations (Elliot 2008; Blumer 1954).
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The initial set of codes for each terrorist entity focused on their fundamental
characteristics. This includes the name of the entity, country of origin, the size of the
group, and the wave it participated in. Some groups separated from the primary entities
used in this analysis and were established outside of the wave years and were included as
wave outliers. The ideological inclination of the groups (anarchist, Marxist-Leninist,
anticolonial, separatist, nationalist) were also recorded. Several groups included a
combination several ideological influences, most commonly a mixture of anticolonialism
and Marxist-Leninism. The type of entity was also recorded, including classifications of
individuals, groups, formal organizations, support groups, movements, influential
authors, texts, and related non-terrorist organizations and social movements.
The primary sensitizing concepts for analysis were derived from subculture
theory. This includes the components of subcultures: 1) cultural elements; 2) the social
network as the referent for a subculture’s boundaries; and 3) an identity component that
includes a membership claim (Fine and Kleinman 1979). Cultural elements refer to
values, beliefs, norms, knowledge, symbols, and language unique to the terrorist entities.
Greater attention was paid to descriptions of cultural elements when these concepts were
not utilitarian or consistent with objective consensus on the circumstances of a society.
Codes for social networks included the pathways to joining terrorist entities, the extent to
which sympathetic communities shared the same cultural ideas as terrorist entities, and/or
multiple terrorist entities within a national movement. Finally, identity and membership
claims were coded when terrorist entities included a specific term to identify themselves,
a set of behaviors or expectations associated with that definition, and observations on
how terrorist entities differentiate themselves from larger, non-violent social movements.

55

To address terrorism as a cultural tool, this research also examined the adaptation
of texts and influences to local contexts. The first part of this concept is discussed below
with reference to the influential linkages between groups. The major sensitizing concept
for data collection was the adaptation of the content cited from these influential linkages.
This includes coding all descriptions of how groups modified ideologies, synthesized
them with local ideologies, applied them to local sociohistorical circumstances, or
selectively applied ideological influences.
To understand the spread of international terrorism, data was also connected on
the influential connections between groups. Descriptions of terrorist entities and group’s
statements were examined for references to other groups, ideologies, texts, or authors. In
addition to this, descriptions of terrorist entities that included reference to terrorist
specific media sources were recorded. The connections between groups included codes
for interpersonal connections between groups, inspirational examples set by other
terrorist groups, influential texts and authors, and organizational connections through
splits, mergers, and shared memberships between groups. These observations relate to the
influence of cultural interlocks and their connection to the development of terrorist
groups.
In addition to these factors, observations for the current explanations of terrorism
were also collected. This is done in order to consider the support for a subcultural
explanation of terrorism relative to the dominant explanations, and to minimize the risk
of confirmation bias within the results. For the strain theory explanations this includes
observations regarding socio-economic status, demographic characteristics, and
education of members. In addition to these raw variables, perceptions of group members
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on strains and grievances within society, and how the group addresses those issues, were
collected. To contextualize the perceptions of grievances, historical accounts were
consulted as to the accuracy of those perceptions.
The rational actor theory expects that all terrorist groups emerge from earlier
social movements that were unable to achieve change, or due to a perception that
terrorism is the best means to achieve the desired change. This conceptual category
included explicit statements, descriptions of violence as necessary, and terrorist groups
splintering from social movement organizations over the use of violence. Terrorist
entities relationships to non-violent social movements were also recorded. An additional
factor that emerged as a major factor in the adoption of terrorism was the role of
repression of social movements. Instances where violence was used to repress a social
movement, terrorist groups defined actions by the state as repressive, or social
movements were subjected to nongovernmental violence were coded to examine this
factor. In relation to the overarching theory, these findings will also elaborate on the role
of collective grievances in motivating group membership, as well as role of perceptions
in the decision to adopt terrorism.
In addition to the theoretically expected concepts and categories, several emergent
themes developed in the course of this research. These were primarily major categories
within the cultural elements being examined in the context of subculture theory.
Specifically, the involve observations related to the terrorist identity, discussed here as
the Role of the Revolutionist, and its characteristics. This involved coding for the
characterizations of the role, what it was called, and how it was viewed. A set of beliefs
and values constituted a morality of terrorism, and included the coding of terrorist
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entities’ justifications for violence. Another emergent theme involved terrorists’
perception of violence, and this included coding for its necessity, benefits, and value
attributed to it. Finally, observations related to the perception and pursuit of the truth by
terrorist groups included coding for their statements on the acquisition of knowledge,
their statements on the accuracy of their views, and dogmatic characteristics of this
belief.
3.2.4 Caveats and Considerations
There is a great deal of diversity particularly within the anarchist wave, and in
part this illustrates the historical limitations of this research. Anarchism was conflated
with terrorism, as well as other distinct movements such as socialism, nihilism,
nationalism, and Russian populism (Kemp 2018). In practice, this conflation has resulted
in many groups being included in the anarchist wave that are not anarchists, however
many of these groups would have been included regardless as a result of their influential
ties and connections to the anarchists. The Irish Republicans, Russian Populists and
Nihilists, nationalists of various nations, Marxists, and the anarchists of the late 19th and
early 20th century are inextricably connected to each other, and many of the movements
to follow.
An additional issue arises connected to the reliance of this study on the histories
of groups and movements. A significant portion of the data collected here come from
secondary sources, and as a result the observations of groups are in part the result of the
historical narratives about terrorist entities, rather than objective accounts. The historical
record is not evenly researched across groups and nations, nor is it comprehensive.
Furthermore, the historical record and the available primary documents included in this
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analysis are limited to those that are available in the English language, and therefore
groups that are related to English speaking nations, or are of interest to those nations are
overrepresented in the observations that this analysis is based on. As a result, there is a
wealth of knowledge of some groups that have inspired the imaginations of researchers,
such as the IRA and RAF, but far less on other groups. To a degree, this is a result of the
size and scope of some groups, with small unnamed groups that carry out few actions
going relatively undetected. However, the amount of information available for groups is
not directly connected to their size and influence. RAF was relatively small and
ineffective, but a good story and the focus of a great deal of scholarly discussion. In
contrast, nationalist and socialist movements in South America, Africa, the Middle East,
and Eastern Europe have been much larger and influential but have less written about
them, at least in English.
As a result, there are two limitations to the data presented here. First, it is not
uniform across groups and it is unlikely that such a comprehensive account of terrorist
groups is possible. However, much of what has been observed from the incomplete
records and descriptions of the groups observed here is largely consistent with the
patterns seen in other groups and substantiated in prior research. Second, the construction
of the social network of terrorism is incomplete on three counts. Since this research is
focused on the adoption of terrorism, collaborative relationships between established
groups were not included in the final analysis. The influence terrorist groups have on
each other’s development after initially forming is an intriguing question but is beyond
the scope of the current investigation. Additionally, vague actors and connections were
excluded. Random, unidentified Americans that first exposed anarchism to Japanese and
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Australian individuals are excluded, although the influence of the authors or larger
ideology that the Japanese and Australian actors adopted is preserved in the final
network. Similarly, hypothesized connections or statements of similarities between
groups were not included as influential connections. This contributes to the final reason
that the presented social network is incomplete, specifically that there are likely
influential or personal connections between groups that were unobserved either through a
limitation of this research’s sources or the historical record. As a result, the social
network presented here is an underestimation of the relationships that connect terrorism
across time and space, but is unlikely to inaccurately present connections where there are
none.
3.2.5 Analysis
To examine terrorism as a cultural tool, the first part of this analysis will be to
examine the presence and influence of cultural factors on the adoption of terrorism. This
initial analysis will examine the role of strain, rationality, and cultural factors in the
adoption of terrorism to determine the overall support for subculture theory and the
alternative hypotheses. For the second part of the analysis, a social network visualizing
the relationships between groups in terms of their inspirational and interpersonal
connections is constructed. If terrorism is influential as a cultural tool, the resulting social
network of groups should be highly connected, within and between waves of terrorism.
Furthermore, by clarifying the types of connections, the role of interpersonal
relationships and the mass media can be compared and elaborated upon. Furthermore, the
relationships between groups operating within the same historical waves can be observed.
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The third part of the analysis will be to describe the historical use of terrorism as a
cultural tool. Specifically, the connections between groups and their historical
counterparts will be examined. If terrorism exists as a cultural tool, then it is expected
that there will be some relationship between each wave of terrorism and the preceding
wave. Furthermore, it is expected that the aspects adopted from former movements will
extend beyond terrorism as a tool in the course of social change. The lack of observable
relationships between groups and their historical predecessors would suggest that
terrorism is not a cultural tool, but a strategy arrived at independently by various groups.
Using multiple historical waves not only enables a historical analysis of terrorism
as a cultural tool, but also provides three case studies of global waves of terrorism, with
group cases nested within those waves. As a result, a parallel case history methodology
can be used to demonstrate the applicability of the proposed theoretical framework.
Parallel case history methodology is a strategy for examining multiple cases to highlight
a similar underlying process against diverse socio-historical circumstances (Skocpol and
Somers 1980). The three waves of terrorism examined here represent three unique cases
of international terrorist movements, and demonstrating the applicability of subculture
theory across multiple contexts.
This allows for a comparison of the influence of cultural interlocks, ideology, and
collective problems on the international diffusion of terrorism. First, the collective
problems that motivate terrorism can be compared to determine if there is a common
strain or grievance, across waves or within them across nations, that motivate terroristic
behavior. Second, the role of cultural interlocks in the spread of international terrorism
can be examined, whether it is a product of migration, mass media, or other factors.
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Finally, the role of ideology can be examined, particularly how it spreads and is (or isn’t)
adapted to local circumstances. Each of the major waves of terrorism represent an
overarching ideology, but the defining question of international terrorism here is how it
spreads internationally. As a cultural tool, the different ideologies within each wave can
be adapted to national circumstances, and consequently local variations of each ideology
would be expected. In contrast, if the spread of terrorism reflects the adoption of an
ideology, than the national groups would reflect that overarching ideology.
This part of the study is focused specifically on the connections between groups
to demonstrate the classification of terrorism as a cultural tool. As a counterpoint to the
proposed theory, a null hypothesis can be introduced to compare the findings too. Within
the literature, there are two positions on the understanding of the causes of terrorism. The
first is that terrorism is a class of behavior that can be explained, despite the diverse
forms of the phenomenon (Robison, Crenshaw, and Jenkins 2006). The other is that each
instance of terrorism is a unique product of particular socio-historical circumstances, and
as a result there can be no overarching theory that explains terrorism (Tilly 2004;
Laqueur 2001; Post 2007). In analyzing the data collected, this null hypothesis will also
be included in order to contrast the expected findings against. Based on the
commonalities across groups and international waves of terrorism, it is likely that
terrorism does represent a distinct class of behavior, and its international spread a
recurring and significant aspect to also be explained. It is against this survey of terrorism
in the past that the current international wave of terrorism can be fully understood, not as
a fundamentally new aspect of a digital world, but the evolution of a century old problem.
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3.3 CONCLUSION
By taking the mixed methods approach, this dissertation is able to examine the
contemporary spread of terrorism through ISIS in detail and complement these findings
with the broader analysis of prior waves of international terrorism. The first benefit of
this approach is that it places the current spread of ISIS in historical context, which
enables an analysis of the unique aspects of the group and its use of the internet. To the
extent that ISIS reflects the larger patterns of behavior of other terrorist groups, the
detailed study of ISIS online also provides invaluable insights by providing direct
observations of a terrorist group’s propaganda campaign through a form of the mass
media. In this way, the detailed examination of ISIS can provide insights into how prior
terrorist organizations recruited and spread, to the degree that the observations of ISIS’s
behavior and that of prior terrorist groups overlap in observable ways. Finally, the mixed
methods approach also provides a multi-dimensional test of subculture theory’s relevance
to terrorism.
The analysis of the data collected here first focuses on the independent findings of
each part of this study. First, the findings from the virtual ethnography of ISIS are
presented, including the process of finding and navigating the virtual caliphate, different
actors involved with the virtual caliphate, and a detailed discussion of the group’s
ideology and culture. Second, the historical-comparative study is presented with a focus
on the overarching themes across groups and waves of terrorism. These include general
observations, observations relevant to the alternative hypotheses, and the evidence that is
consistent with a subcultural explanation of terrorism. These findings are then placed in
the context of groups’ relationships to each other through a social network constructed
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based on the influential and inspirational relationships between terrorists, groups,
organizations, and several central actors. Generally, there is evidence that the consistent
cultural aspects present across groups in this sample can be traced through several central
influences. These independent findings are then analyzed together. This analysis
examines ISIS and its internet use in the context of the spread of prior terrorist
organizations, as well as examining how the detailed examination of ISIS can further
inform the historical analysis through details that are lost to time for other groups. The
concluding analysis examines the findings in their totality and their support for a
subcultural explanation of terrorism.
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CHAPTER 4
A VIRTUAL ETHNOGRAPHY OF ISIS ONLINE
In discussing the history of terrorism and state responses to it, Carr (2006) notes
that terrorists are consistently depicted as evil or irrational individuals consumed by
bloodlust. The external public image is rarely shared by those within the group or among
their sympathizers. The second part of this dissertation is inspired partially by this
observation. ISIS and the Islamic State are commonly depicted as a brutal and murderous
group, instituting draconian punishments dictated by their interpretation of Sharī’ah,
killing Muslims that do not accept their version of Islam, and encouraging indiscriminate
terror attacks around the world. Given this coverage, the following the group has gained
across the world, online and off, is confounding.
ISIS is also distinguished by its immense success in gaining recruits, supporters,
and sympathizers online, pioneering a global social media campaign whose closest
parallel in the history of terrorism are the lone wolf bombers of the anarchist era. To fully
understand the group’s spread online and its success in online recruitment a virtual
ethnography was conducted across the years of 2018 and 2019, examining the content,
accounts, and dimensions of the virtual caliphate. This has produced a unique
documentation of a caliphate in decline after the policing of the group’s content and
accounts has pushed the group towards more unconventional, unpopular platforms.
However, a great deal of the content that comprises the virtual caliphate remains, hidden
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across various parts of the internet, and this gives a great deal of insight into the
worldview of the Islamic State.
ISIS’s worldview partially overlaps with other groups addressing problems facing
Muslims around the world. However, the group is unique in several significant ways,
namely their conception of wala and bara, takfir, hijrah, jihad, and Sharī’ah. According to
ISIS, the group is a continuation of a history of brave Muslim warriors, the mujahidin,
protecting the Middle East from invaders. They are the greatest of this line, ushering in
the apocalypse and ending the final crusade. These actions are for the establishment and
success of the Khilafah, or caliphate, a land for Muslims to practice their religion fully,
free from persecution.
4.0.1 Language, Spelling, and ISIS in the Context of the Larger Islamic Community
There are several issues that require clarification before describing the online ISIS
community. First is the relationship between ISIS and the larger Islamic community, and
second regards the differences in spelling and meaning of Islamic concepts and names
used by ISIS. The first issue is essential to preventing an inaccurate and unfair conflation
of the worldviews that ISIS presents and those of the wider Islamic community,
particularly those non-violent activist communities that possess similar critiques of global
society and goals for the Muslim community. Although ISIS shares some of these
positions, they are secondary to the love of jihad, takfir, and murder that the group
prioritizes in their own words. The similarities that do exist have not translated into
widespread support for the group. Nations with large Muslim populations have
overwhelmingly negative opinions of the group, and only a slim minority hold a positive
opinion (Poushter 2015). In addition to this, those Muslims residing in the Middle East
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are the greatest focus of ISIS’s violence. When similarities between ISIS and the Islamic
community are discussed here, it is to understand the wider context of ideas that possibly
contribute to ISIS recruitment, and, more importantly, to distinguish those cultural
aspects unique to the group.
The second issue regards the terms and their spelling, given the various
transliterations of many Islamic terms and their additional connotations. Given ISIS’s
practice of Islam is distinct from how it is practiced outside the Islamic State, I have
chosen to maintain their transliteration of terms, and have tried to best convey the
meaning that ISIS specifically attaches to these ideas, highlighting those concepts that
differentiate ISIS from other Jihadist, activist, and Muslim groups. However, even ISIS
uses different spelling conventions depending on the writer or source. For instance,
mujāhidīn is initially used in the magazine Dabiq, but the group would later use
mujahidin in Rumiyah despite both sources being official magazine publications of ISIS.
The spellings used here, outside of direct quotations, are those most dominantly used by
the group, usually in their official magazines. The discussion of Islamic concepts here
should not be mistaken for an accurate description of their common use in Islam, but their
meaning specifically related to ISIS, particularly the concepts of hijrah, jihad, Sharī’ah,
wala and bara, and takfir.
4.0.2 A Note on Propaganda
As a caveat before a deeper glimpse into the worldview of ISIS, none of the
description presented here should be considered as excusatory or sympathetic. The goal
of this study was to understand the mindset of ISIS, as it is presented online for English
speaking users, and how that mindset could lead to identification with a group popularly
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defined by its brutality. Additionally, this also means that the group’s propaganda is not
thoroughly debunked and fact checked here, as the present goal is to focus on the image
they portray that attracts supporters. There are several times in the course of this research
that the use of propaganda, a misleading representation of reality to persuade and
manipulate readers, was obvious, and many more times that I suspected that the facts,
images, and/or accounts published by the group were fabricated.
Outright examples of propaganda ranged from a photoshopped image of a
Burmese Buddhist with a gun, supporting the group’s narrative on the persecution of
Muslims in Burma, to the manipulative use of the plight of the Palestinians to rally
support. This tactic is recommended by the group’s recruiting manual, suggesting that
recruiters should take advantage of the Muslim consensus on the Palestinian issue as a
tentative introduction towards jihadist ideas. Suspected propaganda ranged from the
reports on the state of affairs within the caliphate to written statements by Western
hostages that echoed and supported the group’s own narrative. The most extreme case
was a recurring column by captured journalist John Cantlie, in which his treatment by the
Islamic State is praised and the actions of Western governments are condemned.
Although these positions could be easily debunked, the Islamic State is highly critical of
the media, consistently portraying it as lying about the group, undermining the sources
that contradict ISIS’s narrative.
4.0.3 Ethical Conundrums
In addition to questions of the material’s accuracy, there is a significant ethical
issue regarding the inclusion of information essential to accessing this content. Some
content is easily accessible. The group’s official magazines, Dabiq and Rumiyah, are
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published online through the Clarion Project, a counter-extremist organization, for the
purposes of understanding the group’s ideology in order to combat it. However, other
materials related to the group have been effectively policed and reporting on these
materials has avoided naming the documents or their locations to hinder their acquisition.
In the course of this research I came across several platforms that were preferred by the
group during the time period of the study, and within these specific platforms a great deal
of the group’s materials is still accessible. A name and/or location is frequently sufficient
to find the materials, regardless of how well the content has been policed.
This information is not solely focused on news and doctrine, but also the more
sensitive information related to the group, such as recruitment strategies, security
strategies, how to contact official members, how to travel to the caliphate, and the
construction of bombs. This raises an ethical concern as to providing the name of the
documents and locations where they are easily found. Providing these details effectively
facilitates in the materials’ distribution. As a result, there is a trade-off between
accurately describing the group’s online presence and not amplifying it by assisting in its
discovery. This challenge has been present since the era of anarchist terror where
scholarly research on terrorism and explosives was coopted for violent purposes.
Therefore, this study will restrict its citations of ISIS materials to those widely publicized
and accessible by the general population, the official magazines. The specific names of
other documents and the platforms that they can be accessed on is largely irrelevant to the
present study and they can be described in generic ways that minimizes the potential risk
of facilitating the distribution of sensitive information and terrorist propaganda, while
still preserving the relevant information, the worldview they present.
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In addition to this sensitive information, information on sympathizer’s accounts
are kept confidential and aliases reflecting the sentiment of the original name or their
writings are used instead. Despite the policing of social media for content, groups, and
accounts related to ISIS, accounts that declare some support, share images, or otherwise
indicate a positive image of the group persist across the plethora of social media
platforms. This raises two problems. First, some of the observed accounts included
possible identifying information and were not blatantly involved with ISIS. Effectively,
these were fans of ISIS. As a result, including account information has the potential to
harm the individuals observed, since these ‘fans’ do not take the same security
precautions as other, more involved individuals. Also, although the internet is a public
space, most people share a reasonable assumption of privacy regarding their accounts.
The second issue regards accounts on platforms that can be used to distribute messages or
files. Similar to the information regarding the name and locations of sensitive documents,
account names can be used to find individuals that publish ISIS content, and are also kept
confidential.
4.1 A RESEARCHER’S PERSPECTIVE
The goal of this ethnography is to describe the Virtual Caliphate or Isis online and
what about it compels people to sympathize and join the group. Therefore, it is important
to first account for my perspective as an observer, and how this may significantly
influence my observations. The most relevant factors that provide context to this study
are the limitations of being an English speaking, non-Muslim, white observer, my
internet experience, and the time period of the study.
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4.1.1 Linguistic, Racial, and Religiously Different
Only speaking English, being a non-Muslim, and a white observer are likely the
most limiting aspects of my perspective. In terms of language, my observations of ISIS
content are limited to those in English. Although there is a great deal of material
produced in English and my basic internet browser helpfully translated many minor pages
that I would otherwise not be able to read, there was still a notable language barrier.
There are significant efforts by the group to helpfully translate materials for English
speakers, most often in the official magazines but also in manuals and guides. Most
propaganda videos that I found were in Arabic as well as most of the hashtags the group
advertised in their magazine. There is reason to suspect significant differences between
the experience of navigating the virtual caliphate across the English dominant regions of
the internet. My experience with the commentary around related videos on Youtube and
similar platforms differed in significant ways from research on Arabic language Youtube
discourse, likely as a result of the broader English-speaking audience (Al-Rawi 2018).
My limited knowledge about Islam was not as significant of a limitation, since
ISIS propaganda is thorough in communicating its interpretation of the religion. This
ignorance was influential in my evolving understanding of ISIS, since I essentially first
learned a great deal of Middle Eastern history, the tenets and virtues of Islam, and many
of the narrower issues of the region from the group’s propaganda. However, this
highlighted an intriguing aspect of the group’s propaganda for non-Muslim observers—it
is extremely easy to mistake the virtues of Islam that ISIS describes as virtues of the
group instead. This may be particularly relevant to understanding the recruitment of nonMuslim’s, especially given reports that ISIS recruiters encourage their targets not to
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associate with Muslim communities. Additionally, some converts report first researching
the group before Islam due to interest raised by news coverage of ISIS, echoing the
strategy of propaganda by deed. Although this limits the degree to which my observations
may be relevant to the Muslim recruits, the appeals of ISIS to fellow Muslims are
extremely direct and explicit, focusing on the inability of Muslims to truly practice their
religion in the West, the deaths of Muslim civilians in the middle east caused by western
forces, the discrimination and hostility facing Muslims worldwide, and religious
arguments.
4.1.2 Internet Experience and Temporal Limitations
Since this project involves finding content online, an accounting of my general
level of tech-savviness is required. Greater or lesser awareness of different platforms and
sites, how the internet works, how people interact online, and different ways of sharing or
access content directly impacts what type of content I would experience. A user unaware
of torrents or other file-sharing services, the dark web, or popular new social media sites
and apps does not experience content from those areas, and likewise a researcher unaware
of these aspects similarly cannot cover them. I would not be considered a novice, nor an
expert, but I am generally familiar and aware of the ephemera that comprise internet
culture. The secondary sources reviewed and the official materials of ISIS provided
further guidance on the best areas to search for the group.
A much larger limitation is the time frame in which this research was conducted,
over the course of 2018 and into 2019 after significant blows had been dealt to the
Islamic State in the Middle East and online through an increased policing by the most
popular platforms. Although accounts supportive of ISIS still existed across the most
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popular platforms on the internet, such as Facebook, Youtube, Twitter, Instagram, and
Tumblr, these were rare. Those accounts that were found and likely to have a more direct
involvement in the group did not publicly indicate their support. Rather, their relationship
was suspected due to their inclusion in recruiting and travel manuals. The account names
were not identical but involved variations used by the group in reposting documents. For
example, a helpful account might be named Muhajir1, with the advice to check Muhajir2,
Muhajir3, and so on in case the account was removed. Although this prevents an accurate
depiction of the virtual caliphate at its height, it does give this study the unique
perspective of how online communities persist after being policed.
Official Twitter accounts, Jihadist blogs on Tumblr, and distribution of videos on
Youtube are all aspects of the virtual caliphate that are largely absent today. Most
notably, the direct reach of the group on the most popular platforms has drastically
decreased. One activist organization, Average Mohamed, would describe kids receiving
four to five ISIS or al-Qaeda Facebook posts a month when they first started to work with
youth globally. By 2019, the organization reports the youth they are working with as
receiving zero postings on Facebook. The virtual caliphate still exists however, and,
despite the efforts at policing this content by most platforms, it still has some degree of
presence on most platforms. Although social media has been the focus of most efforts,
the propaganda and materials of the group are still squirrelled away across many file
sharing and publishing platforms. In part, this is a consequence of the group’s practice,
and encouragement of followers, to upload these materials across multiple platforms,
using different names, and in different formats so that it could not be taken down
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completely. As a result, the virtual caliphate persists and is widely available to anyone
determined to find it.
4.2 NAVIGATING THE VIRTUAL CALIPHATE
The process of becoming immersed in the worldview of ISIS and the virtual
caliphate occurred through three overlapping phases: the practical discovery of materials
and communities; experiencing the appeal of (some of) the group’s stated goals; and the
perceiving the injustices against the Muslim world and hypocritical attitudes of the West.
The initial discovery of ISIS’s materials is disturbingly easy, and it echoes the challenges
that previous waves of terrorism have faced between educational and informational
materials and ‘dangerous information’. Beyond those materials that are easily available
exist the accounts and policed content that is far more difficult to find as a result of the
online policing of ISIS content. Further investigation of ISIS quickly results in the
discovery of several distinct positions operating in relation to the virtual caliphate, from
oppositional actors to the virtual mujahidin. In addition to the practical navigation of the
virtual caliphate, there are distinct ideological entry points to the group. These include the
positive representations of the group and their goals and the injustices that the group
claims to confront.
4.2.1 The Geography of the Virtual Caliphate
My first step in this investigation was to obtain the official content produced by
ISIS. I found the name of ISIS’s magazines through news coverage of online
radicalization, and as I consumed more news coverage, investigative reports, and
academic papers I found the primary platforms ISIS used, symbols they used and how
they communicated, and the names of videos, publications, hashtags, and media centers
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for the group. Any curiosity about the group can be quickly rewarded by information that
can be used to find the virtual caliphate by legitimate informational sources performing
their duty to maintain an informed citizenry. With the exception of the official
magazines, however, the majority of content related to ISIS is heavily policed and
removed from most platforms.
A major part of this ethnography involved specifically finding those indicators
and symbols that signal to others support for ISIS. There are certain patterns to the
naming of accounts related to ISIS, such as the titles Umm or Abu, names incorporating a
national origin, variations of ISIS, Mujahid, and Muhajir (emigrant) (Klausen 2015).
While this helps identify accounts that are more explicitly drawing a connection between
themselves and ISIS, more important is the language, concepts, article and video titles
used by the group. In part, the transliteration of the Arabic language used by ISIS would
facilitate finding its materials, while simultaneously making it difficult to find
background information from other sources. Concepts emphasized and uniquely
interpreted by the group, such as hijrah, would similarly distinguish content related to
ISIS from other Islamic communities. The most difficult materials to distinguish from
ISIS content were those produced by other jihadist groups, since their ideological
differences were often complex and nuanced. Complicating this is the fact that ISIS has
coopted some of these materials, particularly those that provide practical, operational
information.
Similar to its real-world counterpart, the virtual caliphate was largely in ruins
between 2018-2019, at least outside of communication apps that have become the
dominant forms of communication for the group and its supporters abroad. The virtual
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caliphate has a minor presence on most of the dominant platforms, such as Facebook,
Youtube, Twitter, Instagram, Reddit, Instagram, and Tumblr. The accounts, communities,
and content that still exist on these platforms, and have a clear relation to ISIS, are
relatively small and inoffensive, primarily sharing images or music that glamorize the
group. Other content has become more clandestine over time and is distributed across a
plethora of social media or content sharing platforms, including MySpace, JustPaste.it,
Pastebin.com, Scribd, 4chan, LiveLeak, Soundcloud, Slideshare, and more. Additionally,
ISIS content was sometimes given innocuous names, such as “it’s the least you could do”
and “how to make chocolate cake”, the officially suggested filename. As a result, the
virtual caliphate as it exists today is distributed across the virtual landscape, hiding in
plain sight among the sheer scope of the information the internet makes available,
occasionally slightly concealed by a name.
The influence of several structural conditions on my pursuit of the virtual
caliphate became apparent over the course of searching for more content. The use of
various platforms by ISIS and its sympathizers is well known, as well as the migrant
nature of the virtual caliphate as a result of platforms taking action against ISIS users and
content (Johnson et. al. 2016). Consequently, content on the known platforms is less
prominent and relies on more obscure knowledge of the group, its language, and
signifiers. As a result, observing the virtual caliphate through singular platforms provides
a limited view of the larger entity, and in particular this highlights the role and influence
of the search engine. If searching for the virtual caliphate outside of a specific platform, a
user necessarily uses a search engine, but importantly the choice of search engine has a
significant impact on the content that is found, and subsequent access and exposure to

76

ISIS content. To address this, multiple search engines were consistently used to find ISIS
related content, specifically Google, Bing, DuckDuckGo, and BoardReader, a search
engine specifically for internet forums. User knowledge of different platforms, apps,
search engines, or other means of navigating the internet effectively limits the degree to
which they can encounter the virtual caliphate now that the group has been policed from
the dominant platforms.
4.2.2 The Demography of the Virtual Caliphate
The virtual caliphate exists structurally across the internet through its distribution
across different platforms with varying degrees of direct access via search engines. In
addition to this, the virtual caliphate exists in relation to various communities online and
with varying degrees of participation from supporters and sympathizers. There are variety
of actors producing content relevant to ISIS, including oppositional actors, related
Islamic communities, sympathizers, related jihadist groups, supporters, virtual mujahidin,
and official ISIS sources. Informational sources, such as research and news coverage,
may be considered an additional, minor area related to this overall classificatory schema.
The position of content or an account towards ISIS is not always clear, and the further
one moves from the official content and ardent supporters the more blurred the line
becomes between the virtual caliphate, other jihadist groups, and even non-violent
Islamic activist groups. As a result, this research includes only content that can be
confidently connected to ISIS, with the exception of this discussion on related
communities.
The core of the virtual caliphate are the official sources and accounts connected to
the group and the media that the group has published. In the course of this research, I
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reviewed two books, four manuals on recruitment, operational security, traveling to the
Islamic State, and carrying out attacks, three newsletters on the Islamic State, twenty-five
magazine issues across two titles, an hour-long documentary on the gold standard, two
music videos, a handful of videos and songs (anasheeds), and countless images valorizing
the mujahidin. Although this list includes a significant amount of the official materials
produced by ISIS, there are likely further, more obscure, publications. However, there
were few new concepts introduced towards the end of the analysis, indicating that
saturation of the group’s themes had been achieved.
Outside the central, official core of ISIS are their supporters, the virtual
mujahidin, and those planning to travel to the Islamic State. The central group outside the
official sources that are visibly active online are the virtual mujahidin, a unique status
within ISIS and the frontline of the group’s digital campaign. The virtual mujahid are
those individuals engaged in promoting ISIS online, reposting and maintaining ISIS
media, managing ISIS’s public image, and recruiting (daw’ah). At times, the virtual
mujahid would add to the official materials. One user, “I<3IslamicState”, would produce
small text documents providing advice to the virtual mujahidin in operating online and
supporting the group. Admittedly, these materials did not include particularly useful
details beyond moral support and suggestions for websites and accounts to follow for
new information from the Islamic State. However, I<3IslamicState would also repost
official documents, including an operational security manual, information on the media
war against ISIS, and a publication justifying beheadings. Along with these practical
documents, large collections of ISIS music and images were also uploaded by
I<3IslamicState.
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Related to the direct supporters and actors involved with ISIS are the materials of
other jihadist groups that ISIS has coopted and are influential for terrorist groups and lone
wolfs abroad. The official materials of ISIS focus on doctrinal questions and elaborating
their arguments for legitimacy. As a result, they are not significant tactical resources
(Clifford 2018). Instead of producing their own tactical manuals, ISIS has largely
incorporated and distributed the materials produced by other jihadist groups, particularly
al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda’s own official magazine is recommended as a source of practical
information for carrying out attacks, from Molotov cocktails to car bombs, and are much
easier to find. In addition to the use of their predecessor’s materials, virtual mujahidin
also share and distribute content from other jihadist groups. In part, this may be due to the
lack of discernment by English speaking lone wolf actors between the various jihadist
groups (Clifford 2018). However, this has also occurred as a result of the incorporation of
other jihadist groups under the umbrella of ISIS. A group based in the Philippines would
use its own media division to develop small documents discussing the dangers of the
media war against ISIS and justifying beheadings, a consequence of the many foreign
groups that have pledged allegiance to ISIS as an umbrella organization.
The outermost rim of the virtual caliphate are its sympathizers. These individuals
share images, music, and videos sympathetic or supportive of the group, but typically
lack any significant ideological or operational information. Instead, they serve to valorize
the group, often depicting the mujahidin in a heroic light. At most, these sympathizers
may include a post or an account description that espouses support for the group,
criticism of the West, or reference to the problems facing Muslims. Overall, they include
little substance regarding the group’s wider goals and practices. It is unclear if the
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group’s more maligned practices and positions are known to these users, or if their
admiration is based on issues that overlap with ISIS’s worldview and the romanticizing
of the mujahidin.
Many aspects of ISIS’s worldview overlap with the larger Islamic community.
However, the unique aspects of ISIS’s worldview are not similarly shared by the Muslim
community. It is important to understand these aspects to distinguish how ISIS is unique
and how its views relate to a larger community, from which it may attract supporters. The
major points of overlap revolve around Islam, Sharī’ah, and the establishment of the
Khilafah (caliphate), criticism of the West and the wars in the Middle East, and broader
injustices facing Muslims around the world. For instance, a Facebook page that shares
similar language to ISIS makes references to the kuffar (non-believers, specifically nonMuslims) and addressing Muslim grievances, but makes no calls to violence or jihad.
Instead, it congratulates the legal prosecution of Muslim terrorists in India, but questions
why politicians responsible for greater violence against Muslims remain in power. The
group criticizes the division of the Middle East into nation-states by European powers,
but still lacks any of those unique elements particular to ISIS. This is illustrative of many
communities and accounts that I came across that could be carelessly conflated with ISIS
in much the same way that activists in the previous waves of terrorism would be equated
to the few terrorists that shared their ideals. Some of these communities did not discuss
the group in detail, focusing instead on other issues. However, those groups that did
discuss ISIS would be the fiercest critics of the group online.
The online environment has eliminated the geographic limitations on
communication between people around the world, enabling the growth of communities
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around an array of interests and perspectives. An unintended consequence, and one that
may be of some significance, is that it also facilitates greater interaction with those with
antagonistic views. Despite the focus of this research being on presence of ISIS online, a
great deal of content I came across was antagonistic of the group. In many ways, this is a
natural consequence of the internet’s elimination of boundaries that would normally
separate these discussions. This is best seen in the case of hashtags, keywords used relate
content on social media indicated with a pound sign (#hashtag). In searching for content
using ISIS hashtags the majority of content is aggressively anti-ISIS, and often takes a
mocking tone. At times, these responses and other content can serve to reinforce ISIS’s
message that Muslims are hated by the West, with individuals posting disparaging
remarks about Islam, referring to it as savage or barbaric, or supportive of systematic
violence against the Muslims and the Middle East. Although ISIS would make frequent
references to the West’s hatred of Islam, none of their writings demonstrated this point as
effectively as what was written by westerners.
Individual antagonists are the largest group in the sphere of ISIS antagonists, but
two other distinct collectives also exist. First, several internet social movements have
acted against the group. Typically, these have revolved around coopting the group’s
hashtags, attacking its image, or manipulating search engines to guide users away from
ISIS related content. Sometimes, these have involved minor events that are not explicitly
mobilized against the virtual caliphate such as the development of memes related to the
Islamic State. A nasheed (Islamic poem/song) by the group, “Salil al-Sawarim”, would be
remixed and shared widely, including a version in the style of 8-bit videogames,
electronic dance music, and an anime influenced pop version (Know Your Meme 2015a).
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Other forms of internet collective action would include the ISIS-Chan meme, a grass
roots campaign to counter the ISIS propaganda by disrupting the results returned by
search engines. Instead of propaganda, images of an anthropomorphized ISIS anime
character with a taste for muskmelon would show up in the results for queries for ISIS
content (Know Your Meme 2015b). More sophisticated actions against ISIS by internet
collectives have also existed. Users of the internet platform 4chan would attempt to
mobilize a campaign against ISIS (Menegus 2017). Anonymous, the hacktivist group,
undertook a series of actions against ISIS and ISIS accounts, including Operation Charlie
Hebdo (Brooking 2015). The most organized campaign against ISIS discovered in the
course of this research was the counterpropaganda by the US State Department. This
included a propaganda video that was just as graphic and violent as those produced by
ISIS, only with ominous music and condescending text instead of the inspirational music
and sense of righteousness that accompanies ISIS propaganda videos (Military.com
2014).
The most articulate group opposing ISIS online are the Islamic activist groups that
I encountered in researching the concepts used by ISIS. There are many commonalities in
the collective action frames of ISIS and these communities, but frequently those that
address ISIS forcefully rebuke the group. Halim (2014) calls out the hatred of Muslims in
the West and Western support for dictatorships that carry out massacres as the cause of
the rise of ISIS. The hypocrisy of the US is also criticized, arguing that the US turned a
blind eye to the mass murder of Muslims by ISIS until it attacked US allies. Although
these are issues ISIS frequently evokes, the group is strongly condemned as Khawarij, a
group from Islamic history characterized as viewing themselves as the only group with
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true faith that condemned the rest of mankind as undesirables that to be killed. Even those
supportive of other jihadist groups are critical of the group. A website of an Islamic
scholar echoes similar sentiments and attitudes as those in ISIS’s propaganda, only to
strongly condemn the group for the practice of takfir after praising Osama bin Laden.
ISIS stands alone, almost universally maligned and ideologically opposed to cooperation
with those outside the group. Despite its brutal acts and this opposition, the group has still
been successful in attracting followers around the world, begging the question—why?
4.2.3 The Appeal of ISIS
ISIS-produced content is disorienting to consume (Klausen 2015). Reading the
materials of the Islamic State can result in a sensation of whiplash, where virtuous
positions regarding justice, oppression, equality, and charity are followed by sentiments
of hatred, enslavement, death, and genocide. Images of cats are followed by deceased
mujahidin, racially diverse group photos that could be advertisements for a university are
replaced by images of ISIS’s victims, civilian victims of drone strikes positioned next to
smiling photos of young mujahidin, and inspirational videos cut between heroic fighters
and horrific executions. The articles are no less of a rollercoaster ride, including
comments on racial equality, how to be a virtuous leader, and discussions on the
importance of taking care of those in the community before delving into calls to violence
and religious justifications for pillaging, murder, genocide, and sex slavery. Most
commentary describes the grotesque and disturbing parts of ISIS, and as a result the
aspects of ISIS that may appear positive to its audience is largely ignored, reinforcing the
image of the terrorist as a bloodthirsty lunatic.
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A complete understanding of the group, and how it appeals to people, necessitates
an examination of how it, and others, depict it positively. The major themes in the
positive depiction of ISIS that would contribute to a wider appeal are its image of
professionalism, the humanization and valorization of the mujahidin, and its depiction of
the caliphate. Within its depiction of the caliphate are the group’s claimed values,
including advocacy for justice, the elimination of oppression, and charity. Supporting this
are the many accounts of groups and individuals pledging allegiance (bay’ah) to the
Islamic State, specifically due to the group’s achievement of these values through the
implementation of Sharī’ah.
The professional image conveyed by ISIS’s official media cannot be understated,
and it effectively conveys an air of legitimacy to the group. The images, magazines,
music, and videos of the group are professionally produced, and are equitable in quality
to major media companies and their content. Furthermore, the writing is of similar
quality. Each magazine typically has an overarching theme, and most the articles within
the issue speak to that overall theme. Articles include ample references to the Quran and
Islamic historical sources, and at times include footnotes to clarify points in the articles.
The result of this effort is an air of legitimacy and authority conveyed by its professional
presentation.
In addition to this, ISIS effectively presents the mujahidin in ways that both
humanizes and valorizes them. Pictures and videos of ISIS mujahidin depict smiling
faces and hands joined together in unity. Videos depicting the mujahidin show them
smiling, laughing, and singing. The descriptions of the lives of mujahidin in the memorial
articles echo their humanity. They are described as always smiling, sensitive to injustice,
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ready to help others, and as paragons of humility, sincerity, devotion, and commitment.
These memorials include stories of mujahidin risking their lives for each other and testify
that the fallen were beloved by their brothers. A guide to traveling to the Islamic State
includes jokes about women’s love of clothes and sporks, and a plea for forgiveness if his
travel advice was inaccurate, apologizing and admitting “I am only trying my best, and
trying my best is the best I can do”. In addition to these humanizing accounts, ISIS
mujahidin are often depicted akin to action heroes in pictures, songs, and videos.
The utopian image of the Khilafah, or caliphate, further adds to the allure of the
group. The image conveyed is one of a community overjoyed to be able to practice its
religion freely and fully, including the abolishment of injustice, oppression, and
suffering. According to the writer advising on travel to the Islamic State, “We are a
gregarious Ummah [the Muslim community], we form societies, we live together, helping
one another”. ISIS would also proclaim that “guarding against injustice and wrongdoing
are significant, and they comprise the foundation of our religion”. A great deal of the
Islamic State’s infrastructure, they claim, is dedicated to social justice and the elimination
of oppression. They emphasize welfare programs, equal treatment for the wealthy and
poor, and racial equality under Allah. To address these issues, the Islamic State has
established a healthcare system, an Office for Consumer Protection, and a Central Office
for Investigating Grievances to address injustices between its citizens. The programs they
implement draw from the collectivism of Islam, and in describing these programs justice
and the well-being of Muslims are often emphasized. In addition to these services, the
Islamic State boasts of its charity, providing meat to the needy during Ramadan and
caring for orphans and widows. At the core of these virtuous positions is ISIS’s claim of

85

implementing Sharī’ah, which is presented through interviews and articles as a central
feature that attracted recruits. Notably, these virtuous positions are not a characteristic
unique to ISIS but derived from Islamic beliefs and values (Grieve 2016).
In addition to the materials boasting of the infrastructure and justice implemented
by the Islamic State, there is a wealth of writings and videos justifying its more horrific
practices. The taking of war booty, polygamy, slavery, executions and their methods, and
massacres are extensively defended using the Quran and Islamic texts as the definitive
basis for justifications. At times, the virtuous and atrocious are combined. Racial
prejudice is described as having no place in the caliphate, and “[t]he reason for this is
simple: A Muslim’s loyalty is determined, not by his skin color, his tribal affiliation, or
his last name, but by his faith” (ISIS 2015: 19). The article would go on to say that “[t]he
fate of a kāfir [non-believer] waging war against the Muslims is one and the same across
the entire racial spectrum – slaughter” (ISIS 2015: 19).
4.2.4 Injustice and Hypocrisy
ISIS’s framing of the conflict between Islam and the West is particularly
effective. It accomplishes this by pointing to injustices and relentlessly attacking
hypocrisy in the actions of the West. This is reinforced by individual commentary online
that aggressively attacks Islam online, as well as the realities of prejudice and
discrimination. Gallup found that 43% of Americans harbored some degree of prejudice
towards Muslims, the highest self-reported prejudice of any religious group tested. The
majority of Americans also believe that the majority of the country is prejudiced against
Muslims, and the majority of religious groups believe Muslims are sympathetic towards
al-Qaeda (Younis 2015). ISIS asserts that the West is always hostile to Islam. Muslims in
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the west are described as living in humiliation and disgrace, subject to intrusive policing
and monitoring, and prevented from fully practicing their religion. The manuals they
produce even account for the prejudice and discrimination against Muslims in the West.
They advise concealing one’s actions, avoiding any appearance of ‘military training’
(such as paintball), and even going so far as suggesting a name change to gain
employment more easily, stating that people with Islamic names are less likely to be
hired. The manual for mujahidin in the West describes the struggles facing Muslims in
the West and conditions leading to radicalization:
Many Muslims are putting alot of effort into showing the world that we are
peaceful citizens, we're spending thousands of Euros to do Da'wah (invitation to
Islam) campaigns to show how good we are in society, but we're miserably
failing. The leaders of disbelief repeatedly lie in the media and say that we
Muslims are all terrorists, while we denied it and wanted to be peaceful citizens.
But they have cornered us and forced us into becoming radicalised, and that will
be the cause of their defeat and be the cause for the conquest of Rome…So if
Muslims are portrayed as evil terrorists, then the mass killing which happens to us
afterwards will not be a big deal, infact it will be a sigh of relief for the fooled
masses of people.
In addition to the experience of Muslims in the West, ISIS often references the
deaths of civilians that have occurred throughout the wars in the Middle East. Images of
the women and children that are the victims of airstrikes frequently accompany
condemnations of the West and calls to join the Islamic State. Official statements by the
groups often reference these atrocities and add to them the state repression and violence
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by Middle Eastern regimes supported by Western powers. In explaining their position,
ISIS states:
We hate you for your crimes against the Muslims; your drones and fighter jets
bomb, kill, and maim our people around the world, and your puppets in the
usurped lands of the Muslims oppress, torture, and wage war against anyone who
calls to the truth. As such, we fight you to stop you from killing our men, women,
and children, to liberate those of them whom you imprison and torture, and to take
revenge for the countless Muslims who’ve suffered as a result of your deeds…We
hate you for invading our lands and fight you to repel you and drive you out (ISIS
2017, p. 32).
ISIS emphasizes the contradictory attitudes of Western observers towards the loss
of innocent life to further justify its violence. In justifying beheadings, they would claim
that Americans killed 1.5 million Iraqis, and that the majority of these were children. This
is compared to the outrage over the executions of Americans by the Islamic State, and
consistently this is pointed to as a hypocritical position. This sentiment is not isolated to
ISIS, or even jihadist groups, but is shared by non-violent activist communities. One such
group criticized the Western governments’ treatment of Muslims and the deaths from
wars in the Middle East, while seemingly believing that “if anyone killed a Westerner it
would be as if he killed all mankind” (Abdullah 2016). This accusation of hypocrisy
extends to the treatment of white terrorists in Western nations that target Muslims. In a
manual to be a mujahid in the West, instructions for a nail bomb are accompanied by an
image of a British man in KKK garb in front of a confederate flag. The caption explains
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that this man intended to use a nail bomb to kill people at a mosque. At the bottom of the
image, written in red, are the consequences of this man’s actions, “Sentence: 2 years”.
4.3 THE WORLDVIEW OF THE ISLAMIC STATE
The collection action frame of ISIS, indicting the West as the cause of injustices
against Muslims around the world and deaths in the Middle East, largely overlaps with
other Muslim communities. Similarly, there is some evidence to suggest that the group’s
apocalypticism, although central to the group’s belief system, is not unique to the group
within the Muslim world (Filiu 2011). The features that truly distinguish ISIS from other
jihadist groups and the wider Muslim community are its specific interpretation of hijrah,
jihad, Sharī’ah, and the practice of takfir. The central aspects of ISIS’s belief system can
be divided into its conception of its place in history, its goals for the caliphate, and the
obligations it places on all Muslims.
4.3.1 The Importance of History
To understand ISIS requires understanding its conception of the group’s place in
history, its position in the global arena, and role in the future. ISIS idolizes the historic
eras of Islam, uses Islamic history to justify and inform their behavior, and views their
actions in the context of a longer, protracted struggle against the Western world.
However, ISIS’s conception of history is not limited to the past. The group views its
present struggle a part of foretold historical events ending in the Islamic apocalypse, the
Final Hour. History is essential to understanding many of the group’s justifications of its
actions and the importance it places on those actions. ISIS is explicit in the importance of
history to its dogma, stating, “History repeats itself by Allah’s divine decree. This is the
sunnah (established way) of Allah in His creation…There is no escape from this divine
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decree. It must happen and it certainly will” (ISIS 2014, p. 32). Its official magazine
includes a regular column, “From the Pages of History”, which uses historical events to
justify its actions, reinforce the obligations it imposes on Muslims, and condemn its
enemies. Its actions similarly demonstrate the importance it places on history, specifically
in the destruction of monuments to Syria’s national legacy, since those monuments were
testaments to the evils of nationalism. As is typical to the group’s announcements, this
destruction would be compared to Islamic historical precedent: the destruction of false
idols by Ibrahim (Abrahim), a story shared among the Abrahamic religions that possesses
particular significance within Islam (Grieve 2016).
ISIS’s positions regarding governance, war, and life are primarily derived from
the Quran, the hadiths describing the life of the Prophet Muhammed, or Islamic history.
Often their historical analysis is also used to reinforce the obligations it imposes on all
Muslims. ISIS would cite the battle of Uhud to emphasize listening and obeying leaders,
explaining that when the Muslim army at Uhud suffered calamity and setbacks when they
disobeyed the Prophet (ISIS 2016). Similarly, examples of Prophet Muhammed killing
apostates would be given to justify the Islamic State’s ruling against the Murtaddin
(people that have stopped practicing Islam). Pillaging, slavery, beheadings, genocide, and
many other practices of the group are similarly justified and religiously mandated by ISIS
using historical and religious precedent.
4.3.2 Historical Turning Points
ISIS has positioned itself in the larger context of history by drawing parallels
between the history of Islam and the recent histories of the Middle East, global politics,
and the competing jihadist groups. The group draws explicit parallels between Islamic
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and modern history through its connection of Jahiliyyah (time before Islam) with the
Sykes-Picot agreement, which divided the Middle East into nation-states. Similarly, it
follows this by connecting the Islamic State to the first caliphate and the Golden Age of
Islam as the new Islamic empire. Although every position of the group is steeped in
historical justification, it is particularly important to recognize the historical turning
points emphasized by the group to understand how it places itself in the course of history.
Before there was Islam, there was Jahiliyyah. This is referred to as the period of
ignorance before Islam, characterized by tribal conflict that would be alleviated as the
region came underneath Muslim rule beginning with Muhammed (ISIS 2015b, Grieve
2016). ISIS does not address Jahiliyyah in great detail, instead relying on a shared
understanding of Islam to convey its importance and consequences. The group warns that
those that do not pledge allegiance to the group will die the ‘death of Jahiliyyah’ and
condemns Muslims with nationalist inclinations as belonging to this barbaric period.
Alone, the concept and time period of Jahiliyyah represents a time of division and the
absence of Islam. This historical precedent is most important for its comparison to the
modern historical era’s Sykes-Picot agreement.
Prior to the Sykes-Picot Agreement, the Middle East was not strictly divided into
nation-states, and the Muslim world generally viewed the region as united under Islam
(Greive 2016). This concept of the unity of Muslims across all other divisive boundaries,
such as nationality, tribalism, and race, is one that is heavily emphasized by ISIS in its
writings. The division of the Middle East into separate competing nations by foreign
powers is therefore perceived as a fundamental attack on Islam and a violation of the true
law as established by Allah. As a result, the Sykes-Picot agreement features greatly in
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ISIS’s understanding of the history of the modern world and its problems. The central
issue is that the Sykes-Picot Agreement is viewed as a Western attempt to return the
Middle East to Jahiliyyah (ISIS 2015B). According to ISIS, the agreement illustrates the
strategy of the crusaders to divide and conquer the Muslim World, and their willingness
to permit Islamic symbolism only if it is tainted by nationalism. In turn, this reinforces
ISIS’s emphasis on unity in the Muslim world, so long as it is under the black flag of the
Islamic State.
The second historical event emphasized by the group occurs in the course of the
history of Islam and changes in its religious practices. This event regards the Murji’ah,
irja, the Khawarij, and takfir, and is essential to understanding ISIS given the group’s
unique emphasis on takfir. The Murji’ah guided Islam away from the practice of takfir, or
declaring self-identified Muslims to be non-Muslims due to perceived inadequacies in
their practice of Islam. This development rests on the concept of irja, that only Allah can
judge if a Muslim’s practice of the faith is flawed. Therefore, Muslims cannot judge other
Muslims regarding their religious practice. This is diametrically opposed to the Khawarij,
“who made the performance of all obligations and abandonment of all sins essential for
one to be Muslim” (ISIS 2015c: 42). The Khawarij are remembered as a group that
terrorized other Muslims that did not practice Islam according to the beliefs of the
Khawarij. Although ISIS is quick to critically draw the parallels between present day
Muslims and the Murji’ah, they also strongly deny the frequent accusations of being
Khawarij themselves. However, the Islamic State’s emphasis on takfir and their violence
against Muslims makes this comparison to the Khawarij particularly fitting, ironically
proving their thesis that history repeats itself.
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Other major events of special importance to ISIS revolve around the tradition of
jihad, the examples set by the mujahidin of previous conflicts, and the condemnation of
the group’s enemies. Videos produced by the Islamic state cut quickly between the
modern mujahidin and depictions of their historical counterparts, drawing a direct parallel
between the two. ISIS would draw a direct comparison between themselves and Muslims
facing the Mongol invasion, an example used to illustrate that jihad should never be
abandoned (ISIS 2016b). They use this example to indict Muslims oppose, criticize, or
undermine the mujahidin as blasphemous for their hindrance of jihad, and hypocrites for
abandoning Islam in the face of invaders. This history lesson not only reinforces the
emphasis on jihad as obligatory, but also in undermining the critics of the group (ISIS
2016c). ISIS draws lessons from the Battle of Fallujah on the usefulness of confronting
humiliation with battle and aspirational examples of might, honor, and resistance.
History would also be used as further evidence of the dangerousness of Shiism as
well as the tawaghit, the tyrannical rulers in the Middle East (ISIS 2016d). Historical
critiques also focus on the specific instances of competing jihadist groups cooperating
with Western nations or dictatorial regimes in the Middle East to discredit them (ISIS
2015). Conflicts with the West are similarly historically situated, with ISIS noting that
President Barack Obama’s acknowledgement that war against the Islamic State would
take time echoed the similar statements by President George W. Bush regarding the War
on Terror thirteen years prior, another affirmation for the group that history repeats itself.
4.3.3 A Caliphate Surrounded by Enemies
Based on the historical narrative of ISIS, the group is heralding the revival of
Islam by establishing the Khilafah, ending the divisions created by the Sykes-Picot
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agreement, reinstating the true practice of Islam through Sharī’ah, and providing a refuge
for Muslims from the prejudice and violence of the West. ISIS would declare the
establishment of the caliphate, proclaiming that “[t]he time has come for those
generations that were drowning in oceans of disgrace, being nursed on the milk of
humiliation, and being ruled by the vilest of all people…the time has come for them to
rise.” (ISIS 2014b:9). The caliphate is presented as the solution to the problems facing
Muslims. It emphasizes the ability to fully practice Islam as the primary appeal, but also
includes everything from discrimination and humiliation to economic security by
protecting Muslims from the impending collapse of the corrupt global financial system. It
also provides a safe haven from the enemies of Muslims, the West, Shiism, the tawaghit,
the ‘sorcerous media’, and misleading scholars.
Invoking a history of conflict between Islam and the West, the US and its allies
are consistently referenced throughout ISIS’s writings as crusaders. This has the dual
effect of placing the current conflict into the larger historical narrative, as well as
implicitly framing the current conflict as a defensive war against Western aggressors.
According to ISIS, it is presently engaged in a defense against the final crusade, one
which will end in the coming of the Final Hour (ISIS 2014). In addition to conflicts and
their collateral damage, the West is attacked for its interference and exploitation of the
Middle East, from the Sykes-Picot agreement to the manipulation of Arabic leaders, the
tawaghit. These rulers prevent the worship of Islam as a result of Western influence,
which is demonstrated by ISIS using pictures of US politicians with Arabic leaders (ISIS
2015b).
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In addition to the West and Arabic rulers, Shia Muslims are also specifically
discussed as the most dangerous group that ISIS faces. Referred to as the Rafidi, a
pejorative term which translates as rejectors, Shia Muslims are described as the greatest
enemy ISIS faces. ISIS references a letter written to Osama bin Laden that summarizes
their views: “The Rāfidah [Shia Muslims] are the insurmountable obstacle, the lurking
snake, the scorpion of deception and malice, the prowling enemy, the deadly
poison…The second war is a difficult and fierce one with a scheming enemy [Shia
Muslims] who dresses like a friend, shows approval, and calls to unity, while he conceals
evil and plots day and night” (ISIS 2016d: 41). ISIS continues on to describe the crimes
of Shia Muslims against the Sunni, criticize their practice of Islam as a form of Judaism,
and argue that a Shia savior figure is likely the Dajjal, an Islamic equivalent of the
Antichrist.
The last of category of enemies in physical conflict with ISIS are other jihadist or
armed groups in the region. Some armed groups, such as the Peshmerga, the PKK, and
the FSA, are condemned and discredited as US proxy groups comprised of criminals and
drug dealers. More time is dedicated to addressing competing jihadist groups that have
come into conflict with ISIS. The group clarifies the different types of antagonistic
groups it faces: “1) Islamic factions with an international agenda. 2) “Islamic” factions
with a nationalist agenda. 3) Nationalist factions with an “Islamic” agenda. 4) Secularist
factions with a democratic agenda.” (ISIS 2015c: 52). Groups with nationalist and
democratic dispositions are de facto enemies, since both qualify as kufr, or disbelief.
Islamic factions with international agendas are criticized for not fully implementing
Sharī’ah in their practice of jihad and not practicing takfir, essentially accusing them of

95

not fully practicing Islam. This has led to a coalition of odd bedfellows combating ISIS,
where even al-Qaeda is viewed as an ally against the group by some US officials and
denounced as an enemy by ISIS using these comments as evidence.
The last enemies aligned against ISIS are the sorcerous media and the misleading
scholars that wage a psychological campaign to undermine the group. ISIS dedicates a
great deal of time challenging and attempting to refute the interpretation of Islam by
scholars. According to ISIS, scholars are intermediaries that dilute the religion and
mislead the Muslim community, and that they are unnecessary since the Quran is explicit
in its instructions (ISIS 2015). ISIS is especially critical of the claim by scholars that
Islam is a religion of peace. A group that pledged allegiance to ISIS published an article
justifying beheadings and reiterating the Islamic State’s claims against ‘misleading
scholars’. They argue:
The reality is that the ones who are distorting the image of Islam are not those
who behead the disbelieves [sic] and terrorize them, but it is only the ones who
want it to be Mandela-ism and Ghandism which doesn’t have any killing in it nor
fighting nor violence nor spilling blood nor striking at the throats nor striking of
the necks.
This conflict against Islamic scholars is a part of ISIS’s larger battle for legitimacy as the
true practitioners of Islam. In contrast, their criticism of the media has been a battle for
establishing the truth about the caliphate.
ISIS emphasizes that the media war is one of its most important battlefronts, since
the propaganda of its enemies is meant to discourage would-be mujahidin and undermine
support for the group. According to ISIS, the West bans users from internet platforms in
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order to prevent people from having access to accurate information. They cast doubt on
the strength of the mujahidin while overstating the strength of their militaries and
attributes the Islamic State’s victories to everything but the mujahidin. In addition to
these direct attacks on the character of the Islamic State, the media also undermines the
group by falsely blaming them for attacks as well as disavowing credit for other acts.
Similarly, people that are not central to ISIS and hypocrites are promoted in the Western
media in order to further undermine the group. According to the analysis, the media is
“the psychological weapon able to destroy the will to resist, it is just as lethal, they are
trying to shake the confidence of al-Mujahedeen, the Muslims and the supporters of alMujahedeen, to make them feel as though they are not capable of handling the situation
or that they are wasting their time, to mislead the masses and dissuade them from
supporting them”. ISIS’s writings reassure Western mujahid not to concern themselves
with how the media will depict them, and often accuse the media of misrepresenting
those that carry out attacks in their home countries. ISIS argues that the media distorts the
character of the Islamic State, presenting the group as loving murder and slaughter (ISIS
2015b). To combat this, they include stories of Muslims that are initially fearful of the
group eventually praising its virtues. ISIS even addresses Americans and Europeans
regarding the media, stating that the governments and media are lying about the Islamic
State initiating a war against the West (ISIS 2017b).
4.3.4 Apocalypse Now
Although ISIS usually frames the conflict with the West as a defensive conflict,
the group espouses several decidedly offensive goals in their worldview. This includes
the group’s claim to be central to the impending Islamic apocalypse, the Final Hour. This
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is a part of ISIS’s worldview that is emphasized more than any other aspect, introducing
every issue of its first magazine, Dabiq, with the same quote: “The spark has been lit here
in Iraq, and its heat will continue to intensify – by Allah’s per- mission – until it burns the
crusader armies in Dābiq”. This quote is an explicit reference to the final conflict in the
Islamic apocalypse. The Final Hour looms throughout the writings of ISIS, from this
featured quote to the frequent use of phrases such as ‘as the hour approaches’ and ‘until
the final hour’ as common beginnings and conclusions to their statements and articles.
This is due to ISIS’s belief that it is central to the Final Hour, and the foretold
victory that will end in global conquest. According to ISIS, the Hour will be established
when Romans land near Halab (Aleppo, Syria), where they will be confronted by an army
from Madinah (Saudi Arabia) made up of the best people on earth. A third will flee, a
third will die as the best martyrs, and a third will conquer the Romans, and never be
afflicted by fitnah, which translates as trials or tribulations. After this final great battle the
era of Roman Christians will end, and Muslims will conquer Constantinople (Ishtanbul,
Turkey) and Rome. Romans and Rome feature heavily in the narrative of ISIS but refer to
all Christians of Europe and their colonies by ISIS. This connection to Romans and the
crusades connects the historical conflicts to the present day as the final crusade that ends
in the Final Hour. This apocalypse narrative establishes great rewards for ISIS mujahidin
as the greatest martyrs or an end to suffering and assures a victory over the West that is
mandated by Allah. Furthermore, claiming the Islamic State to be the prophesized final
caliphate is additional proof of the group’s legitimacy. To this end ISIS discusses many
signs that indicate the Hour is near and has taken an active role in fulfilling prophesy.
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ISIS describes its leaders as certain of the approaching of the Hour. This
conviction is used as an additional sign that the Hour approaches, by drawing a historical
comparison to Ibn Taymiyyah, a religious leader whose prophesies were supposedly
fulfilled. This precedent is used to confirm the legitimacy of prophesy, and that
legitimacy is used to support the leadership’s claims that the Hour draws near. ISIS even
acknowledges the outlandishness of claims of prophesy, but they defend the accuracy of
their leadership’s statements. In a footnote, they argue “If one were to make such
statements of certainty [like those of Ibn Taymiyyah] regarding Allah’s promise in our
times, the ignorant claimants of knowledge would accuse him with severe deviance and
heresy!” (ISIS 2014: 36). Effectively, Ibn Taymiyyah would be accused of being a false
prophet today, just as the leadership of ISIS is, so these criticisms do not undermine their
statements on the upcoming apocalypse.
The specific signs that they point to are not compelling on their own, and ISIS is
responsible for fulfilling the most discussed signs. They write: “The battle between the
Muslims and the Jews, between the Muslims and the Romans, and the revival of the
Caliphate, were all from among the signs foretold by the Prophet through revelation. And
yet, the disbeliever doubts” (ISIS 2017: 13). In addition to war and the caliphate, the
adoption of the gold dinar in the caliphate is seen as fulfilling the prophesy that the hour
would come with the discovery of gold (ISIS 2016). Similarly, the reinstitution of slavery
is taken as another sign (ISIS 2014). These signs of the Final Hour are important because
they support the belief of impending and certain victory in addition to substantiating the
legitimacy of ISIS.
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4.4 THE KHILAFAH, SHARĪ’AH, AND TAKFIR
At the core of ISIS’s beliefs is the establishment of the Khilafah, or caliphate.
This is primarily due to their motivation to live their lives Islamically, by the tenets of
Sharī’ah. However, there are several distinct ideological implications of ISIS’s
conception of Islam that dictate the nature of the Khilafah and Sharī’ah. Specifically, the
group’s fundamentalist, or literalist, interpretation of Islam and practice of takfir dictate a
caliphate ruled by conformity and obedience.
4.4.1 The Khilafah, Unity, and Obedience
“The State is a state for all Muslims. The land is for the Muslims, all the Muslims.
O Muslims everywhere, whoever is capable of performing hijrah (emigration) to the
Islamic State, then let him do so” (ISIS 2014b: 11). According to ISIS, the Khilafah is
defined by its adherence to Sharī’ah, espousing ideas of justice, charity, and opposing
oppression. It is a land without the artificial divisions of tribalism or nationalism, where
Muslims can live free from the corrupting influence of the West and freely practice their
religion. The Khilafah is effective, according to ISIS, in providing those services
necessary to meeting the needs of Muslims, including offices responsible for healthcare,
law enforcement, consumer protection, public relations, zakah (a welfare equivalent),
religious education, and addressing injustices. ISIS boasts of bringing stability to the
area, caring for widows and orphans, and ensuring the availability of food and
commodities to those under its authority (ISIS 2014b). The defining features of the
Islamic State are not its governance, but its implementation of ISIS’s interpretation of
Sharī’ah, the unity of Muslims under a single leader, and its quest to unite the world in
Islam.
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The Khilafah is of central importance to the Islamic State, and its completion is
the ultimate goal of the group. The Khilafah is described by ISIS as a source of fear for
the kuffar, the disbelievers. Along with jihad, the Khilafah is presented as a source of
salvation from fitnah (trials/tribulations) facing Muslims. According to ISIS, the
problems facing Muslims can be resolved by avoiding the deviant Muslims that do not
truly practice Islam, Western influences, and sticking to the jama’ah, the Muslim
congregation, and the Imam, used by ISIS to refer to the leader of Muslims: “This new
condition [the establishment of the Khilafah] opens the path for the complete unification
of all Muslim peoples and lands under the single authority of the Khalifah” (ISIS 2014b:
40). These ideas, the unity of Muslims and obedience to a single leader, are second only
to Sharī’ah in their importance to ISIS’s conception of the Khilafah.
ISIS argues that all Muslims should unite underneath the banner of the Islamic
State, disregarding the artificial divisions of nationalism, tribalism, and patriotism. This is
consistent with ISIS’s historical narrative emphasizing the Sykes-Picot treaty as
reinstating Jahiliyyah. According to ISIS, “[t]he Muslim, however, does not accept the
Ummah remaining divided in the name of petty concepts, for he recognizes that the only
acceptable line of division is that which separates between a Muslim and a kāfir, whereas
any other course of division would only be a source of weakness.” (ISIS 2015: 20). The
establishment of the Khilafah, according to ISIS, obligates all Muslims to unite
underneath its banner and not to divide their strength. The importance of the Khilafah is
also directly connected to the historical narrative of ISIS regarding Jahiliyyah. They ask
Muslims to “reject these calls to disunity and come together. Live the life of Islam, for
which you have already left the path of falsehood, and do not die the death of Jahiliyyah,
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a time in which there was no united Muslim nation having pledged allegiance to a single
imam and thus having no obedience to a rightful authority.” (ISIS 2017: 27). This would
lead to a frequent citation, “Whoever comes to you wanting to break your strength or
divide your unity while your matter is altogether under a single man, then kill him…This
is the punishment for one who merely attempts to divide the Muslim Jamā’ah – the
Khilāfah – through propaganda and arms” (ISIS 2016d: 8).
In part, this can be seen in the emphasis on the unity of Muslims under the
Khilafah, but this concept is formally discussed in ISIS’s interpretation of the Islamic
concepts of wala and bara: “the strongest bond of Islam is...love for the sake of Allah and
hate for the sake of Allah” (ISIS 2015: 19). Wala and bara are among the defining
features of ISIS. Those that do not observe these concepts are criticized, such as the alQaeda alliance with the Taliban, since the latter’s nationalism is contradictory to these
concepts (ISIS 2015). The unity of Muslims, specifically their love for each other (wala),
emphasized by ISIS is intimately connected to the hatred of all those outside of the group
(bara): “people around the world [are] gathering based on hatred of cross worshippers,
apostates, crosses borders and ballot boxes” (ISIS 2014c). A consequence of this
emphasis on conformity under the banner of the Islamic State is the harsh punishment
dictated for those that refuse to comply with it, criminalizing their disobedience to the
caliphate. Disunity, such as Islamic scholars criticizing ISIS, is presented as a danger to
the Islamic State by undermining the solidarity of Muslims and enabling their oppression
by the West (ISIS 2016c).
In addition to unity through love of each other and hatred of everyone else, ISIS
emphasizes the importance of the ruler of the caliphate, referred to by ISIS as the imam
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(religious leader) and Khalifah (ruler of the Khilafah/caliphate). Obedience to the imam
is a core component of the Khilafah according to ISIS: “Whoever pledges allegiance to
an imam, giving him his hand in sincerity, should obey him as much as he is able to. And
if another man comes forward disputing his legitimacy, then strike that other man’s
neck.” (ISIS 2014b: 40). The responsibility of Muslims to ‘strike the necks’ of the
disobedient is reiterated throughout the ISIS’s discussions on the importance of
obedience to the ruler of the caliphate. This obedience would be further emphasized by
ISIS in their description of the consequences of not pledging allegiance, or giving bay’ah,
to an Islamic leader. Those that die without pledging bay’ah die a death of Jahiliyyah
(ISIS 2016).
Unity, in ISIS’s conception, does not only imply obedience and hatred of others,
but global conquest. An ISIS recruiter acknowledged that ISIS aspires to kill all those
that try to stop Islam around the world, including everyone that does not agree with the
caliphate (Erelle 2015). According to ISIS, “[t]he shade of this blessed flag [of the
Islamic State] will expand until it covers all eastern and western extents of the Earth,
filling the world with the truth and justice of Islam and putting an end to the falsehood
and tyranny of jāhiliyyah, even if America and its coalition despise such…” (ISIS 2015c:
3). The final goals of ISIS are not limited to Muslim state ruled by Sharī’ah, but require
global unity under Islam. This is dictated primarily by ISIS’s conception of wala and
bara, which demands the annihilation of those that do not practice Islam according to
ISIS. It is also demanded by their interpretation of Islam:
[E]ven if you were to stop bombing us, imprisoning us, torturing us, vilifying us,
and usurping our lands, we would continue to hate you because our primary
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reason for hating you will not cease to exist until you embrace Islam…What’s
equally if not more important to understand is that we fight you, not simply to
punish and deter you, but to bring you true freedom in this life and salvation in
the Hereafter... recognize that we will never stop hating you until you embrace
Islam, and will never stop fighting you until you’re ready to leave the swamp of
warfare and terrorism through the exits we provide, the very exits put forth by our
Lord for the People of the Scripture: Islam, jizyah [a tax or tribute], or – as a last
means of fleeting respite – a temporary truce…If you refuse, then we offer you
the option to pay jizyah and live under the authority of Islam in humiliation (ISIS
2017: 33).
ISIS refers to these three options, annihilation, Islam, or jizyah, consistently as the only
acceptable outcomes for the Islamic State.
4.4.2 Sharī’ah
According to ISIS, all of this is divinely mandated through Sharī’ah. Despite its
practice within the Islamic State and the common misconceptions of it in the West,
Sharī’ah is not a collection of draconian laws with extreme punishments, but a set of
complex, wide ranging, evolving set of principles to help Muslims come closer to Allah
including freedom of speech, expression, and thought (Kuruvilla 2017; Quraishi-Landes
2016; Bristol 2018; Grieve 2016). ISIS has implemented a fundamentalist, or literalist,
interpretation of Sharī’ah that is not shared by the wider Muslim community. ISIS is
highly critical of the broader interpretation of Sharī’ah and Islamic scholars that advance
more modern conceptions of Islam. According to ISIS, scholars advance these
interpretations “for the purpose of advancing an agenda that attempts to “Islamize” more
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“liberal” concepts that the kuffār apply across the board for achieving evil, such as
political pluralism, freedom of religion, and acceptance of sodomites.” (ISIS 2015: 19).
Although Sharī’ah is discussed primarily in reference to its implementation as the
law of the land, it is important to note that, as principles, Sharī’ah informs almost every
aspect of jihad as practiced by ISIS. An analysis of the media war on ISIS incorporates
Quranic verses for support. A manual on operational security explicitly discusses it from
a Sharī’ah point of view, incorporating Islamic beliefs and history. Across the
testimonials of converts to the group and interviews with leaders of organizations that
have pledged allegiance to ISIS the thorough adherence to Sharī’ah in governance and
the practice of jihad is the major appeal of the group. Often, older jihadist organizations
and groups are criticized for not fully adhering to Sharī’ah in their operations (ISIS
2015d).
This is consistent with ISIS’s position that no aspect of life should be ungoverned
by Islam, arguing that others were “treating the Qur’an as a book of chanting and
recitation rather than a book of governance, legislation, and enforcement” (ISIS 2014b:
24). According to ISIS, it is the implementation of Sharī’ah that attracts people to the
group, and a collection of testimonials are presented to attest to this fact (ISIS 2015d).
Similarly, Islamic states are also criticized for sacrificing Islamic principles and not fully
implementing Sharī’ah law. This is especially true for those Arabic states with
democratic institutions, since democracy relies are artificial, man-made law rather than
divine mandate.
At the core of ISIS’s argument against modern democracy is their position that
man-made laws are by inherently inferior to those established by Allah and implemented
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through Sharī’ah. According to ISIS, legislation is the right of Allah alone (ISIS 2015d).
These man-made laws are viewed as fabrications that ignore divinely dictated rule, a
legislation according to man’s whims and desires, and as a result democracy is viewed as
a form of blasphemy (ISIS 2015d; ISIS 2016c). Typically, ISIS is even more explicit in
their attack upon democracy, referring to it as a false idol or religion, along with
nationalism and capitalism (ISIS 2014b; ISIS 2015c; ISIS 2016c).
4.4.3 Takfir
The strict interpretation and enforcement of Sharī’ah by ISIS is central to the
group’s defining characteristic—the practice of takfir. As discussed above, the discussion
of takfir is strongly rooted in a history involving the Murji’ah, irja, and the Khawarij.
ISIS focuses their discussion on the Murji’ah and the concept of irja, and how this results
in Muslims not practicing their faith. According to ISIS, the Murji’ah and modern
Muslims sharing the concept of irja claim “that the abandonment of all obligations and
the performance of all sins does not affect one’s Īmān [belief/faith] even if one were to
completely abandon the pillars of Islam!”. Essentially, ISIS argues that one cannot have
faith without fully practicing the duties it demands. As a result, ISIS labels all Muslims
that do not practice Islam according to the Islamic State’s interpretation as apostates or
non-believers, and apostasy carries a death sentence in the eyes of the group. ISIS has
further elaborated on the practice of takfir, arguing against the use of ignorance as an
excuse against the penalty for apostasy. The official magazines of ISIS include long,
thorough argumentative essays to justify declarations of takfir against groups.
Conversely, articles on proper behavior advise against frivolous claims of takfir (ISIS
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2014d). However, in practice ISIS has developed a framework for easily declaring
antagonistic Muslims as apostates.
According to the Islamic State, a range of modern concepts are forms of apostasy,
including nationalism, patriotism, communism, democracy, tolerance, and the protection
of minorities. Involvement with these concepts, such as political participation, is
therefore cause to be declared an apostate. Extending from this logic, ISIS decries all
Muslims that fight against it as apostates, since combating them is tantamount to fighting
against Sharī’ah to replace it with the blasphemous (kufr) rule of man. Even other jihadist
groups are subject to this judgment when they do not rule by Sharī’ah or oppose the
Islamic State (ISIS 2016). The judgment of takfir carries a heavy penalty, since according
to ISIS it is Sharī’ah, or obligatory, to kill apostates (ISIS 2016c). Notably, ISIS claims to
offer full amnesty to those Muslims that stand against it, so long as they repent and
surrender themselves to the Islamic State (ISIS 2016c). They do not, however, offer the
choice of disagreement. ISIS would draw parallels to Islamic version of the Great Flood
myth as an example that, when people were given a choice in how to practice, they chose
wrong and perished as an example to future generations: “Then, when a group within the
Ummah woke up and rejected this twisted methodology of giving people the choice
between absolute truth and complete falsehood, the members of this group were stained
by this polluted ideology, except those whom Allah had mercy upon.” (ISIS 2014e: 5).
Referred to as murtaddin or apostates, former Muslims that convert to different
religions are particularly demonized by ISIS. “[I]t is also known that the kufr of apostasy
is worse, by consensus, than original kufr. As such, fighting the apostates takes priority
over fighting the original kāfir” (ISIS 2016c). The group also extends their definition of
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the murtaddin to include those that openly commit kufr (disbelief) unapologetically. As a
result, all the actions deemed by the Islamic State to be a violation of Islam, including
fighting against the Islamic State and participating in the democratic process, are
sufficient to condemn other Muslims to death. Not only are Muslims outside of the
Islamic State condemned by ISIS, but their belief system dictates a purge of the
disobedient: “Moreover, had the imam left them alone after having been appointed to his
position and let them continue their rebellion and division, he would be sinful and would
not be acting sincerely towards his Muslim citizens” (ISIS 2014b: 24).
ISIS explicitly describes takfir is one of the most important principles of Islam
(ISIS 2017c). However, ISIS is largely alone in this interpretation of the Quran. The
importance placed on the practice of takfir can also be seen in the effort devoted to its
justification and practice. Their first newsletter would primarily feature a column on
seminar training the group had provided to train new Imams to handle the central
dilemmas of the times; rejecting taghut, making takfir of a kafir, takfir of specific
individual, and not accepting excuses of ignorance to rules when it related to major shirk.
ISIS argues that those that do not embrace takfir are not fully practicing Islam and are,
themselves, comparable to the non-believers (ISIS 2014d; ISIS 2015c). This is because of
ISIS’s position that faith must be expressed in deeds, and not only words and feelings,
and takfir is used to effectively disqualify their opponents as ‘true’ Muslims. Once this
disqualification is applied, death or conformity to ISIS’s Islam are the only options
offered by the group.
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4.5 HIJRAH, JIHAD, AND THE MUJAHIDIN
ISIS is motivated by the value imbued upon the caliphate and their interrelated
beliefs and norms derived from their version of Sharī’ah. What follows are the behaviors
and obligations the group demands not only from its followers, but all Muslims.
Specifically, ISIS calls upon Muslims to travel to the Islamic State in order to wage jihad.
This is core to the central status within the group, the mujahidin, the Islamic warriors of
ISIS.
4.5.1 Hijrah to the Islamic State
There are several behaviors that ISIS declares to be obligatory upon all Muslims.
According to ISIS, a Muslim’s first obligation is to perform hijrah, or emigrate, to the
Islamic State. If extraordinary reasons prevent one from making hijrah, one should
organize bay’at (pledges of allegiance) to the Islamic State and publicize them in order to
demonstrate Muslims’ loyalty to each other and agonize the kuffar (non-believers). If
extreme circumstances beyond one’s control prevents even this, a Muslim’s belief in the
Islamic State as the true Khilafah is sufficient to avoid the death of Jahiliyyah (ISIS
2014e). According to ISIS, the concept of hijrah implies far more than travel to the
Islamic State and is described as an essential step to jihad. However, not all of those
involved with the Islamic State are mujahidin in the traditional sense, fighting in the
Middle East or carrying out terror attacks in their native countries. A new category of
mujahidin has emerged within the virtual caliphate, the virtual mujahidin. The central
roles of the virtual mujahidin are to pledge bay’ah (allegiance), make dawah (recruit),
and to maintain the virtual caliphate.
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Traditionally, hijrah refers to the migration of the Prophet Muhammed from lands
where persecution of Muslims made the practice of difficult. While it continues to refer
to travel for the purposes of avoiding repression the prevents the practice of Islam, ISIS
has incorporated it into its concept of jihad (Uberman and Shay 2016). ISIS describes the
importance of hijrah: “We call upon you so that you leave the life of humiliation,
disgrace, degradation, subordination, loss, emptiness, and poverty, to a life of honor,
respect, leadership, richness, and another matter that you love”. Hijrah is declared to be
obligatory upon all Muslims by ISIS, and the group has intrinsically connected it to jihad
(ISIS 2014b). Hijrah is essential not only for a Muslim’s jihad, but also to protect them
from the negative influence of the West:
Hijrah for Allah’s cause has many purposes, amongst them being to escape
tribulations, fearing that one may fall into them and that his religion may be
affected by them. Also, getting used to seeing kufr and shirk without changing it
could lead to death of the heart, to the point that the person does not recognize
Islam and its people. Also, from amongst the purposes of hijrah is to join the sides
of the Muslims, support them, strengthen their forces, and wage jihād against the
enemies of Allah and their enemies” (ISIS 2015c: 32).
If one cannot make hijrah, he is obligated to attack the enemies of the Islamic State.
Along with takfir, wala, and bara, hijrah is among the unique, defining features of
ISIS. Across the content produced by ISIS hijrah is emphasized as the first duty of all
Muslims. After first meeting an ISIS recruiter online, an undercover reporter would be
propositioned to travel to the Islamic State almost immediately (Erelle 2015). Later, the
recruiter would argue that the reporter’s ostensible religious beliefs demand hijrah. The
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importance of hijrah is further invested with historical parallels, equating it to the
historical hijrah of Prophet Muhammed (ISIS 2014b). This original hijrah of the Prophet
is described by ISIS as the greatest event in the history of Islam (ISIS 2015c). Although
less frequent than tales of the mujahidin, ISIS does tell tales of glamorizing hijrah. The
guide to traveling to the Islamic State includes these adventurous and romantic stories of
hijrah almost as much as it does practical information.
Hijrah is praiseworthy and obligatory but is also important due to its relationship
with jihad and the nature of the Western world. According to ISIS, “There is no life
without Jihad, and there is no Jihad without Hijrah” (ISIS 2014c: 31). The importance of
hijrah is derived in part from this connection to jihad, which ISIS holds to be the greatest
act one can engage in. However, hijrah is also important as a means to escape the
corrupting influence of the West:
After almost twenty years of living under the persecution of the crusaders and the
apostates, one could finally live an Islamic life with safety and security. He was
able to practice his faith in jihād without worry of the kāfir intelligence agencies
suddenly raiding his home. He could pronounce takfīr of the tawāghīt and the
murtaddīn without fear of imprisonment. (ISIS 2016: 29).
Hijrah to the Islamic State provides the first opportunity in a generation to fully practice
Islam, an impossibility in the West. According to ISIS, Muslims in the West suffer from a
Strangeness that is inescapable so long as one remains in Darul-Kufr, land of the
crusaders and non-believers. This Strangeness comes from practicing one’s faith in a land
where others are worshiping clergy, legislatures, the media, and their own desires. This

111

Strangeness compels the Muslim to search for a land to practice Islam more fully, a
compulsion that can be satisfied only through hijrah (ISIS 2016).
In part, this is due to the nature of the West. Living among the disbelievers, the
kuffar, is corrupting and remaining in the West is described as dangerous to one’s faith or
the purity of their spirit (ISIS 2014c). According to ISIS, those that live among the
mushriken (sinners/idolators), frequently used interchangeably with kuffar when
discussing democracy, nationalism, and tolerance which are viewed as false idols, are
like them, which is why the Prophet advised leaving these lands (ISIS 2015c). They argue
that the West is plunged into a spiral of sexual deviance and immorality and disease, one
sign of its eradication of morals (ISIS 2015d). The harmful effects of the West can be
seen in the Muslim youth entangled in a life of drugs, alcohol, gangs, promiscuity, and
other vices (ISIS 2016). Young Muslims must also contend with a school system that
indoctrinates them with ideas of tolerance and blasphemous holidays such as Christmas,
Easter, and Halloween (ISIS 2016). These factors erode the purity of Muslim souls, their
fitrah, that aids him/her in distinguishing the good in the world from the bad, and lead to
questioning the existence of Allah.
To escape the dangers posed by the West to a Muslim’s faith, they must make
hijrah to Darul-Islam, the Islamic State where one can fully practice their religion. ISIS
frequently touts hijrah to the Islamic State as an easy task, but strongly warns against
immigrating out of the Islamic State as a dangerous task, both physically and spiritually.
“[I]t should be known that voluntarily leaving Dārul-Islām for dārul-kufr is a dangerous
major sin, as it is a passage towards kufr and a gate towards one’s children and
grandchildren abandoning Islam for Christianity, atheism, or liberalism.” (ISIS 2015: 22).
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In addition to this spiritual danger, ISIS emphasizes the deaths and injuries incurred by
those that have attempted to leave the Islamic State, driving the point home with
photographic evidence of tragically failed escapes from the caliphate.
4.5.2 Jihad
Hijrah is not the only obligation of Muslims, but the first step toward participation
in jihad and martyrdom: “jihad [is] based upon hijrah [emigration], bay’ah [allegiance],
sam’ (listening), ta’ah (obedience), and i’dad (training), leading to ribat [patrolling
outposts] and qital (fighting), then Khilafah or shahadah [martyrdom]”. ISIS conceives of
jihad as the greatest religious obligation of Muslims, an instrument of change, an
ameliorating action, a natural compulsion, and the greatest possible deed. Recruiters are
encouraged to guide potential recruits to a final conclusion that affirms this—"That Jihad
is the only salvation and solution”. Above all, ISIS emphasizes jihad as an obligation
mandated by Allah. From an official statement, ISIS implores Muslims, “So where are
you O Muslim in relation to the command of your Lord, who commanded you to fast in
one verse, and commanded you with jihād and fighting in dozens of verses?”.
For ISIS, jihad is the only means to achieve change, specifically the creation of a
global caliphate and elimination of non-believers: “The jama’ah [Muslim congregation,
refers to the followers of ISIS] would use the absent obligation of jihad as its
fundamental means for change, implementing Allah’s command, {And fight them until
there is no fitnah and [until] the religion, all of it, is for Allah}” (ISIS 2014b: 35). Jihad is
not only an instrument of change but a means to alleviate the suffering of Muslims.
“Jihād not only grants life on the larger scale of the Ummah [the entire Muslim
community], it also grants a fuller life on the scale of the individual”, curing worry,
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sorrow, humiliation and the effects of subjugation to the West (ISIS 2014c: 31). ISIS
elaborates on the benefits of jihad, describing jihad as a solution to what they refer to as a
“sentimental death”, a condition of sorrow characterized by a longing to commit jihad.
This condition inevitably leads to death, either from sorrow at the abandonment of jihad
or through martyrdom (ISIS 2014c).
ISIS valorizes jihad and the mujahidin that undertake it and condemns those that
avoid or abandon it. Those that avoid jihad are frequently criticized as hypocrites
(munafiqun). Those that abandon jihad are denounced as fornicators, sodomites,
drunkards, or effeminate males (ISIS 2015). In contrast, jihad and the mujahidin that
engage in it, are venerated in the videos and music of ISIS. A refrain from an ISIS
nasheed, an Islamic sung poem, emphasizes the centrality of jihad: "Clashing of the
swords: a nasheed of the defiant.\The path of fighting is the path of life.\So amidst an
assault, tyranny is destroyed.\And concealment of the voice results in the beauty of the
echo”. Another nasheed would similarly emphasize the importance of jihad: “Oh, My
Brothers, Jihad Is The Way\To Bring Back The Honor Of Our Glorious Days.\The
Promise Of Allah Will Always Remain\That Fighting For His Sake Is The Ultimate
Gain”. Jihad is the central behavior to ISIS, and consequently it, and those that engage in
it, the mujahidin, are celebrated.
Although jihad is typically associated primarily with those that engage in
violence, there are many ways to carry out jihad. Jihad includes contributing wealth, and
according to ISIS there is no excuse for anyone that has been blessed with wealth not to
contribute it to jihad, even before all other forms of charity (ISIS 2016e). For the virtual
mujahidin, the preservation of the virtual caliphate and recruitment would be the paths of
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jihad. ISIS even provides guidance to how women can support jihad. Although they state
that women are excused from exercising jihad, the group emphasizes other activities for
women to wage jihad, including financial support, emotional support for their mujahid
husbands, facilitating attacks, reproducing, and raising the next generation of mujahidin
(ISIS 2015). However, jihad is primarily carried out by the mujahidin, and their virtual
counterparts.
4.5.3 The Mujahidin and their Virtual Counterparts
The mujahidin are highly praised throughout the content related to ISIS. At the
most basic level, this involves images, videos, and music valorizing the mujahidin that
are widely shared by sympathizers. Often, this content would emphasize the image of the
mujahidin as action heroes. Many mujahidin or ISIS supporters would post images of
themselves dressed as soldiers in order to get noticed and feel important (Erelle 2015).
An ISIS recruiter would explicitly reference the status conferred by the mujahidin status,
specifically focusing on the mujahidin as the subject of women’s fantasies and warriors
of Allah (Erelle 2015). A manual on being a mujahid in the West explicitly describes it as
operating as a secret agent living a double life and suggests the spy film series The
Bourne Identity as an educational source for spycraft. The manual proclaims in its
conclusion, “You are now your own one man army!”. However, the veneration of the
mujahidin extends beyond this heroic and adventurous image.
ISIS describes the mujahidin as paragons of virtue. They are sincere, humble,
honest, patient, dedicated, generous, valiant, and possess unshakeable resolve. They are
ultimate soldiers fulfilling the command of Allah. They are recognized and admired for
these virtues and sacrifices and are memorialized throughout the ISIS content on the
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internet. The ISIS magazines frequently feature interviews or memorials to commemorate
the valor of the mujahidin and convey their adventures and heroic acts. These memorials
emphasize dedication, generosity, humbleness, a thirst for knowledge, and a refusal to
permit evil. The advice given to the mujahidin encourages them to live up to this image,
with sincerity of action being a common piece of advice. According to ISIS, behaving as
mujahidin should be done not to gain praise or to boast, but to praise Allah and practice
Islam alone.
The group would also emphasize the importance of sacrifice and martyrdom in its
discussion of jihad and being mujahidin. From a manual on being a mujahid in the West:
We ask Him to honor us with the reward of martyrdom for His sake…There is no
doubt that martyrdom for the sake of Allah is a great honor, a blessed rank, a
noble blessing from Allah…They had forgotten that the tree of this Ummah is not
watered except by the blood of its martyrs (ISIS 2016: 38).
Sacrifice would be praised by ISIS, as in the case of the San Bernardino shooters, who
were valorized for their willingness to sacrifice everything for Allah, including a life with
their child.
The fighters in Iraq and Syria, and the attackers in countries around the world, are
not the only claimants of the mujahidin title within ISIS. The virtual mujahidin comprise
the majority of efforts by ISIS online and encompass many more behaviors than
physically fighting. The virtual mujahidin primarily serve a supportive function. One
media center would state:
It is about time that we realized that our brothers need our help. And that help is
not always by money or bodies, sometimes it is by our tongues and words,
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helping them, standing by them, praying for them and refuting the distortions
against them.
Virtual mujahidin are central to the spread of ISIS propaganda and its recruitment efforts,
maintaining the presence of ISIS content online and forming a community to facilitate
recruitment. I<3IslamicState would be supportive in her writing to fellow or aspiring
supporters. From her guide: “how eat a elephant?! its easy step by step! dont get yourself
too tired and always have rest and fun for yourself to be dont tired and enjoy your
jihading!...and i pray for you to be in health and happy and i dream bests for islamic state
and you... i will see you in janah! inshalla...”.
Among the virtual mujahid’s central roles is in organizing bay’at (pledges of
allegiance) to the Islamic State and publicizing them in order to demonstrate Muslims’
loyalty to each other and agonize the kuffar (non-believers). A manual to guide in this
effort further emphasizes the value of the act of recruitment, stating that dawah purifies
the soul and is a requirement to spiritual success. In addition to this primary purpose, the
virtual mujahid should spread ISIS publications and literature. I<3ISIS, a virtual mujahid,
would explicitly describe the job of the virtual mujahid in a short, personal guide:
ok if you dont want to go in islamic state you can help is from your location! if
you just share islamic state propaganda videos you do a big help for islamic state!
or make a your own weblog/website and then share your posts that may help
islamic state!
The various manuals produced by ISIS provide an array of ways to facilitate this, from
advising how to find new accounts after the old accounts were blocked, or how content
will be reposted after being taken down. ISIS encourages the virtual mujahid to take part
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in this, instructing them on how to continually upload and share its materials, and the
virtual mujahidin also produce their own content to augment the official materials.
A virtual mujahid, RealDealISIL, would focus instead on perpetuating the values
of the group by distinguishing between the real and fake mujahidin online. According to
RealDealISIL, real mujahidin espouse enthusiasm, purpose, sincerity and sacrifice. He
primarily criticizes users on online forums that are performatively vocal in their desire to
fight for ISIS.
A real mujahid doesnt ever disclose his intention to anyone even to his own
family rather he maintains high level secrecy and keeps his intention between him
and Allah swt until he insha allah gets to the battlefield or dies on the way getting
there what he does not do is shout out loud his intention or tell anyone…A fake
mujahid is one who is needlessly shouting his mouth off and saying he wants to
join the mujahidin or he openly says to go and fight.
In addition to producing their own content and sharing the original format of official ISIS
documents, virtual mujahidin would also reproduce the official sources in different
formats. An analysis of the media war against ISIS would be copied and posted as a
webpage article on the now defunct ‘Islamic State Times’. Various articles from the
official magazines would be copied into text sharing platforms or forums. Highlighting
the use of diverse platforms, at least one document would be found in slideshow format
on Slideshare, a knowledge sharing platform oriented around slide show presentations.
4.4 CONCLUSION
This virtual ethnography has examined the online presence of ISIS online over the
course of 2018 and 2019. ISIS’s magazines, manuals, videos, and followers are still
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present across many platforms to varying degrees despite the group largely moving to
mobile communication apps since its purge from the most popular platforms online. ISIS
builds off of broad concerns about the injustices and violence against Muslims around the
world and the religion of Islam but distinguishes itself through its conception of wala and
bara, takfir, hijrah, and Sharī’ah. As a result of this unique interpretation of Islam, ISIS
has placed itself at odds with the overwhelming majority of the Muslim community,
including jihadists and their supporters, but the group has used religious justifications and
the caliphate as manifest evidence of its legitimacy as the leader of the Muslim world.
These justifications, the group’s attacks on its ideological competitors, and its online
propagandists, the virtual mujahidin, allowed ISIS to thrive online.
4.4.1 ISIS: An Islamic Aberration
ISIS overlaps with a much larger general social movement, involving many
distinct variations including other jihadist groups and non-violent Islamic movements.
The common aspects of these movements are the shared dimensions of their collective
action frame, specifically the injustices facing Muslims and the responsible parties. These
movements diverge in the details of their collective action frames, particularly in their
call to action. This distinction is largest between the non-violent and jihadist groups
regarding the role of violence in attaining social change. However, in addition to these
differences in framing, ISIS distinguishes itself from other social movements in its
peculiar interpretation of Islam.
Collective action frames focus on the construction of meanings that orient a social
movement by diagnosing a problem in society, attributing blame for that negative
condition, and providing solutions to that problem, calling on people to support the
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collective action. Prior research on the Dabiq magazine has focused on its role in
framing, also acknowledging that it includes a significant amount of content that is better
understood through the lens of subculture theory (Andersen and Sandberg 2018).
Andersen and Sandberg (2018) focus on the subcultural style presented in Dabiq,
specifically focusing on the representations of the mujahidin, celebration of violence, and
jihad as a solution to feelings of alienation among Muslims in the West. However, the
collective action frame of ISIS is a derivation of prior jihadist and non-violent Islamic
activists, and the unique aspects of ISIS’s collective action frame are based on subcultural
beliefs, values, and norms that extend beyond the style of the group.
Many aspects of ISIS’s collective action frame overlaps with other jihadist groups
and non-violent Islamic activists. Criticism of civilian deaths caused by the wars in the
Middle East and problems of prejudice and discrimination in the West are widely
discussed by non-violent Muslim communities. Furthermore, this includes a critique of
the Western double-standard regarding human life, wherein the deaths of Westerners or
victims of the Islamic State are prioritized over the far more numerous Muslim deaths
through collateral damage from the War on Terror. Similarly, the US and Arabic
governments are often blamed for these problems. A focus on the injustices against
Muslims globally and holding US and Arabic governments responsible is not unique to
ISIS and other jihadist groups. ISIS and other jihadist groups distinguish themselves in
their solution to address these problems, arguing for violence as the means for social
change.
ISIS’s conception of wala, bara, takfir, and hijrah further distinguish the group
from other jihadist organizations. This is most clear in the near universal condemnation
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of ISIS as khawarij because of the practice of takfir. Takfir, however, is derived partially
from the group’s interpretation of wala and bara. ISIS has interpreted and formulated
them into an extreme form of an us versus them mentality, proclaiming the deepest love
for all those inside the group who practice Islam according to ISIS’s interpretation and
demanding an equally deep hatred for everyone else. Takfir extends this hatred to other
Muslims, by revoking their Muslim status and declaring them non-believers alongside the
West. Hijrah is similarly embedded in ISIS’s bifurcated worldview of a pure Islamic
State and the corrupting world outside of it. The result of this depiction of the world
demands hijrah by necessity, in addition to its nature as a religious obligation, to escape
from the damage life among non-believers causes to one’s faith and fitrah, one’s human
nature that distinguishes good and evil, right from wrong. The establishment of the
Khilafah, wala, bara, hijrah, and takfir are the aspects of ISIS that defines the group and
sets it apart from other jihadist groups, and these are core cultural aspects unique to it.
ISIS believes in the dangers inherent in living in the West or Muslim nations
where Sharī’ah is not implemented. The group believes that the Khilafah is the only place
to truly worship Islam, that it is a central part of the coming apocalypse, and that modern
concepts of nationality, democracy, capitalism, and legislation are blasphemous idols.
The understanding of the world based on these beliefs is an affront to the values shared
by ISIS members and supporters, values of Sharī’ah and the practice of Islam and the
dream of a caliphate where Islam is practiced freely and fully. Valuing a religious life
lived through Sharī’ah adds greater significance to the norms, or obligations in their
terms, of the group—to pledge bay’ah, make hijrah, wage jihad, and declare takfir. The
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normative aspect of ISIS is highlighted by the social control function of takfir, the strict
observation of Islamic norms and absolute punishments for deviance.
4.4.2 Legitimacy and Group Boundaries
While the doctrine of ISIS comprises the greatest portion of ISIS’s produced
materials, a significant amount of effort is also dedicated to policing the boundaries of the
group, defending its legitimacy, and undermining the legitimacy of its opposition. These
materials have significant implications for both, the framing of ISIS and its subcultural
aspects. The mujahidin are encouraged to be sincere in their actions, acting based on their
religious principles rather than to attain status or praise. With this encouragement, the
group also chastises those that loudly proclaim their intents, or brag about making hijrah
or jihad. ISIS frequently emphasizes its claims of legitimacy as the true caliphate, using
religious precedent to substantiate its position as the true purveyors of Islam. This is
intimately connected to the group’s efforts to undermine those that attack its legitimacy,
particularly the sorcerous media and misleading scholars. This is in addition to attacking
the credibility of competing jihadist groups that may siphon followers from the group.
Within the group, these boundaries are policed regarding participants behavior
and sincerity, clarifying the true mujahidin from posers. Online, this distinction is
emphasized regarding public displays of support or proclamations of intent to make
hijrah or carry out terror attacks. It would similarly be policed by other virtual mujahidin
and in the writings of ISIS. This revolves around the motivation ISIS values and
demands, religious sincerity and humbleness. Followers of ISIS are implored to keep
their intentions secret, between themselves and Allah, and emphasizing the deed as far
more important than mere words. Even those that do accomplish the valued hijrah and
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violence are encouraged not to become braggadocious, since these actions should be done
as a part of a Muslim’s religious practice, and not for praise or status. This emphasis on
sincerity in action through secrecy is characteristic of the value and normative nature of
the obligations the group imposes but may also be a strategic decision. Those that
actively discuss their plans online are more likely to be apprehended before they
successfully travel to the Islamic State or carry out a terrorist attack.
ISIS’s attacks on media coverage and dissenting Islamic scholars are essential to
its claims of legitimacy. These claims primarily derive from the establishment of the
caliphate, the implementation of Sharī’ah, the interpretation of religious texts, and the
declarations of allegiance from individuals and groups. The establishment of the caliphate
is supported with news about the programs and services provided by the Islamic State to
substantiate its claim of implementing Sharī’ah. Further evidence of the implementation
of Sharī’ah includes the declarations of takfir and accounts of the mujahidin and jihadist
groups that have pledged allegiance to ISIS. Frequently these accounts attest to the
complete observance of Sharī’ah within the Islamic State as their reason for joining the
group, sometimes leaving other jihadist groups. The declarations of allegiance that these
individuals and groups make are often featured in the official magazines to support the
ISIS’s demand that all Muslims unify under the Islamic State. The cornerstone of this
support is the interpretation and implementation of Sharī’ah, necessitating the lengthy
religious justifications for all of ISIS’s behaviors.
The significance of Sharī’ah to the legitimacy of ISIS and the Islamic State makes
religious criticisms the most dangerous threat to the group. This may be the reason for the
extensive focus on attacking the Islamic scholars as unnecessary and disruptive to Islam.
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Scholars are presented as unnecessary, since the Quran is an explicit and comprehensive
guide to every aspect of life. They are also dangerous, since they can mislead Muslims
away from their religion. This has resulted in an explicit call for the assassination of
religious scholars and leaders in the West that present Islam as a religion of peace. More
often, ISIS simply presents extensive arguments refuting interpretations of Islam counter
to their own, interpretations that would undermine the Islamic State’s claim of leadership
over the Muslim world.
If scholars attack the basis of legitimacy for the Islamic State, the media attacks
the proof the Islamic State is legitimate. ISIS focuses on the depictions of its strength
relative to its opponents, arguing that the media presents the mujahidin as far weaker than
they truly are and the West as far stronger. This directly contributes to perceptions of the
possible success of the group. Similarly, the group claims the media is misleading in
presenting the Islamic State as bloodthirsty murderers of Muslims, which the group
counters with accounts of Muslims happily surprised by the group’s virtues. Oddly, this
is a somewhat inconsistent position even within the ISIS materials, since the group is
proud of the executions it has carried out in the practice of takfir. Discrediting the media
and encouraging followers to only trust the virtual mujahidin and official ISIS releases
inoculates followers from coverage that would question those manifest signs of the
Islamic State’s legitimacy, such as the success of their governance and services, military
might, and treatment of Muslims.
Sharī’ah and takfir are also the basis for discrediting competing jihadist groups.
At times, these are equated with opposing the Islamic State, or even not actively
supporting it by pledging bay’ah to the group. This is accomplished by first establishing
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the Islamic State’s implementation of Sharī’ah, then equating the Islamic State with
Sharī’ah, and concludes with labeling ISIS’s opposition as opposing Sharī’ah. This is
further substantiated by accounts and descriptions of competing jihadist groups and their
leaders as not fully practicing Sharī’ah in their jihad or implementing Sharī’ah where
they have territorial control. A thorough examination of other jihadist groups can
establish the degree to which prior jihadist groups have policed these boundaries to
determine the role of ISIS’s framing of opposition in the group’s success. Specifically,
this strategy takes advantage of the increased potential for confirmation bias possible
through the internet by preemptively interpreting the competing messages that one will be
exposed to through online navigation.
4.4.3 Virtual Communities, Geographies, and Demographies
Discrediting and undermining oppositional groups may have a significant role in
the success of ISIS, and it should be understood in the context of how these efforts are
facilitated by the ISIS’s virtual campaign. At its height, the virtual caliphate was unique
in the broad net that it cast for supporters, with a large presence on the dominant social
media platforms and even, reportedly, a presence on dating sites and gaming platforms.
ISIS is a lesson on the abolishment of geographic and social limitations for recruitment to
social movements and other collectivities. In its decline, the virtual caliphate illustrates a
different lesson, the difficulty in fully eliminating an entrenched community online.
Despite widespread policing, ISIS materials and accounts still exist across numerous
diverse platforms, and the greatest current barrier to accessing these materials is merely
the knowledge of what to look for and where to find it.
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This is the consequence of the virtual mujahidin and their role in propagating the
virtual caliphate. Although the virtual mujahidin are not as central to the group as the
mujahidin that carry out terror attacks or travel to the Islamic State for combat, they are
significant for their role in attracting followers that do engage in violence. This is
accomplished through the continual maintenance of ISIS materials online in various
forms, from the most sensitive materials involving bomb making to the images valorizing
the mujahidin and jihad. Harnessing these supporters and providing them with materials
to distribute is likely the greatest reason for ISIS’s success online, and this is likely to
emerge as a growing role within social movements well into the future.
Essential to understanding the role of the virtual mujahidin in the broad exposure
to ISIS propaganda is an understanding of the internet as a virtual space, comprised of
platforms akin to the scenes of prior subcultures and a geography dictated not by space,
but by the conditions that modify navigation to internet content. Internet platforms,
particularly social media and content sharing websites, provide areas for niches
supportive of extremist groups like ISIS to grow and gain exposure to non-followers.
Removal from these sites, or impeding their visibility, does not necessarily suffocate a
movement, since the search functions available online allow people to quickly find others
of similar mindsets using a shared terminology. As a result, understanding collectivities
like ISIS online requires an understanding not only of the destination locations, the
internet platforms, but the search engines that structure the discovery of those locations.
Different search engines lead to different paths toward this content, and this becomes
even more relevant when considering the suggested content that platforms automatically
recommend, which can lead to exposure to extremist content independent of traditional
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social ties. These mechanical ties, connections between individuals and content generated
by computer algorithms, have a secondary consequence to this exposure to possible
extremist content, namely a broader exposure to dissenting views.
It was impossible to search for ISIS related content without coming into contact
with a range of other communities and their content online. This ranged from the
unrelated discussions of the Dajjal on a website discussing Islamic mysticism to an
independent, national jihadist group to the oppositional groups condemning takfir. The
ubiquitous nature of competing viewpoints was best illustrated in searching platforms,
such as Twitter, by ISIS related hashtags and the dominantly anti-ISIS results they
produce. Above, the interconnectivity of individuals through these platforms was
described as a means of exposure, but this same interconnectivity produces a situation
wherein there are few areas completely insulated from competing related, neutral, or
oppositional actors and content. This highlights the importance of ISIS’s efforts to
discredit those opposing the group by preemptively undermining them, describing them
as the sorcerous media, misleading scholars, or apostate Muslims. It also highlights how
those oppositional sources can be harnessed for additional support, as illustrated by the
extreme cases of prejudice and hatred against Muslims observed here that confirm ISIS’s
indictments of the West.
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CHAPTER 5
HISTORY ECHOES:
ANARCHIST, ANTICOLONIAL, AND NEW LEFT TERRORISM
The virtual ethnography of ISIS provides a contemporary account of the group’s
online activities. However, it is unclear to what degree ISIS is similar to other terrorist
groups, and, more importantly, how the group’s use of the internet differs role of the
mass media in the spread of prior international waves of terrorism. In order to expand
these findings from the virtual ethnography, a comparative-historical analysis is
undertaken to examine prior terrorist groups. Establishing the similarities between ISIS
and prior terrorist groups allows for an informed examination of the differences in the
spread of terrorist groups through the mass media examined in greater detail in Chapter
Six.
This comparative-historical analysis has examined terrorist groups that were part
of the first three historical waves of terrorism to determine the applicability of subculture
theory to terrorism, and to provide necessary context to the virtual ethnography of ISIS.
The first part of these results examines the dominant themes that emerged in this review
of groups, as well as a focus on those aspects that have been previously theorized to be
relevant to the development of terrorism. These findings have supported the relevance of
the dominant perspectives on terrorism and provide insights into the process through
which grievances and negative social conditions contribute to terrorism as well as how
terrorists act as rational actors. However, the subculture theory explanation of terrorism is
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particularly supported by these results, with groups across countries and waves exhibiting
unique identities that promote violence, diffusion across a social network with varying
levels of commitment, and the role of cultural values in mediating the dominant
explanations of terrorism, grievances and rational choice.
There are several limitations to these observations. First and foremost, the data
collected here is limited to the historical record and those records that are in English. As a
result, the amount of information available is influenced by the interest and level of
commentary that surrounds a group. Germany’s Red Army Faction [RAF], for instance,
has provoked a significant body of literature, and as a result there are significantly more
details available for this group than others. Secondarily, the older waves of terrorism
consequently have fewer direct records and surviving accounts when compared to their
more contemporaneous counterparts. Finally, there are significant political differences in
the interpretation of different acts as terrorism. Anti-colonial struggles have tended to
incorporate terrorist groups into their national narrative, and as a result there is less focus
on these groups with the politically charged label of ‘terrorist’. This is a potential point of
concern as there are fewer recorded anti-colonial and national-separatist groups observed
here than in other waves. However, this is consistent with the work of Sedgwick (2007)
on the foreign influence in the spread of terrorism, who noted relatively little terrorist
activity between 1920 and 1960.
The findings of this research have been divided between the fundamental
characteristics of the terrorist groups, observations related to the grievance and strain
theories, observations related to the rational choice theories, and those related to a
subcultural explanation of terrorism. Notably, themes and consistent observations from
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these categories could be placed in other categories as well. Repression and political
disenfranchisement are important to both, the grievance and rational choice explanations
of terrorism. Similarly, tactics and strategy could be equally appropriate in the
fundamental characteristics of terrorism as well as the rational choice observations. In the
final analysis, these factors are examined in conjunction, but for the purposes of structure
they are presented here with the categories for which they are most relevant.
This chapter first discusses the fundamental characteristics of terrorist groups; the
demographic characteristics of terrorist groups, their origins in social movements and
form, and their tactics and strategies. Second, the grievances and strains related to
motivating the creation of terrorist groups are examined, particularly the difference
between directly experienced and vicarious strains, the relevance of global strains to the
terrorist wave phenomenon, and the importance of understanding the perception of strains
and grievances. Third, the factors relevant to rational choice theories are discussed,
examining groups’ perceptions of alternative options, the achievability of their goals, and
the role of repression in the adoption of terrorism. Finally, the major themes relevant to a
subcultural explanation of terrorism are discussed, specifically the identity component of
terrorism, the construction of terrorists’ morality, and the normative and valued aspects of
violence as a behavior, independent of tactical or strategic benefits. In the conclusion,
these findings are evaluated as a whole and how their support adopting subculture theory
as an explanation of terrorism.
5.1 FUNDAMENTAL CHARACTERISTICS OF TERRORISM
This study of groups across the international waves of terrorism has reaffirmed
and further clarified many of the fundamental characteristics of terrorism. These include
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the lack of a consistent profile of a terrorist, the origins of terrorism in social movements
and their various forms, and the diversity of tactics and strategies used by terrorist
groups. Consistent with prior research, this study found that terrorists come from various
social classes, genders, religions, and nationalities (Smith 1994; Victoroff 2005).
Reaffirming the basic assumption of the rational actor perspectives on terrorism, all
terrorist groups studied here were found to develop out of larger social movements
(Alimi 2011; Oberschall 2004; Beck 2008; Brents and Mshigeni 2004). In addition to
this, the large variability in the structure and characteristics of terrorist groups and their
frequent cooccurrence with other groups and organizations suggests that terrorism should
be studied as movements comprised of individuals, groups, and organizations.
5.1.1 Individuals and a profile
Consistent with previous research, this review of terrorist groups within the first
three major waves of terrorism illustrates the lack of evidence for any terrorist profile
(Victoroff 2005). The terrorist groups reviewed here tend to be largely homogenous in
their memberships, but there is a great deal of diversity across groups. Specifically,
groups tend to coalesce around a particular socioeconomic, religious, or other social
demographic, but this demographic changes across groups. Groups studied here come
from various socioeconomic classes, from the impoverished to the lesser nobility, various
religions and nationalities, and include women to varying degrees.
The Russian Populist and Nihilist groups drew heavily from students, the petit
bourgeois, and minor nobility (Burleigh 2010; Carr 2006). The global anarchist
movement was popular among the working class, and the individual terrorist attacks
came from this demographic (Kemp 2018). Despite common descriptions otherwise, the
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IRA was described by a British official as free of ruffians, made up of young men
without criminal records acting under military orders (Carr 2006). Other nationalist
groups would draw from universities and other classes in society. Groups apart of the
New Left wave in the western democracies and Japan were comprised mainly of
university students but had a larger working class membership in South America.
Although groups comprised of students and intellectuals are overrepresented
within this sample, these groups draw from populations across the class hierarchy, with
the exception of societal elites. Kikuyu peasants and farmers were among the Kenyan
nationalist groups (Carr 2006). The Shining Path in Peru would be started and led by
university intellectuals, but the majority of members were poor (Starn 2019). Educated
middle classes were the leaders of Bengali nationalists (Silvestri 2000), Kenyan armed
groups, and the Argentinian ERP (Carr 2006). Although there is a consistent presence of
educated middle classes, and students or intellectuals specifically, among terrorist groups,
they are not the exclusive proponents of terroristic violence.
No religion has a monopoly on terroristic violence. A small selection illustrates
the religious diversity of terrorism, with Hinduism among Bengali revolutionaries (Heehs
1994), Islam and Hindusim in the HRA (Gupta 1997), Catholics in the Shirtless
Commando (Comando Descamisados) (Moyano 1995) and Montoneros (Carr 2006),
Judaism in the Terrorist Fraction of the People’s Will, Zealots, and Irgun (Burleigh
2010), and Islam among the Algerian Front de Libération Nationale [FLN] (Revere
1973). The first-generation IRA would be comprised primarily of young, single Catholic
males from urban backgrounds and educated by Christian brothers (Burleigh 2010). The
role of religion on terrorism is perhaps best illustrated through the case of the Basque
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Euskadi Ta Askatasuna [ETA]. Members where introduced to politics through church run
scout groups, religious pilgrimages or hiking trips, and other locations where the native
but criminalized Basque language could be spoken freely (Carr 2006). Religion’s role in
terrorism may be less directly inspirational than the role it serves as an institution in
society that facilitates the development of communities of people sharing similar issues.
Although the majority of terrorists are male, the involvement of women in
terrorism appears to be determined more by the gender norms of the society or group than
women’s propensity for terrorism. Women have been involved in terrorism as active
participants and support roles. Cumann na mBann was a women’s organization that
provided vital intelligence, nursing, and material support to the IRA (Burleigh 2010). In
the FLN, a female bomb squad would be made up of university graduates (Carr 2006).
These women were strategically chosen for the squad on the basis of attractiveness and
westernized appearance that would allow them to bypass checkpoints more easily (Carr
2006). The RAF’s organizational structure involved a dual leadership structure, with a
male and female co-leaders (Aust 2009). Although there is frequently a gendered division
of labor across terrorist groups and their supporters, women proven to be just as capable
of terroristic violence. The major factor in their participation appears to be primarily the
groups’ gender norms.
The impact of these demographic characteristics may be less directly influential
on an individual’s adoption of terrorism than indirect, by structuring their experience of
grievances and connections to other people that may adopt terrorism. This indirect link
can lead to any grouping producing a terrorist group, including at least one organization
emerging among mental patients in group therapy run by a psychiatrist that believed all
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mental illness was caused by capitalism (Socialist Patients Collective [SPK]) (Carr 2006).
This is further substantiated by the internal homogeneity of groups and diversity across
national movements, such as the SPK above, or dominantly Jewish anarchist groups in
Russia, Chernoye Znamya (The Black Flag) and the Terrorist Fraction of the People’s
Will (Burleigh 2010; Chaliand and Blin 2007). These demographic factors may not be
direct factors in the adoption of terrorism, but rather dimensions along which people
congregate, associate, or experience strains or grievances.
5.1.2 Social Movements and Terrorism
This review of terrorist groups substantiates the assumption of rational choice
theories that terrorism is a behavior that occurs in the course of a social movement and
extends this assumption by providing support for the analysis of terrorism as movements
rather than individuals, groups, or organizations. Every individual, group and
organization reviewed here emerged out of a larger social movement. Notably, the
entirety of the parent movement does not adopt terrorism, and terrorists vary in their
continued use of alternative means. In addition to emerging out of social movements,
terrorism to be more appropriately classified as a form of social movement than a
behavior of specific individuals, groups, or organizations. This is due to the frequent
presence of sympathizers and support groups in addition to terrorist groups, as well as the
consistent observation of multiple groups and organizations operating for similar causes
and with overlapping or fluid memberships within national campaigns.
Not all terrorist groups emerge similarly from social movements. Terrorist groups
emerge from three sources, the relationships that comprise the social network of the
movement, social movement organizations, and prior terrorist groups or organizations.
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RAF members would first become exposed to Marx and Lenin through their involvement
in the larger New Left movement (Carr 2006; Colvin 2009). Lehi would secede from HaIrgun Ha-Tzevai Ha-Leumi [IZL] due to the group’s belief that the British should be
given no respite while fighting the Nazis (Getter 1980). In India, many members of
Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh [RSS] were defectors from Gandhi’s nonviolent social
movement (Chaliand and Blin 2007). Furthermore, this supports a modification to the
explanations of terrorism that view it as a direct product of individual characteristics or
strains/grievances. Without controlling for the involvement of individuals from these
demographics in social movements it is impossible to determine if these demographics
explain involvement in terrorism, or prior involvement in the social movements that give
rise to terrorism.
Several groups developed as armed wings within traditional political parties and
social movement organizations. The Party of Socialist Revolutionaries [SRs] in Russia
would establish the SR Combat Organization (Burleigh 2010). Fatah would similarly
form a specific military wing, al-Asifah, despite being widely regarded as a terrorist
organization as a whole (Carr 2006). Groups that develop as formal armed wings within
their political parties were relatively rare compared to those that developed through splits
with political parties or social movement organizations or through the connections of
people involved in those movements or organizations.
Many groups would begin through splitting with parent organizations and parties
as a result of their advocacy for violence. Narodnya Volya would split from the second
Zemlya I Volya over the decision to adopt violence. Subsequent organizations would
follow this pattern set by their predecessors when the Union of Socialist Revolutionaries-
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Maximalists would break away from the Party of Socialist Revolutionaries when the
latter renounced violence (Burleigh 2010). Other groups that originate as break away
groups of larger political and social movement organizations include the Action for
National Liberation [ALN] group in Brazil, Japanese United Red Army [URA], and
ETA. The major implication of this observation is that terrorism does not emerge from a
vacuum. The characteristics of the social movement, including its size, level of
organization, and ideological frame, structure the qualities of the terrorist groups that
emerge from it.
In addition to recognizing social movements as the origin point for terrorism, a
variety of forms of terrorism as a behavior have been observed. Specifically, terrorism
has existed as a behavior undertaken by an organization, groups, individuals, and as
movements. This observation is significant because it addresses the assumptions of some
theories that explain terrorism in the context of only one of these forms, particularly
organizations.
It is common to study terrorism as a behavior or strategy of organizations (Park
and Sitter 2016). In developing an overarching theory of collective violence, (Roche
1996) argues that terrorism is characterized by a greater degree of organization that
comes from long running grievances. Several cases within this study exhibit the high
degree of organization that some terrorist entities possess. The IRA and Provisional IRA
[pIRA] are perhaps the quintessential examples of terrorist organizations. Several
terrorist groups develop out of organizations, either as a result of breakaway
organizations or established military wings or organizations. Although the largest and
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most dangerous terrorist entities are formal organizations, terrorism is not a behavior
unique to organizations.
Smaller but more numerous, there are also many terrorist groups that lack the
formal organizational structure of their larger counterparts. The Black Liberation Army
[BLA], Symbionese Liberation Army [SLA], and Weather Underground were all a part
of the larger New Left movement in the US, and even within these groups there was no
centralized organization or chain of command (Roseneau 2013). In Germany, the youth
counterculture movement would produce the RAF, Tupamaros West Berlin, Roaming
Hash Rebels, Mescaleros, SPK, Holgier Meins Commandos, and Black Front (Carr
2006). The revolutionary left in Italy would similarly produce an array of groups with
fluid and overlapping memberships, including the BR, Senza Tregua, Prima Linea,
Autonomia, and Armed Proletarian Nuclei (Carr 2006).
The individual terrorist, or “lone wolf”, is much more rare in the history of
terrorism. In a review of the first three waves of terrorism, individual terrorists are only
represented during the anarchist period. However, it is misleading to view individual
terrorists in isolation from their larger context. Although Ravachol, Valliant, and Henry
would take a central place in the history of anarchist terrorism in France, they made up a
small portion of a wave of anarchist bombings (Shaya 2010). All of these cases occurred
within the context of the larger anarchist movement that these individuals were a part of,
even though their terrorist acts were accomplished independently, albeit with the help of
supporters at times. France was not unique, and despite drawing inspiration from
Narodnya Volya most anarchist attacks were carried out by individuals (Carr 2006; Kemp
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2018). To ascribe an individual level explanation of terrorism to them ignores this larger
milieu that involved numerous other attackers, as well as groups that supported them.
The most appropriate way to explain terrorism is as a distinct form of social
movement. This is because terrorist movements often distinguish themselves from the
originating social movement, and because terrorist organizations, groups, and individuals
rarely appear to occur in isolation. The anarchist and New Left waves were apart of
international movements, and participants within these movements often explicitly
referenced and supported each other. The anarchist wave was characterized by individual
and group attacks, all attacking independently but within the context of the same
movement. Within countries, there are often many more groups than are recorded or
remembered that share membership, pursue similar agendas, or cooperate. This position
is not without precedent, as the Mau Mau of Kenya have been described as lacking any
formal grouping or organization, but as a fight among various groups (Carr 2006).
Furthermore, this approach allows for the incorporation of the financial, tactical, and
other support that groups often receive from the larger movement. For example, the Mau
Mau had an extensive support network that facilitated the hiding of wanted members
(Carr 2006).
In addition to the internal lack of organization among some groups and the
broader community that supports groups, there is are frequently many groups and
organizations operating within nations pursuing similar goals. Between 1903-1907, the
Russian Anarchist movement would involve many different groups, such as Borba
(Struggle), Bezmotivniki (without motive) and Chernoye Znamya (The Black Flag)
despite the frequent focus on Narodnya Volya as the major Russian anarchist group
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(Chaliand and Blin 2007). France in the 1880s was home to many progressive and
revolutionary groups that were poorly documented (Kemp 2018). The Young Bosnia
movement included a collection of groups directly engaged in violence or providing
support to those groups, including The Black Hand (aka Union or Death), Preporod
(Rebirth), and Death or Life (Jackson 2006). The BLA was described as less of an
organized group and more as a concept; any group that espoused its philosophy and
engaged in guerilla warfare was a part of the BLA (Roseneau 2013). In Argentina, the
Montoneros would be remembered as the dominant terrorist group but was one of nine
other major groups that were interrelated through cooperation, mergers, and splinter
groups (Moyano 1995). Many Palestinian organizations exist alongside Fatah and the
PFLP (Carr 2006). The Italian and German groups discussed above similarly reflect this
pattern of multiple groups and organizations using terrorism in pursuit of similar ends.
Expanding on the Italian experience, a detailed study of Italian terrorism for the senate
found roughly 250 communist groups or subversive formations between 1968 and 1982,
and these are among many other anarchist, ecological, and right wing groups (Piscano
1984). Despite this plethora of groups, the historical accounts of New Left terrorism in
Italy is almost wholly focused on the Red Brigades (BR). Compounding the difficulties in
studying terrorism in a group or organizational context is the fluid and overlapping
memberships to these various groups (Carr 2006).
5.2 GRIEVANCES AND STRAINS
Consistent with prior research, this study found that grievances were central to the
development of terrorist campaigns, and that this effect was inconsistent across groups.
Although all groups are related to some form of grievance or strain, these vary in degree
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of severity and whether or not terrorists experience these strains directly. Of particular
interest here are those strains that are global in nature, arising from international relations
or historical developments, so as to distinguish their influence from the international
diffusion of terrorism. There is reason to view each wave of terrorism in the context of a
global or historical strain that impacted many societies around the world. These global
and historical strains serve to highlight the inconsistency that is the varying magnitude of
strains that produce terrorism worldwide and the importance of accounting for the
perception or framing of those strains and grievances.
5.2.1 Objective and Vicarious Strains
This study found that terrorist groups were consistently directly related to some
form of grievance or strain. However, this characteristic is highly variable, encompassing
different types of grievances of different magnitudes, as well as varying in relation to
whether or not members of terrorist groups directly experienced it. Poverty,
discrimination, political disenfranchisement, human rights abuses, and colonialization are
all invoked as the cause of specific terrorist movements around the world throughout
history. Who adopts terrorism as a result of these strains includes the populations
experiencing them, university intellectuals in the same society, as well as people across
the globe in different societies. More important than the specific strains and their
magnitude appear to be the degree to which they are the focus of social movements and
collective action frames.
Consistent with the strain and grievance explanations of terrorism, the largest
terrorist groups and organizations emerge out of negative social conditions including
poverty, discrimination, repression, and political disenfranchisement. The IRB would
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take up arms in response to being required by Britain to export food while Ireland was
experiencing a famine (Nasser 2005). The IRA would continue this armed struggle in
trying to address discrimination in Ireland (Nasser 2005). The FLN would develop out of
conditions of rapid modernization and an economic crisis (Revere 1973). The rapid
decline of the country’s economy and human rights abuses motivated the Tupamaros
(Paul et. al. 2013). The pauperization of the middle class has been connected to the rise of
militant groups in Argentina (Carr 2006, Moyano 1995). In Italy, the BR and similar
groups would develop in the context of a rapidly changing society due to modernization
and industrialization (Orsini 2011). Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam [LTTE] would
develop in the context of discrimination against the Tamil minority, including their
exclusion in language and religion, limitations on university acceptance, and the denial of
citizenship (Yasas 2014).
The Mau Mau in Kenya would be motivated by racial discrimination,
colonization, and repression (Carr 2006). This struggle would be continued by the
Kikuyu Central Association [KAU] and Land and Freedom Army years later in response
to historical grievances and the political and economic domination of the colony (Carr
2006). The ETA would form in response to the criminalization and repression of their
Basque cultural identity (Carr 2006). Other groups emerging in response to occupation
and colonization include the IRA, pIRA, al-Fatah and PFLP in Palestine, Algerian FLN,
EOKA in Cyprus (Carr 2006). Breton nationalist groups would form in France out of
concerns over prejudice, repression of ethnic identity, and a perceived loss of culture, as
well as economic exploitation and internal colonization (Duerr 2015).
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There is a sizable portion of the groups and movements reviewed here that are
motivated primarily by strains experienced by others. This does not wholly characterize
any wave, being present during the anarchist wave, the New Left, and in conjunction with
objective strains. Identification with victims has been included among the risk factors for
engaging in terrorism (Horgan 2008). As a result, terrorist groups are not always acting
on behalf of populations that they are a part of. The Russian groups that developed out of
the Populist movement were comprised of people from privileged backgrounds, whose
parents’ wealth was built on the exploitation of peasants (Carr 2006). In the US, the
Weather Underground would attempt to overcome their white skin privilege by aligning
themselves with the Black Power movement and the Vietcong (Carr 2006).
5.2.2 Global Strains
Despite the overall inconsistency of grievance-based explanations of national
terrorism, there is support for the influence of global or historical based strains on the
adoption of terrorism in distinct waves. The anarchist, national-separatist, and the New
Left waves have all been closely connected to worldwide strains that were a product of
changes in technology or international politics. Nasser (2005) points to the impact of
globalization as a cause of national desperation that motivates terrorism, and also leads to
a homogenization of peoples around the world through their shared experience with
foreign powers. The consequences of industrialization for workers contributed to
widespread support for the anarchist movement (Kemp 2018). The anticolonial wave was
motivated by the impact of colonialization on native peoples and would become
particularly prevalent as international relations changed in the wake of the collapse of the
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Ottoman empire and the World Wars. Finally, the New Left terrorist groups shared
common international grievances against Vietnam and US imperialism.
Although the general grievances of the national-separatist wave existed before the
adoption of terrorism between the 1920s-1960s, the political consequences of the World
Wars and collapse of the Ottoman empire underlies this wave of national-separatist
terror. Irish armed groups were formed throughout history as a result of religious
discrimination, land confiscation, and English occupation. This history of oppression
would reach a high point when the Irish had to export food to Britain during a famine
(Nasser 2005). The strains of colonialization would motivate groups in Palestine, India,
Bosnia, Algeria, and Cyprus. These conflicts would be motivated by long running
grievances, and in many cases the violence observed during the anticolonial wave was a
continuation prior violence. The changes to the international environment as a result of
the World Wars and fall of the Ottoman Empire would provide an opportunity for those
experiencing these long running strains.
The fall of the Ottoman Empire and broken promises by the Western powers led
to the development of the Arab nationalist movement in Palestine, laying the basis for the
Palestinian terror groups of the future (Nasser 2005). The fall of the Ottoman Empire
would similarly contribute to nationalist movements and terrorist groups forming across
the Balkans, including the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization [IMRO] and
related groups in Croatia (Chaliand and Blin 2007). The World Wars would similarly
contribute to the development of nationalist movements across the world (Chaliand and
Blin 2007). The Irish Republicans, Bengali nationalists, and Irgun would view the World
Wars as opportunities to exploit (Carr 2006). The anticolonial wave is partially a product
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of the opportunities afforded by the international environment for those experiencing the
long running strains associated with colonial rule.
The international New Left wave grievances primarily focus on Vietnam and the
Cold War. Cold War conflicts were influential in the formation of terrorist organizations
and is a possible explanation for the widespread adoption of terrorism in the 1960s
(Danzell 2011). Many groups during this era received support from the Soviet Union and
Cuba depending on the groups’ relevance to these nations’ interests (Laqueur 2002). The
common banner for Vietnam and against US imperialism contributed to a collectivism
among the New Left terrorist groups that existed to a smaller degree during the
anticolonial wave and not fully realized in the anarchist wave.
5.2.3 Perception of Strain
The strains and grievances that produce terrorism within this sample are diverse
and vary widely in magnitude and whether or not they were directly experienced. What
these grievances have in common is their embeddedness in the collective action frame of
a social movement. As discussed above, all terrorist groups observed here emerged from
larger social movements. One essential characteristic of social movements is their
development of a frame that identifies an injustice to be addressed. As a result, terrorist
groups are inherently connected to strains and grievances in societies through their
development out of social movements that define those social problems.
Burleigh (2010) argues that the Russian populist movement was inspired by a
sense of guilt among the upper class regarding the circumstances of the rural peasants. In
discussing the factors that led young Italians to join the BR, Orsini (2011) described the
perception of injustice as the primary motivation. The RAF would be motivated by the
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perception that the West German government was secretly fascist (Aust 2009). However,
there is support for the role of strains in the adoption of terrorism as evidenced by the size
difference of groups directly experiencing significant strains, and those acting on the
basis of vicarious strains alone. Additionally, the societal upheavals brought about by
economic development for the anarchist wave, BR in Italy, and some South American
groups, as well as the anticolonial groups in the wake of major international events,
suggests that changes in the status quo may be related to the perception of strains and
grievances.
5.3 THE RATIONALITY OF TERRORISTS
In addition to the support for the rational actor approach’s assumption that
terrorism primarily emerges from social movements, this study found that limitations on
legitimate political opportunities and state repression of social movements were highly
influential in the adoption of terrorism. However, there are significant questions
regarding how terrorists evaluate the effectiveness of other options relative to terrorism,
and whether or not their goals are achievable. Frequently terrorist groups emerge from
societies where legitimate political representation or change is restricted, and especially
in those areas where there is some degree of state repression. In this context the adoption
of terrorism is considered, but its effectiveness is frequently overestimated, and
alternatives dismissed wholesale. Most problematic to rational actor theories of terrorism
is the utopian nature of the goals of many terrorist groups, effectively precluding any
possibility of achieving a victory.
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5.3.1 No Other Choice—Perceptions of Alternative Options
The rational actor explanations of terrorism argue that terrorism is adopted when
it is considered to be more beneficial to achieving a political goal relative to other
methods. Consistent with this argument, terrorism develops in the course of a social
movement as discussed above, and the likelihood of it being adopted is increased when
alternative methods are inhibited through political disenfranchisement or repression.
However, terrorist groups frequently dismiss nonviolent means entirely, despite evidence
that a mixed approach is most effective. This is connected to commonly held belief
among terrorist groups that social change is only possible ‘through the barrel of a gun’.
Social movements as the initial stage inherently confirms the use of alternative
methods by terrorist groups, at least initially. However, the perception of these
alternative, legitimate methods as too slow or ineffective has produced many terrorist
groups. Among the most infamous of the anarchist bombers, Émile Henry would resort to
terrorism in response to the refusal of a company to negotiate during a strike (Laqueur
2002). The Terrorist Fraction of the People’s Will and the Zealots in Palestine would
adopt terrorism out of frustration with the success of non-violent reform (Burleigh 2010).
The Basque ETA would similarly form out of criticisms of the success of its nonviolent
political party counterpart, and the absence of Western support (Duerr 2015).
Organizational failures contributed to an increasing adoption of terrorism as a method by
the first Zemlya I Volya (Burleigh 2010). This trend is seen with the use of other forms of
political violence as well. Left wing terrorism in Venezuala emerged after the failure of
rural guerilla campaigns (Laqueur 2002). The use of terrorism is frequently tied to the
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perception that alternative means are not effective in achieving the political or social
goals of groups.
Political disenfranchisement is frequently a factor that contributes to the adoption
of terrorism through the elimination of alternative, legitimate means to achieve social
change. Muslim Algerians would be refused political rights, leading to the development
of the FLN (Revere 1973). In Peru, the Shining Path would develop in response to
political disenfranchisement and poverty (Starn 2019). Similarly, in Argentina a third of
the electorate would be excluded from the political process (Moyano 1995). The
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam [LTTE] would develop in an area where the minority
group did not have any meaningful representation in the government (Yass 2014).
Consistent with the rational actor explanation of terrorism, areas where alternative,
legitimate political actions are limited contribute to the adoption of political violence.
The changing international landscape demonstrates how terrorism can be
perceived to be an effective tool to achieve social change. Specifically, the anticolonial
wave illustrates how the global structural conditions have impacted the adoption of
terrorism worldwide. After World War II colonized nations found that there were new
audiences to appeal to for support, such as the decolonized nations, the United Nations,
and the communist bloc (Carr 2006). Furthermore, the Irish success in establishing an
independent Ireland inspired revolutionary movements around the world (Carr 2006). As
a result, anticolonial movements now perceived terrorism as a more effective strategy,
through the success of the Irish, the impact of the World Wars on the colonial powers,
and the emergence of an international audience to appeal to for support.
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Infrequently, some groups stopped using terrorism after it was found to be
unsuccessful. The Proletarian Party in Poland would shift to strikes after finding them
more effective (Laqueur 2002). In Russia, Zemlya I Volya would split on the continued
use of terrorism in response to mass executions of activists (Laqueur 2002). SRs would
similarly give up on terrorism as ineffective due to the effectiveness of police infiltration
of the group to disrupt attacks. In the case of the ETA, combining violence with truces
and negotiations was effective at increasing public support and mobilization, and as a
result were more likely to achieve their demands (Criado 2011). This supports a rational
actor explanation of terrorism, since these groups gave up on terrorism when it proved
ineffective. However, one of the primary reasons for many splits among political parties
and social movement organizations and terrorist groups is conflict over the use of
terrorism, specifically the will of at least part of the group or organization to continue to
use terrorism. Narodnya Volya and the Union of SR-Maximalists in Russia split from
Zemlya I Volya and SRs after the groups stopped using terrorism (Burleigh 2010). The
first IRA organization would split into two factions after the treaty splitting Ireland into
two, with a new IRA (with the same name) forming in order to continue fighting for a
united Ireland through force despite the increasing success of conventional political
action (Duerr 2015). This provides mixed support for the rational choice explanation,
since there is evidence of groups using terrorism based its perceived utility, but that
consistently factions within these groups persist in the use of violence even when it is
perceived as ineffective by those in the movement.
In part, the adoption of terrorism as a part of a rational decision calculus should
also address the effectiveness of this approach. Harmon (2010) found that the majority of
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terrorist groups are defeated or only achieve limited success. Other research has argued
that terrorism is wholly ineffective at achieving group goals, that groups do not exhaust
other options prior to adopting terrorism or accept concessions when they do achieve
some success (Abrahms 2008). There is considerably more evidence to support that
terrorism will make achieving these goals more difficult. To the extent to which terrorism
is adopted from the example of other groups, examined in greater detail in the next
chapter, there is little evidence to support the hypothesis that terrorist groups in general
are unaware of the ineffectiveness of the strategy. However, terrorist groups may
overestimate their odds for success by comparing themselves to guerilla campaigns that
are far more likely to be successful (Abrahms and Lula 2012). This is particularly
relevant to the New Left wave given the self-identification of many groups as urban
guerillas.
The perception of terrorism as an effective tool originates in the early adoption
and glorification of dynamite by the Irish groups and anarchists. Irish Republican,
O’Donovan Rossa, would claim in one newspaper that that dynamite “was the best way
for oppressed peoples from all countries to get free from tyranny and oppression” and
“[a] pound of the stuff contained more force than ' a million speeches'” (Burleigh 2010).
The newspaper, United Irishman, would similarly proclaim dynamite as the best remedy
for “old tyrant England” (Burleigh 2010). The wider anarchist movement often
condemned the violent acts of individual terrorists as detrimental to their goals. In the
aftermath of the Ravachol trial in France, an anarchist publication would note that these
violent actors did “more harm than good to the evolution of anarchy” (Heehs 1994:546).
Despite lacking any real success in their own movement, Narodnya Volya, a Russian
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populist group, would inspire Armenian groups, the Hunchakian and the
Dashnaktsouthian, to adopt violence (Sedgwick 2007). The rational actor explanation
accurately reflects those groups who adopt terrorism due to the absence or ineffectiveness
of alternative means and modify their use of violence depending on its success. However,
there is a consistent theme among the terrorist groups examined here to be reluctant to
give up on terrorism once it is adopted, often resulting in organizational splits over the
continued use of violence.
5.3.2 Achievable Goals and Utopian Fantasies
An implicit assumption of the rational actor explanations of terrorism is that the
goal of a terrorist group is achievable. This study finds questionable support for this
assumption, since many groups observed here are acting in the pursuit of a utopian
society that is unachievable. There are exceptions to this, and many groups do have more
specific goals in addition to their primary goal of utopia. Generally, even some of the
more reasonable goals of terrorist groups incorporate some degree of belief that success
means a new society free from the problems of the old one.
The primary goals of terrorists vary in the degree to which they are actually
achievable. The most achievable or realistic goals of terrorist groups reviewed here are
those of the anticolonial and nationalist struggles. Compared to the utopian goals of the
anarchist and Marxist groups to radically change society, the anticolonial and nationalist
groups tend to have discrete, achievable political goals—national independence. There is
some evidence that even these more practical groups suffer from unreasonable
expectations of what success will bring. The pIRA believed that ending British
occupation would solve the problems of Northern Ireland, and former members

150

acknowledged that this was a short-sighted view of the situation and the sectarian conflict
that would continue (English 2004). The HRA would go further, including in their
founding document the explicit goal of a new international order, stating that “The
revolutionary party is not national but international in the sense that its ultimate object is
to bring harmony in the world by respecting and guaranteeing the diverse interests of the
different nations” (HRA 1925). This type of utopian goal is not unique to the HRA and is
particularly common among the anarchist and New Left groups.
Some groups’ goals were inherently unachievable, often through due to their
explicitly utopian nature. This reflects a common theme across some groups in their
misperception of their political environment and possibility of success. Kassel (2009)
observed that anarchist movement generally lacked concrete political aims or noted that
those aims were abstract and unachievable. In his study of the Italian BR, Orsini (2011)
would describe their goal as utopian and only achievable through violence. Japanese New
Left groups similarly aspired to precipitate a global revolution that would transform the
world (Box and McCormack 2004). The utopian nature of the goals of terrorist groups
undermines rational actor explanations of terrorism, since the impossibility of these goals
prevents any legitimate, conventional political behavior from being perceived as
successful.
In addition to questionably achievable goals, several groups observed here
exhibited a poor grasp of the reality of their situations. Some groups perceive themselves
as representatives of the will of the people, not recognizing that the population largely
disagrees or is indifferent to the movement. Narodnya Volya believed that they
represented the will of the people despite the political indifference of the majority of the
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population (Carr 2006). The independence movement of Corsica similarly failed to
recognize that the rest of the population did not want independence (Chaliand and Blin
2007). An unrealistic evaluation of the world and political situation is not limited to the
perceived public support. The RAF perceived the world in a fantastical way detached
from reality, believing the German democracy to be a fascist government in hiding (Carr
2006). According to BR, the world was a sick and putrid place, and violence was the only
way to purify it. Members that renounced violence would attribute the armed struggle to
a superficial analysis of the political and social situation (Carr 2006). This tendency is
seen across the waves of terrorism and illustrates the importance of understanding how
terrorist groups construct the worldview that informs their actions.
5.3.3 A Repression Reaction
Repression is the most consistent factor in the adoption of terrorism among the
groups examined here. Within each movement there is some degree of state repression.
The degree of repression experienced, however, varies widely. Furthermore, many
movements are effectively destroyed through the use of repression. Based on this,
repression appears to be a driving force in the adoption of terrorism, the absolute level of
repression leading to terrorism is less important than the perception of repression, and
terrorism exists primarily within a range of repressive action that enables terrorism and a
level in which a terrorist movement is crushed. Although there is great variation in the
magnitude of repression, symbolic events involving repression are consistently among
the turning points of groups that adopt violence.
Writers and terrorist groups throughout history have consistently explained their
violence in the context of the violence by the state. Heinzen, one of the first intellectual
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justifiers of terrorism, argued that violence must be resorted to in order to fight the
government, a system of violence and murder (Burleigh 2010). The anarchist intellectual
Kropotkin would be a leading apologist for terrorism, arguing that it was justified due to
structural violence (Burleigh 2010). These early ideological influences would be borne
out in the history of terrorism, with repression being the most consistent characteristic of
terrorist groups.
After a series of executions Fenians in England would increase their violent
activities and gain greater support from activists and sympathizers (Burleigh 2010).
Similarly, the brutal suppression of the Easter Rising would create martyrs for
generations of Irish Republicans (as well as some Bengali nationalists) (Chaliand and
Blin 2007). Years later, the pIRA would also adopt violence in response in response to
the deployment of troops and violence occurring in the course of civil rights protests
(Duerr 2015; Nasser 2005). The Russian revolutionary conspiracy, Zemlya i Volya (Land
and Freedom, sometimes translated as Land and Liberty), would develop out of the
repression of the Russian Populism movement which caused many activists to go
underground. The simply named group, The Organization, would go underground after
the repression of Zemlya I Volya, becoming further radicalized and establishing a
dedicated terrorist unit, named Hell (Burleigh 2010). Zemlya I Volya would be the
namesake of a new group a decade later, whose repression would provoke a renewed
adoption of terrorism (Burleigh 2010). The anarchist movement, following in the
footsteps of its Irish and Russian progenitors, would similarly reflect this relationship
between repression and terrorism.
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Like other French anarchists, Henry’s bombing would be in response to the
government repression of anarchists (Laqueur 2002). A leading figure in the Italian
anarchist movement, Luigi Galeani would advocate violence after the violent suppression
of a strike (Larabee 2015). In Japan, the repression of anarchist, socialist, Christian, and
feminist activists would provoke a bomb plot against the Japanese emperor (Kemp 2018).
State repression of strike activities would similarly motivate a bombing by an Australian
anarchist (Kemp 2018).
The nationalist and anticolonial groups that occurred alongside the anarchist
movement and the anticolonial wave similarly reflect this relationship between repression
and terrorism. Hindu nationalists would adopt violence in response to the severity of
British colonial rule generally but was specifically spurred on by a series of British
atrocities that were carried out in retaliation for several killings (Gupta 1997). State terror
and government clamp downs would inspire Palestinian violence as well as the Mau Mau
and other Kenyan armed uprisings (Nasser 2005; Carr 2006). The New Left groups
similarly emerge in national contexts of repression.
Marxist-Leninist groups in Argentina developed in the context of long running
political conflicts and government repression to prevent the politician supported by the
New Left movement from being elected (Moyano 1995). This general trend culminated
in The Night of the Long Batons, wherein the military brutally put down a protest
(Moyano 1995). The Shining Path in Peru would develop in the context of police and
military brutality (Starn 2019). In Japan, the URA would develop out of a history of
conflict with the police, including the criminalization, mass arrests, and incarceration of
protesters (Igarashi 2007). The ETA and related groups would similarly form and grow in
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response to state terror (Duerr 2015). State repression is a consistent factor in the
adoption of terrorism across the historical waves of terrorism, appearing as a factor in the
adoption of terrorism for groups across nations and throughout the history of terrorism.
In addition to state repression, violence against populations by paramilitary or
other civilian groups similarly contributes to the adoption of violence. In 1921 Palestine,
Haganah would be created to protect remote Jewish settlements from anti-semitic
violence, and riots would contribute to Irgun split from the group (Burleigh 2010). The
BLA in the US would develop in response to anti-black violence by the KKK and other
white supremacist groups, as well as police harassment (Roseneau 2013). This would be
reaffirmed when the FBI’s COINTELPRO program was publicly exposed, as well as the
killings of Fred Hampton and George Jackson by police (Roseneau 2013). The pIRA
would similarly develop in response to violence by nonstate actors (O’Doherty 1993).
Although a less factor in the development of terrorist groups, it is important to note that
the violence that inspires terrorism is not always committed by the state.
Although repression is a common theme, there is a huge range in terms of
magnitude. The Russian Populist and Nihilist movements were subject to extreme
repression including massacres by the Russian government (Burleigh 2010). However,
the accidental shooting of a single protestor in the course of the German student
movement was sufficient to motivate the creation of the RAF (Carr 2006). Gudrun
Ensslin, a central member of the RAF, would interpret this accidental shooting as proof
that the police intended to kill all of the activists (Aust 2009; Smith and Moncourt 2009).
The example of the RAF and the shooting of the protester is an example of the type of
inciting repressive events that become symbolically important to the development of
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terrorist groups. Similar to this, the Night of Long Batons in Argentina would incite the
creation of New Left groups in the country, however this illustrates the symbolic
importance of particular repressive events (Moyano 1995). The Argentinian New Left
movement had a history of state repression prior to this event, but this event became
specifically important to the movement.
5.4 A SUBCULTURE OF TERROR
Subculture theory has been argued here to serve as a mediating factor between the
traditional explanations of violence, grievances and rational choice. Many groups possess
various unique cultural peculiarities, but the focus here is on those cultural aspects of
groups that contribute to the adoption of terrorism. Three cultural elements were found
here to be common to most terrorist groups and are directly relevant to the choice to
engage in terrorism. First, terrorist groups and movements often include a unique identity
to those that adopt violence, referred to here as the role of the revolutionist. Second,
groups incorporate similar justifications and worldviews that promote terrorism as a
moral act. Finally, terrorist groups attribute far greater value to violence than merely its
use as a tactic or strategy in the pursuit of social change. These elements are well
represented across the groups examined here, but are also present in the worldview of
ISIS discussed in Chapter Four. This substantiates the relative comparability of ISIS with
these prior international waves of terrorism, and provides the basis of comparing ISIS’s
spread through the internet with the of prior terrorist groups internationally, elaborated on
in Chapter Five.
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5.4.1 Role of the Revolutionist
The most defining and consistent characteristic across terrorist groups in this
sample is the definition of, and aspiration to, an ideal role, the Revolutionist. This role
has a different title depending on the group, its ideology, and time period, but it is
consistent in its description of the terrorist as a romantic hero, a revolutionary virtuoso
motivated to self-sacrifice by the suffering of others. The role of the Revolutionist may
be referred to as terrorist, urban guerilla, revolutionary, or some title specific to the
group, but it is extremely consistent in its core characteristics, romanticism and selfsacrifice. Revolutionists are commemorated across the history of terrorism in poems and
songs. Equally important to the characteristics of this role is how it is used to distinguish
members of terrorist groups from those involved in the larger, non-violent social
movement, and the conformity that the role demands.
In his study on the Red Brigades (BR), Orsini (2011) described the process of
becoming a revolutionary as the learning of the group’s worldview, and in defining the
group as a sect he emphasizes on the importance of the identity gained through the group.
This observation on the importance of the Revolutionist identity in the adoption of
terrorism is largely substantiated by this research. The terrorist is consistently described
as a heroic figure by groups and movements using violence. Some research has suggested
that the idealization of revolutionaries is among the motivations to engage in terrorism.
For instance, Carr (2006) described the motivations of pIRA members partially as a
desire to pursue heroism and adventure to escape the mundanity of life. This motivation
is understandable, given the portrayal of terrorists among their groups and communities.
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Possibly the first treatise focused on the Revolutionist identity, Catechism for a
Revolutionist, by Sergei Nachaev, would describe the revolutionary personality as one
devoid of relationships, a tragic hero and martyr dedicated to revolution (Carr 2006).
Russian anarchist Sergei 'Stepniak' Kravchinsky would describe the terrorist as “a new
historical figure, noble, terrible, fascinating, the martyr and the hero” (Carr 2006). In
describing the history of the Russian Revolution, Lenin (1973) described the hero
worship of populist and nihilist terrorist among members of the movement. SRs would
echo this role, seeing themselves as responding to a revolutionary calling (Carr 2006).
They would believe that “the revolutionary was a hero driven by hate, inspired by honor
and willingness to sacrifice himself” (Laqueur 2002:40).
Among anticolonial groups, IMRO fighters, referring to themselves as the
Comitadjis, were described as initially being romantic and picturesque fighters, not
merely revolutionaries for sport (St. Christowe 2009). Bengali nationalists would honor
Irish republican heroes, claiming an Irish memoir as a bible depicting the terrorist as a
heroic and romantic figure to aspire to (Silvestri 2000). The groups associated with the
Young Bosnia movement similarly identified themselves as archetypal heroes and praised
the virtues of sacrifice (Jackson 2006). Songs and poems to commemorate Irish
revolutionaries across generations of Irish struggles (Laqeuer 2009). The FLN would
clarify three differing roles: the Moudjahid, who is defined and transformed by his ideals
and idealism; the Fidayine, fighters solely dedicated to the revolution; and the
Mousselbeline, courageous peasant auxiliaries conscious of their value and dignity
(Revere 1973).

158

Among the New Left groups, a shared identity would be claimed by groups
around the world—the urban guerilla. Carlos Marighella (2009) described the urban
guerilla as a man who fought dictatorships, a patriot, and a friend to the people and
freedom, possessing bravery and decisiveness, and possessing a series of skills akin to the
heroes of spy movies. The Weather Underground, RAF, Tupamaros, URA, JRA, among
many others considered themselves to be urban guerillas. Among the BR, the Red
Brigadist was described as a doomed man, with no personal interests or attachments, that
dedicated his/her life to destruction in the name of the revolution (Orsini 2011). Despite
different names, across the waves of international terrorism there exists a valued identity
of the Revolutionist that sets terrorists apart from their peers as romantic heroes of the
revolution, ones that would give their lives in the pursuit of social change.
Speaking from the gallows, Kartar Singh of India would proclaim, “If I had to live
more lives than one, I would sacrifice each of them for my country's sake.” (Gupta
1997:14). This illustrates a core characteristic of the Revolutionist identity, the
importance of self-sacrifice. Implicit in the strategy of propaganda by deed was the
recognition that the individual anarchist must sacrifice themselves in order to reach the
widest possible audience with their message (Carr 2006). In Ireland, the IRB would view
themselves as an extension of a history of martyrs for Irish independence (Burleigh
2010). Members of Narodnya Volya were reported to have accepted that they would die
but had accepted this as the price to be paid for the liberation of humanity (Chaliand and
Blin 2007). Sergei Kravchinsky (2009) would identify the terrorist as a fascinating
character, existing as a hero and a martyr. Emma Goldman, despite speaking out against
violence, would romanticize the terrorist as the only fighter willing to take on the evils of
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society (Kassel 2009). Henry, the anarchist bomber, would state that "only anarchists
were capable of self-sacrifice" (Laqueur 2002:129).
Palestinian nationalists would refer to themselves as fedayeen, or those that
sacrifice themselves, and held the belief that their violence could bring redemption to the
humiliated Palestinian diaspora (Carr 2006; Nasser 2005). Indian nationalists would
emphasize the importance of self-sacrifice and name one of their pamphlets O Martyrs
(Gupta 1997). Similar to the IRA before it, the pIRA would view their struggle in terms
of revolutionary sacrifice (Silvestri 2000; Carr 2006). Bengali nationalists would
commemorate IRA martyrs as well as their own (Silvestri 2000). The FLN would make a
conscious attempt to define a revolutionary personality, one that recognized their
sacrifices and ability to achieve social change (Revere 1973)
Lenin (1963) described terrorists in terms of self-sacrifice, but largely criticized
them as ineffective and disconnected from revolutionary theory. His perspective on the
valorization of terrorism is particularly relevant however, given how influential his
writings would become to the adoption of terrorism. Japanese New Left groups would
also emphasize sacrifice (Box and McCormack 2004; Igarashi 2007). The Japanese Red
Army Faction (Sekigun-ha) were described as nostalgic romantics detached from reality
and influenced by a tradition of nationalist self-sacrifice peculiar to Japan, but reflective
of terrorism generally (Box and McCormack 2004). The self-sacrifice aspect of the
Revolutionist identity is among the defining features of terrorist groups studied here, with
it being observed in groups across all of the waves of international terror.
In addition to the construction of this revolutionary identity, some groups have
been observed to rigidly enforce behaviors appropriate for a revolutionary and dedicate
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themselves to demonstrating their authenticity as revolutionaries. The Japanese Red
Army Faction, and the groups that would emerge from it, would emphasize ideological
purity and conformity to the group’s ideals (Box and McCormack 2004). The most
extreme expression were the deaths of group members in the course of self- and groupcriticism sessions by the URA (Box and McCormack 2004; Igarashi 2007). However,
other groups would similarly engage in these criticism sessions, including the BR, RAF,
Weather Underground. The Malayan Races Liberation Army [MRLA] would brutally
punish members perceived to be disloyal or insufficiently committed (Carr 2006). In
addition to the criticism sessions of some groups, many other groups had extraordinarily
rigid rules governing their behavior. The BR manuals included rules encompassing the
lifestyles of members, including a specified bedtime (Carr 2006). However, groups in this
study exhibiting this emphasis on demonstrating authenticity and punishing violations of
the revolutionary identity are limited to the New Left groups. It is therefore unclear if this
is a unique aspect of these groups, or simply unobserved in the other groups.
The concept of the Revolutionist identity can be seen in the qualities attributed to
those that hold the status, the expectation of self-sacrifice and fighting for the cause, and
the degree to which this identity is subject to social control, exemplified in the criticism
sessions of the New Left groups. The final importance characteristic of this identity is
how it is used by groups to distinguish themselves from the larger social movements they
formed in. The best-known anarchist writers often criticized terrorists for their actions
(Shaya 2010). The use of violence was often divisive in the anarchist movements
generally as well (Kemp 2018). Despite these criticisms, there remained a great deal of
idealization of those that engaged in terrorism in the writings of the most influential
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anarchist intellectuals, elevating these individuals within the movement. Like other
groups discussed here, the URA would distinguish itself from the larger New Left
movement by incorporating the willingness to use violence as the litmus test of
revolutionary dedication, and members’ preoccupation with proving their revolutionary
credentials (Carr 2006, Igarashi 2007). This behavior would be seen in the US as well,
where the Weather Underground and other student groups were fixated on the notion that
revolutionary violence was proof of political commitment and moral coherence and
obsessed with demonstrating their authenticity. RAF would criticize the rest of the
movement, describing them as prattlers, insincere comrades, and so-called revolutionaries
(RAF 2009). The RAF would dedicate a significant amount of time in their writings to
attacking the West German Left as nonrevolutionary, ineffective, and lacking action
(Colvin 2009). The emphasis on protecting this identity and using it to distinguish
terrorist groups from the larger, non-violent movements they are related to illustrates the
importance of this role to terrorist groups. Violence is a function of this role that
distinguishes the terrorist, and often this violence is believed to be justified or necessary.
5.4.2 The Morality of Terror
One of the crucial risk factors in the adoption of terrorism is the belief that those
actions are not inherently immoral (Horgan 2008). Terrorist groups often justify their
actions as not only not inherently immoral, but morally required. This emphasis is seen in
the pIRA’s Green Book, which instructs the recruit that the ‘campaign of resistance’ is
morally justified (IRA 2016). The importance of this justification is recognized by the
group, who notes, “It is not an easy thing to take up a gun and go out to kill some person
without strong convictions or justification” (IRA 2016:2). Across groups and waves this
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moral justification for terrorism is extremely consistent, expanding on Carr’s (2006)
observation that extremely similar language was used to justify violence among
anticolonial movements. The terrorist morality perceives the state or other actors as the
aggressors, whose violence far outweighs that of the terrorist, whose actions are done in
self-defense or retaliation. Violence, unfortunately, is the only means to attain a desirable
change in society or right some injustice. In addition to these core principles, supporting
aspects of the terrorist’s moral worldview involve the bifurcation of society,
dehumanization of their enemies, and altruistic nature of their violence.
The RAF would define their actions as altruistic actions similar to the
contemporaries in Italy, the BR, who viewed their violence as a means to save mankind
(Orsini 2011; Colvin 2009). This attitude in the New Left wave of terrorism can be traced
back to the Narodnya Volya but is shared by all terrorist groups that perceive themselves
as acting on the behalf of a population (Carr 2006). This is the belief that terrorism is
inherently an act on behalf of, and to benefit, others. This theme of terrorists’ definitions
of their actions as altruistic is discussed further below, but it is a part of the justification
given for their violence.
The central aspect of the morality of terror is in the comparison it draws between
its own violence and that of the state. Terrorists argue that their violence is minor, or even
purely symbolic, when compared to the violence of the state. State violence not only
diminishes the scope of terroristic violence but justifies its use. Terrorism is a lesser
violence used to fight the greater violence of the state. Among the earliest intellectual
proponents of terrorism, Heinzen (2009:67) succinctly stated “Murder is their [the state’s]
motto, so let murder be their answer”. Anarchist intellectual Bakunin (2009) argued that
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terrorist violence was less costly than state violence. Goldman (2009), despite criticizing
the use of violence by anarchists, would similarly draw the comparison to state violence,
acknowledging that it was the far greater evil. Fanon (1963) focused on violence as an
inherent characteristic of colonial powers, arguing that the colonial world was ruled
through violence. This position was similarly shared by Narodnya Volya’s propagandist
Sergei Kravchinsky (2009), who considered brute force to be the basis of the state.
These attitudes were not held only by the intellectuals that impacted these
movements. Anarchist Henry would argue that his indiscriminate bombing was justified,
since the state indiscriminately repressed the people (Laqueur 2002). In The
Revolutionary, the Hindustan Republican Association [HRA] would state, “[The British]
have no justification to rule over India except the justification of sword and therefore the
revolutionary party had taken to the sword. But the sword of the revolutionary party bears
ideas at its edge.” (HRA 1925). The leader of an unnamed group in Rhodesia would state
that he saw no difference between terrorist attacks and airstrikes or napalm bombings
(Carr 2006). In justifying their bombings and executions, Irgun would claim that their
actions were no worse than those carried out by the British (Carr 2006). One member of
EOKA would go further, arguing that terrorism was more selective than a bomber and
that the ends justified the means (Carr 2006). This sentiment is echoed in the New Left
movements, with the Weather Underground arguing that their violence was purely
symbolic compared to the violence of the state (Larabee 2015). The moral beliefs of
terrorists reflect the consistent role of state repression in the development of terror
groups. The terrorist morality is therefore initially based on the belief of the altruism of
the act and the belief that terrorist violence is minor compared to the state violence it
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seeks to address. However, repression is not only relevant to the terrorist morality as a
justification for violence, but also in framing their attacks as defensive or retributive acts.
In addition to the relativity of violence, terrorist groups often position their
violence as defensive in nature, a response to an attacker, or as a form of vengeance for
attacks. This is consistent with Taylor and Quayle (1994), who found that terrorists
viewed their violence as a response to an attacking enemy. Narodnya Volya’s Tarnovski
(2009) argued that terrorism was a form public defense, comparing it to self-defense.
Indian nationalist Harkabi (2009) would argue for revenge, stating that there was no
crime that Britain had not committed against the Indian people. Fanon (1963) would
similarly frame terrorism as a response to an aggressor, arguing that the colonizers
brought violence into every aspect of the lives of the colonized subject.
In the anarchist era, SRs would describe their terror as defensive response to
repression (Burleigh 2010). The anarchists would exemplify the vengeful aspect of
terrorism. The deaths of French protesters would inspire Ravachol and his group to use
violence, and his death would make him a martyr that provoked a series of bombings
emulating his behavior. Among these is Valliant, who would receive support from
anarchist burglar groups to carry out his own attack. This, and Valliant’s subsequent
execution, inspired Emile Henry to carry out his own bombing (Kemp 2018). In London,
Martial Bourdin would repeat this pattern, carrying out bombings in response to the
excessive sentences of fellow anarchists (Kemp 2018).
This justification would similarly be widely observed among the New Left
groups. The BLA would frame their violence as self-defense or retaliation against police
brutality and what was seen as the occupation of Black communities (Roseneau 2013). In

165

Argentina, election rallies would be accompanied by chants praising Revolutionary
Armed Forces [FAR] commandos for a killing in retaliation for the extrajudicial murders
of sixteen prisoners and calling for further vengeance (Moyano 1995). The Weather
Underground (2009) would explicitly describe their attacks as retaliations for criminal
attacks on minorities, while the RAF (2009) would act in response to indiscriminate
police violence. The state and other enemies of terrorist groups are not only defined as
aggressors, but often perceived by terrorist groups to be an absolute evil that they combat
against.
Terrorist groups tend to frame their struggles as battles between good and evil.
According to Orsini (2011), the Italian BR possessed a binary code mentality, wherein
the world was in danger and there were only two sides, the oppressors and the avengers.
Orsini (2011) describes the ideology of the Italian BR as viewing the world as corrupt
and evil. Violence, in the group’s view, was the only way to purify the world and,
through a dramatic revolution, achieve a perfect world. Although this work on BR is the
most thorough examination of this aspect of terrorist groups, it is a common theme across
terrorists of the different nations, movements, and eras. Emile Henry condemned all the
bourgeois, arguing that none were innocent since all of them lived by exploiting the
unfortunate (Laqueur 2002). Furthermore, Emile Henry would describe French society as
rotted to the core (Shaya 2010). Bakunin (2004:70) would write “So may all healthy
young minds forthwith set themselves to the sacred cause of rooting out evil, purifying
and clearing Russia’s soil by fire and sword…”. Other groups would view themselves as
engaged in similar Manichean wars, such as the Shining Path (Starn 2019) and the Young
Bosnia movement (Jackson 2006). The groups involved in the Young Bosnia movement
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saw the world in terms of cultural degeneration that must be transcended by action
leading to societal rebirth (Jackson 2006). The RAF would also adopt the us versus them
mentality advocated by Eldridge Cleaver, a leader in the Black Panthers and later the
BLA (Colvin 2009). This pattern supports the morality of terrorists, who are acting to
defend the people from the violence of the state and perceive this conflict in terms of a
battle between good and evil to save a troubled world.
This brings this discussion full circle to the violence of terrorists, specifically that
it is a necessary action in order to bring this salvation to the world. Elevating the conflict
to a battle between good and evil that can lead to a utopian revolution justifies any means
to attain that goal, and at this point violence becomes a moral imperative. Heinzen (2009)
would argue for the necessity of murder to stop the violence of the state. Kropotkin
(2009) would similarly argue that a revolution was necessary. Fanon (1963) and Harkabi
(2009) were more specific, both arguing that violence was the only way to end colonial
rule. In part, this belief in the necessity of violence extends beyond the morality of
terrorism and involves the larger beliefs and values that terrorist groups tie to the use of
violence.
5.4.3 The Value of Violence
The dominant interpretation of terrorism is that it is merely a tool or strategy used
in the pursuit of a political, social, or religious goal. However, this is not how violence is
viewed by terrorists themselves. This study has observed a widespread pattern of
attributing an inherent value to acts of violence, for society and the individual. This
supports the conception of terrorist violence as not only a strategy, but as a cultural or
ritual behavior. The most extreme case of this theme is the group Autonomia, who
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inherently valued revolutionary violence and possessed the stated goal of making the
revolution happen, only to disappear afterwards. This is not the first time that terrorist
groups have been observed to attribute an inherent value to violence. In criticizing the
SRs, Lenin would state his belief that they had come to view terrorism as an end in itself
(Chaliand and Blin 2007). The non-tactical or strategic characteristics of violence to
terrorist groups include the inherent value attributed to violence, and the perception by
groups of the necessity of violence to social change.
Drawing parallels between themselves and the French Revolution, Narodnya
Volya viewed terrorism as a righteous instrument of revolutionary justice (Carr 2006).
Years later, the SRs would view “bomb-throwing [as] ‘holy’” (Laqueur 2002:40), and its
military wing, the SRs Combat Organization, would consider killing a high ranked
official as a privilege and honor (Carr 2006). Kropotkin, an anarchist theorist, encouraged
violence as a validating mechanism (Kassel 2009). This sentiment would also be
demonstrated among anticolonial groups. Harkabi (2009) would state that “Violence
liberates people from their shortcomings and anxieties. It inculcates in them both courage
and fearlessness concerning death” and that violence could purify society. This is similar
to the writings of Fanon that would be influential throughout the anticolonial and New
Left wave. According to Fanon (1963), violence was a cleansing force that would
liberate the individual and rid them of their feelings of inferiority, despair, and passivity.
Charan (2009) from the Hindustan Socialist Revolutionary Army would state that
terrorism put fear in the hearts of oppressors, gave hope, courage and self-confidence.
New Left groups would similarly elevate violence beyond a mere tactic. The BR
would vaguely ascribe meaning to all of their actions, raising them to the status of
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revolutionary antagonisms against the state (Carr 2006). In the BR, killing came to be
understood as an act of justice or a loving act towards humanity, since it was done in the
pursuit of a perfect society (Orsini 2011). Part of the reason the BLA split from the Black
Panthers was Eldritch Cleaver’s advocacy for the therapeutic nature of violence against
colonial oppressors, which he derived from the work of Frantz Fanon (Roseneau 2013).
Whether violence is perceived as a therapeutic act for the individual, or a loving act on
behalf of humanity, imbuing violence with this level of significance effectively renders
violence an end in itself and draws into question its purely utilitarian nature. In addition
to this perception of an inherent value to violence, terrorist groups often believe violence
to be a necessary means to attain their ends.
The most basic characteristic of violence as defined by terrorist groups is its
necessity and an emphasis on taking action. The priority of action can be seen in the IRB
(Burleigh 2010), as well as many New Left groups that emphasize the importance of
revolutionary action to developing revolutionary theory. The RAF specifically referenced
Lenin’s belief that Marxist doctrine was only important when it was put into action
(Colvin 2009). Fanon (1963) would view non-violence, as a solution, a proposal of the
colonialist bourgeois. In his view, the only means to liberation from colonial rule was
force. In The Revolutionary, The Hindustan Republican Association would consistently
reiterate the necessity of violence, stating “It is a self-deception to say that India's
political liberty can be attained through peaceful and legitimate means.” (HRA 1925).
Learning from Mao, the Shining Path in Peru would view violence as a universal law that
is necessary to overthrow the old order (Starn 2019). Emphasis on action, PFLP (2009)
would note that revolutionary theory required revolutionary action. Marighella (2009), an
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urban guerilla can only maintain his existence through killing police and those dedicated
to repression. This lesson would be exhibited by the RAF in Germany, whose members
would be chastised if they did not fire on police whenever the opportunity arose (Aust
2009; Schiller 2009; Varon 2004). Consistently across groups violence is not only valued
inherently but is also believed to be the only means to achieve change.
5.5 CONCLUSION
This study has taken a comparative-historical approach to studying terrorist
groups across the anarchist, anticolonial, and New Left waves of terrorism. In particular,
this section has focused on the common factors across terror groups with a particular
focus on those aspects related to subculture theory and the dominant theoretical
explanations of terrorism. Many of the observations of terrorism made previously were
reaffirmed to some degree, but this study has particularly highlighted the relevance of
incorporating the cultural aspects of terrorism. Explaining terrorism as the product of
subcultural socialization is based on the cultural aspects that facilitate and promote
terrorist acts, the existence of those cultural aspects across a social network rather than
unique to a particular individual, group, or organization, and the mediating role
subcultures play between grievances and rational choices.
The evidence from this comparative-historical analysis provides further context to
the virtual ethnography of ISIS. Specifically, it demonstrates that many characteristics of
ISIS are present in terrorist groups from prior historical waves of terrorism. Similar to
prior groups, ISIS emerged out of the larger jihadist movement, is connected to nonviolent social movements, and exists as a movement involving individual attackers,
groups, and the official organization. Its worldview contains many of the common
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cultural elements observed across terrorist groups historically, such as the mujahidin as
their role of the Revolutionist and the holy value attached to jihad. This similarities
ground ISIS in the context of prior terrorist groups, and provide the basis to compare the
differences in the uses of the mass media and the diffusion of terrorism.
There are some notable aspects of the sample used here that may introduce some
bias in the results. First, by studying groups that are involved in international waves of
terrorism the groups studied here may be more similar to each other than those groups
occurring outside of the sample, and artificially inflating the appearance of similarities
across terrorist groups. However, this study has incorporated observations from groups
across these waves and nations, and many of the strongest findings are consistent across
these dimensions. Another major possible limitation of this study is the over
representation of leftist groups on the observed relevance to repression on terrorism.
Danzell (2011) found that left wing parties were more likely to adopt terrorism because
right wing parties were more likely to disenfranchise them once in power. As a result, the
findings presented here may overstate the importance of repression and political
disenfranchisement to terrorism in general, and these findings may not be applicable to
state organized and right-wing groups.
5.5.1 Subcultures and a Revolutionary Identity
The terrorist group distinguishes itself from the larger social movement through
the construction and adoption of a unique role of the Revolutionist. This role is highly
valued and praised, inspiring songs, poems, and literature, but comes with stringent
demands on the part of the would-be Revolutionist. In fulfilling this role, the terrorist
adopts a worldview that promotes terrorism as a necessary and moral act for the good of a
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wider group for whom the terrorist sacrifices their bonds, freedoms, and life. However,
violence is not only a confirmation of one’s identity as a revolutionist or necessary evil
for a greater good, but an inherently valuable act that enriches its perpetrator or purifies
the world. The role of the Revolutionist, foundational beliefs of the terrorist morality, and
value of violence are common cultural elements that are uniquely expressed across the
terrorist groups in this sample.
Prior research on subcultures has emphasized the importance of roles and
authenticity to gaining status (Melder 2014; Anderson 2009). Furthermore, those roles
that were most central, or authentic, to the subculture often come with the greatest status
and demands the greatest adherence to its norms and values. The Revolutionist identity
reflects these relationships, with terrorists possessing a unique identity that is distinct
among their supporters and sympathizers as well as the larger movement. This identity
requires the greatest commitment by the individual, involving self-sacrifice and isolation
from larger society. However, those that become Revolutionists are often memorialized
as martyrs for the cause, living on in songs, poems, and sometimes namesakes to new
terrorist groups.
While the Revolutionist identity appears to distinguish terrorists from the larger
social movements they are a part of, they also appear to have several common beliefs and
values across groups that justify and facilitate violence. The morality of terrorism is
extremely consistent across groups, including the minimization of their violence, placing
themselves as defenders or avengers, and characterizing their struggle as a battle of good
and evil that can bring salvation to a suffering world. This morality justifies the use of
violence by minimizing the damage it does, removing responsibility for their violence by
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blaming it on an attacking state, by introducing utopian ends that would justify any
means, and by dehumanizing their enemies as a part of the evils of the world.
While the morality of terrorism facilitates the use of violence, the beliefs and
values of groups demand it. Although there are exceptions, many groups believe that
violence is the exclusive means to attaining their goals. Even when groups do renounce
violence this frequently results in a break away group or organization that maintains the
necessity of violence. The perception of violence as the singular means of social change
is embedded in the ideologies and writings that are influential on the adoption of
terrorism, and this certainly impacts the evaluations of alternative means. At the extreme,
violence is valued in itself, far beyond its utilitarian value to obtain social change.
Popularized by Fanon, violence is described as a therapeutic and almost curative solution
to the strains facing people, specifically colonized subjects. Violence would similarly
gain significance to many New Left groups through the belief that Marxist doctrine
required action to be realized, and this action would further inform their revolutionary
theory.
5.5.2 Terrorist Movements
Subcultures are distinguished not only by their peculiar norms, values, and
beliefs, but their distribution through a social network. This study has found that the
means, goals, and culture of terrorist groups are not limited to the boundaries of groups
and organizations, but are widely distributed and shared by many individuals, groups, and
organizations. Furthermore, the cultural elements particular to each group, and those
discussed above that are common to most, are shared to varying degrees beyond the
group, in the same way subcultures exhibit varying levels of involvement.
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In discussing the forms of terrorist groups it was argued here that it is most
appropriate to examine terrorism as movements, rather than individuals, groups, or
organizations. This is because the terrorist groups observed here rarely occurred in
isolation within their own nations and were frequently accompanied by many additional
groups and organizations. Frequently the terrorist groups and organizations observed here
shared similar worldviews and goals, and often there were connections between these
groups in terms of memberships. In addition to the distribution of this shared perspective
among terrorist groups, their ideologies and perspectives extended beyond their borders.
In discussing the role of the Revolutionist, the relevance of the research on
authenticity to participation in deviant subcultures was discussed, emphasizing the status
afforded to those occupying the central statuses in subcultures. Conversely, the varying
participation in a subculture as a product of socialization provides an explanation for the
support networks and sympathizers of terrorist groups. These groups adhere to a similar
belief system, but do not achieve that role of revolutionist. The sister organization to the
IRA, radical burglars that funded anarchist bombings and newspapers, and even the
intellectuals and publishers that broadly advocated violence comprise a broader, but
essential, ecosystem for terrorism.
The culture of terror, its moral beliefs, violent values, and revolutionary identity,
can therefore be seen to be distributed across social networks with varying levels of
participation and involvement. The worldview of terrorists are not bound by group or
organizational membership, but is widely shared by multiple interconnected groups.
Furthermore, this worldview is distributed to varying degrees across their supporters and
sympathizers.
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5.5.3 Mediating Grievances and Rationality
The last, central aspect of demonstrating subcultures as a relevant explanation of
terrorism are their role as mediating factors between the grievances and rational choices.
Although this study has substantiated and reaffirmed many of the basic findings of
previous studies testing these explanations, it has also highlighted the importance of how
these factors are perceived. The impact of grievances and strains on the adoption of
terrorism is not direct, demonstrated here through the wide range of social conditions that
have produced terrorist movements. More important is the collective recognition of a
strain as a social problem. Similarly, rational actors are heavily influenced by the
collective perceptions of the viability of terrorism and alternative methods. More
fundamentally, the goal of these actors is socially constructed, and its utopian nature
justifies extreme measures and necessitates the failure of all other options.
This research reiterates the inconsistent role of grievances and strains on the
development of terrorism. While all groups make reference to specific grievances as the
motivation for their actions, there is a wide variety among these grievances. Some groups
are comprised of those directly impacted by the strains and grievances, whereas others
claim to act on their behalf. There is a huge range in terms of magnitude. Regarding
repression, some groups develop out of conditions of mass incarceration and extrajudicial
killings, while for others skirmishes with police or a single accidental shooting of a
protestor is sufficient. However, there does appear to be an upper limit at which point
repression crushes extremist groups, as seen in the case of the first Zemlya I Volya.
Economic inequality and deprivation ranges from the extremes of the Irish Great Famine
to the less life-threatening concern over consumerism of the Japanese New Left groups.
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Even the level of racial and religious discrimination observed as motivations for terrorist
groups have a wide range, from the extremes found in colonial settings to the fight for
equal rights and treatment in Ireland and the US.
Instead, these findings support an emphasis on the perception of grievances and
strains. This is likely to be strongly connected to social movements, since they involve
the construction of social problems and mobilization of a population. Therefore, the
definition of grievances may not be a direct factor on the adoption of terrorism but a
consequence of the social movements that terrorist groups develop from. The framing of
social problems that occurs in the course of social movements additionally explains the
vicarious connection between some terrorists and the grievances that underlie their
campaigns.
The rational choice explanation of terrorism was largely substantiated by this
research with several caveats. First, this study substantiates the assumption that terrorist
groups emerge out of social movements. Furthermore, political disenfranchisement and
repression were both found to be consistent factors in different groups adopting terrorism.
These factors would limit or eliminate the ability of non-violent political action, and as
such it would be expected that they would contribute to the adoption of violence as a
political tool. Furthermore, the tactics and strategies of terrorist groups are intimately tied
to the decisions of many groups in how to use violence, with several groups avoiding
civilian casualties or modifying their behavior in order to appeal to the public. This is
particularly evident in times of opportunity, such as the aftermath of the World Wars,
when the ability of terrorism to draw international attention to a cause would be most
politically useful.
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Despite this support, there are several factors that the rational actor explanations
do not address. First, the level of political disenfranchisement and repression that produce
terrorism is highly variable, and it appears that certain repressive events gain a symbolic
importance that contributes strongly to the development of terrorism, even when there is
a prior history of repressive action. Second, although there are groups that modify their
behavior to increase the effectiveness of terrorism, or cease its use altogether, this
frequently results in splinter groups that continue the use of terrorism due to the belief in
its effectiveness. This is complicated by the inherent value some terrorist groups have
assigned to violence, as well as the more common belief that social change is only
possible through violence. The largest challenge to the rational choice explanation of
terrorism is the pursuit by many groups of unachievable ends, such as the utopian goals
of anarchism and Marxism. These utopian or unachievable goals are shared with the
anticolonial movements as well, either through the influence of Marxism or a politically
naïve expectation of the outcome of anticolonial struggles.
The role of grievances and strains on terrorism appears to be primarily indirect,
through motivating a social movement. Terrorist groups are often a small element among
this larger social movement, which includes activists, terrorists, sympathizers, and
supporters. The participants of these social movements share similar collective action
frames, particularly a recognition of an injustice. Therefore, part of the worldview that
motivates terrorist acts is established from social movement involvement. In addition to
distinguishing themselves from the larger social movement through the use of violence,
terrorists appear to aspire be revolutionaries, a revered status which demands action.
Facilitating violent behavior is the morality that frequently accompanies terrorist groups,
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which minimizes and justifies terroristic violence as an altruistic act and removes blame
from the terrorist by framing the attacks as defensive. The final recurring cultural aspect
of terrorist groups is the belief in the necessity of violence, and, to a lesser degree, the
inherent value attributed to violence.
This illustrates one of the problems with a purely rational choice explanation of
terrorism. Although some groups exhibit accurately informed, rational behavior, many
groups hold particular beliefs and values that directly impact their perceptions of the
efficacy of terrorism, the political environment, and the importance of their goals. These
perceptions are important because rational actors, terrorists especially, act based on their
perceptions of the cost/benefit analysis. The inherent value attributed to terrorism
precludes its use as a tool for political gain. The belief in the necessity of violence to
achieve social change is a core aspect of many of the groups’ worldviews examined here,
to the extent that alternative, legitimate means are renounced, and groups split over the
use of violence. Furthermore, many terrorist groups perceive their campaigns as mythic
battles between good and evil, oppressors and oppressed, and view the outcome of their
struggles in utopian terms.
Subculture theory provides an explanation for these perceptions, as well as
separation of activist and terrorist. The role of the Revolutionist, the morality of terror,
and the value of violence are cultural aspects of the terrorist groups examined that
distinguish them from their larger social movements. These cultural elements demand
violent action, justify any means, and promote violence as the only possible means. The
degree to which individuals internalize these cultural aspects and the groups’ worldview
orients their relationship to the terrorist group, as sympathizers, supporters, or terrorists.
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This reflects the subcultural work on authenticity, wherein individuals participating in
subcultures gain status through their commitment to the lifestyle (Melder 2014; Anderson
2009). Authenticity, and an obsession with exhibiting it, was explicitly referenced among
several of the groups examined here. These findings support the inclusion of subculture
theory as an explanatory factor in the adoption of terrorism, and in the next chapter the
origins of these cultural aspects will be elucidated.
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CHAPTER 6
THE LINEAGE OF TERROR
This study argues that terrorism is not only a product of subcultural socialization,
but that terrorism and its related concepts exist as a set of cultural ‘tools’ that can be used
and adapted by different groups to address their particular local conditions. To this end,
this study has established a social network of the influential connections between terrorist
groups to track how the concept of terrorism has been transmitted and transformed across
societies and time. Within countries, terrorist related media was observed to be a constant
factor, but less prominent than national histories and myths of resistance and national
identity. Independent of these mythological influences, there were direct relationships
between terrorist movements of different generations. Examining the diffusion of
terrorism between the different waves of terrorism illustrated the changing technological
capabilities of the eras. Influenced by predecessors and contemporaries, terrorist groups
adopt, adapt and innovate upon the ideas of previous groups. Several of these innovations
served as further inspiration for their contemporaries and future generations. This chapter
describes the patterns of the diffusion of terrorism and the role of the mass media in the
pre-internet waves of terrorism, establishing the basis for comparison to understand the
unique impact of the internet on the spread of ISIS today.
This examination of the influential connections between terrorist groups requires
some caveats regarding the data that was used for analysis. First, vague connections
between groups or connections between groups that are implied by historians were
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excluded from this analysis. Additionally, the present study does not include
collaborative, instructional, and solidarity actions between groups, except where these
interactions were a factor in the creation of a group. This is due to the present study’s
focus on how groups initially adopt terrorism. As noted elsewhere, there are many
terrorist groups outside of the wave schema, and there is a question as to the validity of
the wave categorization of terrorism (Park and Sitter 2016, Sedgwick 2007). Although
some groups outside of the waves are included in this analysis, this is due to their
connections to groups that are included in among one of the major waves. Notably, these
groups often served as connections between the terrorism of prior waves and their
descendent groups. Additionally, the diversity of group ideologies within waves confirms
Sedgwick’s (2007) observation that waves are more diverse than originally theorized.
The exclusion of groups outside of the international waves means that the generalizability
of this research may be limited to leftist and anticolonial violence. Right-wing, fascist, or
state-sponsored groups were observed in relation to this sample primarily in the context
of conflict with a group that was a part of a major wave. Previous research suggests that
international influences may be integral to their development as well (Park and Sitter
2016).
6.1 DOMESTIC TERRORISM ACROSS TIME
The spread of terrorism within a nation is primarily influenced by the media
produced by terrorist groups and their related movements, the histories and mythological
past of the nations, and the direct ties movements had to prior generations’ struggles. The
use of the mass media in the form of an underground press is a consistent characteristic of
the terrorist movements examined here. More important to the groups, however, were

181

their mythologized histories, with many groups drawing parallels between themselves
and groups or individuals in their past. The influence of history is not limited to the
myths and martyrs of each nation, but the generational overlap that connects the armed
struggles of successive generations.
6.1.1 From Zines to Manifestos
Although there are differences in the degree of direct involvement of terrorist
groups in the production of pamphlets, newspapers, magazines, and other publications,
there is consistently a mass media effort related to terrorist groups or the social
movements they come from. Pamphlets and underground newspapers or journals
consistently accompany terrorist movements. Although they are not always supportive of
the adoption of violence, they nonetheless often valorize terrorists and express similar
worldviews through their articles. The development of the mass media technologies over
time has fundamentally changed how these texts are distributed, shedding their reliance
on migrants, translators, and publishers over the years.
Within nations there is consistently a widespread use of different forms of the
mass media by terrorist groups and their larger movements. Narodnya Volya would
publish their own newspaper and distribute their propaganda abroad (Carr 2006). Later in
Russia, SRs would distribute its manifesto throughout a number of cities (Chaliand and
Blin 2007). American, Italian, Japanese, and French anarchist publications would
advocate for violence in their respective nations, providing instructional knowledge for
attacks and suggested targets (Carr 2006; Kemp 2018). In the US, the anarchist
movement would have an extensive press presence, despite the movement’s lack of
popularity relative to Italy and France (Burleigh 2010). This would include articles in
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various languages marketed specifically toward immigrant populations in addition to the
native English language. A guide to anarchist publications accounts for almost fifty
different recurring English language publications across the United States in the early
20th century (Longo 2010).
The anticolonial and New Left groups would similarly be accompanied by
publications. In the anticolonial wave, pamphlets and radical presses were present among
the Indian and Bengali nationalists, the Young Bosnia movement, FLN, and LEHI (Gupta
1997; Getter 1980; Jackson 2006; Revere 1973). In addition to an underground press,
LEHI would also produce radio broadcasts (Getter 1980). The Weather Underground
would emerge out of a student movement that included often at least one grassroots,
radical newspaper in all major cities (Varon 2004). The RAF be intimately connected to
the German radical press and released many statements through it (Varon 2004; Aust
2009; Colvin 2009). The publication of newspapers and pamphlets to distribute the
message of terrorist groups is among the most consistent observation across groups
examined here.
In reference to this study’s application of subculture theory, many of those
involved in the writing and publication of these papers, pamphlets, and primers would be
extremely influential through their structural position. The anarchist Johann Most
founded the paper Freiheit which would provide practical knowledge necessary to
commit acts of violence and spread anarchist ideology (Burleigh 2010). Other writers
would be similarly central to the adoption of anarchism and consequent political violence
in their respective nations, including Emma Goldman, Karl Heinzen, Kropotkin,
Bakunin, and Chernysevsky (Burleigh 2010). Kotoku would be instrumental in

183

translating and publishing communist and anarchist writings in early 20th century Japan
(Kemp 2018). Irish Republicans of the same era would similarly be frequent publishers,
with O’Donovan Rossa proclaiming the virtues of dynamite and publishing his own
papers that openly solicited donations for terrorism (Burleigh 2010). Sergei 'Stepniak'
Kravchinsky would export Russian anarchism throughout Europe through his translations
and publications (Carr 2006). Although it is only loosely connected to the groups studied
here, the Paladin Press would publish a variety of books often connected to terrorism,
such as weapons manuals, The Anarchist Cookbook, and books on the construction of
bombs (Larabee 2015). This publisher would be used by groups across the political
spectrum, although it would become most associated with right wing militia groups.
The Paladin Press illustrates a running theme across the waves of terrorism.
Frequently the knowledge that groups require to manufacture bombs, handle weapons,
steal cars, or evade police detection is available without the underground press. Although
the internet is currently viewed as a dangerous outlet for the acquisition of ‘dangerous
information’, the freedom of information has always been taken advantage of by
proponents of violence. Johann Most, possibly the most vocal proponent of anarchist
violence, developed his pamphlet The Science of Revolutionary Warfare using military
manuals that were freely available in public libraries (Burleigh 2010). This publication
would include information on codes, invisible inks, guns, explosives, and poisons. The
pamphlet is notable not because it was the only source for this material, but because it
explained the information in an accessible way (Larabee 2015). These publications
included not only the practical and technical information, but also justifications and
appeals for violence.
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Within nations, mass media and the spread of terrorism and its related ideologies
can be strongly demonstrated by the prevalence of local and national publications directly
by the group, or by the related social movement. In terms of communications interlocks
in the spread of subcultures, this highlights the role of mass media as well as the
structural role of those individuals that publish, translate, and import writings from
anarchist, socialist, and Marxist authors. Terrorism is not only connected to its published
press, but how it uses information that is freely available in society. This is especially
relevant considering the availability of bomb and weapons materials for informational,
academic, or military purposes.
6.1.2 A Revolution for Every Generation
In developing their identities, terrorist groups have often invoked historic and
mythological figures from their nations’ past. Alternatively, groups have also
incorporated the history of oppression or other strains into their particular group
ideologies. The essential aspect of history for terrorism has been how it helps to justify
violence and develop a unique group identity.
History is integral to groups’ understandings of the world. The second Zemlya I
Volya would connect itself to the national history of activism and violence by taking the
name of the prior group (Burleigh 2010). Health is within You! (Salvation is within you!)
would invoke a historical strike when calling for anarchists to seek vengeance. This was
actualized when the Gramsci Circle would take revenge for the violent repression of a
strike (Larabee 2015).
The Russian example illustrates the generational connections across groups.
Although the Narodnya Volya is often remembered as the first modern terrorist
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organization, the group emerged in the context of a much longer history of armed
conflict. In the 1860s, the Nihilist subculture in Russia would produce The Organization
and its terrorist cell, Hell, ending after an attempted assassination of the tsar. In 1866
Nacheav would write the Catechism of the Revolutionist, describing the revolutionary
without connections, dedicated to the overthrow of an unjust society (Carr 2006; Nachaev
2009). In the 1870s the Populist movement would emerge, be repressed, and lead to the
creation of Zemlya I Volya in 1876 which would give birth to Narodnya Volya in 1877.
The political violence of the anarchist wave in Russia would persist, with the SRs
forming in 1902 and leading to several breakaway and related groups (Carr 2006). The
Russian groups are spread across decades and are embedded in a longer running
movement with a history of violence. Their influence would extend far beyond Russia’s
borders through their impact on the other major waves.
The Irish Republican Brotherhood [IRB] would also be known as the Fenians
referencing pre-Christian Irish warriors (Burleigh 2010). The Fenians viewed themselves
as the inheritors of an insurrectionary tradition against British rule. In the pIRA handbook
decades later the Irish conflict would be placed in the context of 800 years of colonial
rule (IRA 2016). IRB is the historic core and mythologized model for the IRA and its
various splinter factions and descendent groups. HRA (1925) would state that it was
following in “the footsteps of great Indian Rishis of the glorious past and of Bolshevik
Russia in the modern age”. Prior to the development of the HRA, Indian Nationalists
would similarly glorify their Hindu past, and the members of this movement would
become mythical heroes of self-sacrifice for consequent attempts at national liberation,
including the HRA (Gupta 1997). The Young Bosnia movement made myths out of the
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martyrs like Bogdan Zerajic, whose grave would become a shrine to the movement
(Jackson 2006).
Gupta (1997) argues that there are three phases to the nationalist movement in
India. Similarly, the experience of the IRA also illustrates how terrorist conflicts can be
embedded in long running struggles. The Irish Republican movement traces its history to
1791 and has existed in some form throughout the 20th century (Coogan 2002). The
Fenians and Irish dynamiters were active in the late 19th century. The IRB and Irish
Volunteers would merge to form the most famous incarnation of Irish Republicanism, the
IRA, would primarily be active between 1916-1923. The final well-known incarnation of
Irish Republicanism would form in 1969 as the pIRA, but smaller groups under the
banner of Irish Republicanism would exist through the end of the century (Coogan 2002;
Bell 1997). The pIRA would draw an explicit connection to the history of armed struggle,
proclaiming itself as the direct representative of the 1918 Dail Eireann Parliament, the
first attempt at a united Irish government (IRA 2016) Although groups frequently make
reference to their mythological past, or the martyrs and heroes of previous generations,
there appears to be a distinct relationship between the generational history of movements
and the future adoption of terrorism.
The New Left wave in many ways was an extension of the Old Left, with a
significant amount of overlapping membership (Parker and Sitter 2016; Grosse 2004).
The history of the New Left in the US could be traced to the abolitionists and old left of
socialists, anarchists, and communists (Grosse 2004). In addition to this generational
relationship between the movements, groups from the New Left illustrate the role of
historical strains and grievances. The RAF would draw parallels between German war
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atrocities, Auschwitz especially, and the Vietnam war (Colvin 2009). Similarly, the
Weather Underground would draw historical comparisons between Vietnam and the
genocide of Native Americans in North America (Varon 2004). Descriptions of JRA
members emphasize their nostalgia and attraction to the tradition of nationalist selfsacrifice (Box and McCormack 2004). Histories of conflict and mythologized warriors of
the past frequently form the backdrop of the terrorist movements reviewed here.
6.2 THE INTERNATIONAL WAVES OF TERRORISM
Comparing the diffusion of terrorist concepts and ideologies between waves
illustrates the spread of terrorism has changed over the course of the last century. The
anarchist wave is characterized by the spread of terrorist ideologies and concepts through
particular individuals that migrated around the globe and translated or published these
ideas. Indirectly, this cross-pollination would influence many nationalist groups through
its influence on prior generations. More directly, news of the Irish victory in achieving
independence would inspire anticolonial movements around the world. The New Left
would highlight the changes in communications technology, with almost no diffusion
through migrant actors. Instead, the television coverage of Vietnam would serve as the
springboard for these movements.
6.2.1 The Anarchists - Immigrants, Importers, and Publishers
The anarchist movement is notable among the other waves of terrorism in its
manifestation through lone wolf actors and the importance in immigrants to spreading its
ideology and worldview across the globe. The anarchist wave is particularly relevant to
the modern-day issue of cyber-radicalized mujahidin, since the attackers mostly acted
individually or with a small group under a common ideological banner. The anarchist
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wave differs greatly from present day in the means to widely distribute a message, with
the global spread of anarchism tied to several notable, world traveling figures. The
ideologies, worldviews, and tactics of these groups and individuals would influence the
generations prior to many of those that would become known as the anticolonial wave.
By the time of the 1960s such a direct connection was unnecessary, and the publications
of Marx, Lenin, Mao, Che Guevara, and Carlos Marighella would be influential
worldwide.
Anarchism would spread around the world through its publications and the
transitory nature of many of its most influential authors. The role of immigration in
spreading terrorist ideologies would change over the course of history, but for the
anarchists and other early groups it would be among the most central mechanisms to the
spread of terrorism. Several individuals are particularly central to the spread of anarchism
at this period through their travels. Sergei Kravchinsky would leave Narodnya Volya and
Russia to publish Underground Russia, effectively translating and introducing Russian
anarchism to the rest of Europe (Carr 2006). Johann Most would live in several countries,
and as a result would import his paper Freiheit to these areas (Burleigh 2010).
Furthermore, his personal relationship with Emma Goldman would even more directly
connect him to the American anarchist movement. This would be supported by
immigration from Germany and Eastern European as well (Laqueur 2002). Italian
anarchists would operate in France, Switzerland, and Spain, further spreading the reach
of anarchism and anarchist terror (Chaliand and Blin 2007). The US anarchist movement
would similarly draw lesions from the Nihilists and Fenians (Burleigh 2010). Anarchist
violence would extend even to Japan and Australia. Kotoku would provide the first
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Japanese translation of the Communist Manifesto and was a central figure in the radical
Japanese press. He would introduce anarchism to Japan after being introduced to
Kropotkin by an American. Although not directly involved in violence, his romantic
interest Kanno would be among a group that planned to bomb the emperor (Kemp 2018).
Similarly, an American would play a similar role in importing anarchist ideas to
Australia, partially inspiring a bombing there (Kemp 2018).
The anarchists were not alone through this era and were influenced by
contemporary groups such as the Fenians. Similarly, both groups would be influential on
nationalist struggles that would bloom in the 1920’s and after. Irish immigration to the
United States would lead to the establishment of communities supportive of the armed
struggle in Ireland (Burleigh 2010). In France, Russian anarchist Nicolas Safranski would
teach native Indians to build bombs, and through his travels Hemchandra Das would
bring materials from anarchists across Europe into India (Heehs 1994). Armenian
terrorism in the late 19th century would borrow from the experience of Narodnya Volya,
and has a direct connection to the group the wife of one of its first leaders who
participated in the Russian movement (Laqueur 2002).
Anarchist publications across countries shared similar language and reflected the
international connections between anarchists as primarily philosophical rather than
organizational (Carr 2006; Burleigh 2010). These publications were published in a
variety of languages and circulated worldwide. Translated books on revolutionary
movements were a central means for the diffusion of terrorist ideologies across nations
(Sedgwick 2007). Bengali Nationalists used a newly translated book on secret societies to
structure their own organization based on the Narodnya Volya model and would
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incorporate writings and memoirs of Irish Republicans into their ideology. This illustrates
how terrorism spreads internationally but is locally adapted to those nations’ unique
circumstances.
In studying the connections between the IRA and Bengali nationalism, Silvestri
(2000) observed that adoption of Western ideas and ideologies was not wholesale, but an
eclectic process where elements were adopted to varying degrees. For some aspects, this
was a conscious decision based on the appropriateness for Irish tactics in the Bengal
situation. Jackson (2006) illustrated a similar process in the Young Bosnia movement that
synthesized and localized Marxist, socialist, and nationalist ideologies. This process of
localizing the writings, ideologies, and concepts of terrorist groups and related ideologies
is repeated across the other major waves of terrorism.
6.2.2 The Anticolonialists - Generational Struggles and Foreign Inspiration
Many nationalist and anticolonial groups have become central to the
independence narrative of their countries, which has further inspired emulation (Parker
and Sitter 2016). The increase in anticolonial terrorism during the 1920s to 1960s is
possibly explained through the new opportunities for international attention and the
resources expended by colonial powers through the World Wars. Additionally, the IRA
would succeed in attaining an independent, but divided, Ireland in 1922, further inspiring
anticolonial groups around the world. Many of the international influences on the
adoption of terrorism during this wave occurred prior to the actual anticolonial wave,
with predecessor movements having connections to the Irish and anarchists.
The influence of the Irish and anarchists would extend through the history of
struggles that were influenced by them in the previous wave. In noting the foreign
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influences on Bengali revolutionaries, Heehs (1994) observed that the influence of the
nihilists, anarchists, and Fenians would come through translated books or international
travelers that had direct contact with anarchists and imported it into Bengal. Bengali
nationalists would learn from French anarchists how to make bombs, copy the structure
of Russian secret organizations, and build on Irish justifications for violence and
strategies for liberation (Silvestri 2000). Bengali revolutionaries at the turn of the 20th
century would mix Fenian and anarchist influences with Hindu religious fanaticism
(Heehs 1994). Bengali revolutionaries would be influenced by Mazzini, particularly his
position on resistance to foreign occupation, attempts to unify a divided nation, advocacy
of active methods, and use of secret societies (Heehs 1994). The IRA would similarly
influence the leader of Jewish terrorist group, LEHI, who adopted the name “Michael” as
a homage to the IRA’s Michael Collins (Parker and Sitter 2016).
Further emphasizing the influence of the early adopters of terrorism, and how this
influence spreads through central actors, is the example of the Mau Mau uprising in
Kenya. The Mau Mau uprising would be an example of the use of violence without
international influence, however it becomes relevant to this analysis in its successor
groups and in its influence on Frantz Fanon. The Kikuyu Central Association would
continue the struggle during the anticolonial wave, in part motivated by the historical
grievances that accompany colonization (Carr 2006). Fanon (1963) cites the Mau Mau
among his influences in addition to Marx and Lenin. Fanon (1963) would go on to be
among the most influential Marxist writers related to terrorism, including groups such as
the IRA, Black Panthers, and the People’s Mujahidin in Iran. Fanon would write from the
basis of the Algerian experience, involving the FLN and ALN battle for Algerian
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independence against the British, European settlers, and right-wing organizations (Fanon
1963). The Algerian War for Independence would gain further significance for the
diffusion of terrorism when it was featured in the movie, The Battle for Algiers, that
would influence a new generation of revolutionaries in the 1960s.
6.2.3 The New Left – A Global Terrorist Movement
The New Left wave would realize the dreams of the anarchist and anticolonial
waves of a global movement, with many groups actively collaborating or committing
attacks in solidarity across the world. In part, this is the result of the Vietnam war and the
impact it had on many nation’s student movements. Vietnam would have an indirect
influence globally through revolutionary icons such as Che Guevara, as well as directly
through the coverage of the violence in the country (Sedgwick 2007; Varon 2004). The
slogan “one, two, many Vietnams” would inspire student activists around the world,
including Japan, (Box and McCormack 2004), Germany (Colvin 2009; Aust 2009), the
US (Varon 2004), France, Italy (Orsini 2011), Argentina (Movano 1995), and Peru (Starn
2019). The groups of this wave reference far more influences than the previous
generations, drawing from the experience of prior revolutionaries.
Unlike the anarchist and anticolonial wave before it, there are few connections
between groups that involve a personal relationship or rely on migration for the spread of
an ideology. This review of New Left groups found only one case involving migration,
the leader of Action Directe (AD), would be involved with the RAF in Germany and later
establish AD in France (Warnes 2013). This is notable considering the centrality of
particular individuals in the spread of anarchism and anarchism’s influence on nationalist
groups. Instead, the New Left wave is characterized by far greater international
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cooperation, with many groups committing attacks in solidarity with other groups,
training together, and even committing attacks on other groups’ behalf. These groups
claim identification to a larger, global movement under the banner of Marxist-Leninism,
despite a great deal of ideological diversity across nations.
The New Left would cite a variety of influences, both historical and
contemporary. Historically, the writings of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Mao, and Fanon would
be the most referenced influenced by groups of the New Left Wave. Among their
contemporaries within the wave, Che Guevara, the Tupamaros, and writers that
popularized the concept of the Urban Guerilla would be the most influential, in addition
to a general sense of inspiration associated with Cuba, Russia, and Vietnam. Although
many groups reference being inspired by these nations, and armed struggles elsewhere in
the world, there is rarely any specific concept attached to this influence beyond general
inspiration. The influence of Che Guevara appears to be primarily inspirational, or rather
aspirational, as well, with his image as a revolutionary icon and his call to create “one,
two, many Vietnams” as the major influences on the groups of this wave. Many groups
would answer this call to turn their home countries to new ‘Vietnams’ but would make
few references to Che Guevara and his writings otherwise. The Battle of Algiers, a
documentary about the revolutionary violence in Algeria, would be the first impression of
the Algerian War for Independence many would have, and thousands of revolutionaries
around the world would draw tactical inspiration from it (Carr 2006). The documentary
would depict a culture of heroic self-sacrifice and nobility, as well as introducing a scene
on the moral ambiguity of killing civilians for a cause. However, none of the groups
reviewed here made explicit reference to the film, despite Fanon’s connection to Algeria
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and the New Left groups. Other international influences include the modelling of the
pIRA’s manual based on Colonel Qaddafi’s book of the same name (Carr 2006).
Inconsistent with a pure ideological interpretation of terrorism, the ideologies and
texts used by groups within this sample were applied inconsistently. When analyzed, the
statements of the RAF and Weather Underground were found to lack a coherent ideology
(Smith and Moncourt 2009; Varon 2004; Colvin 2009). The most glaring example of the
piecemeal nature of groups’ adoption of ideologies is the central influence of Marx,
Engels, and Lenin, despite each dismissing (non-state) terrorism as ineffective,
undesirable, or fundamentally opposed to Marxist-Leninism (Laqueur 2009). Although
Lenin (1963) spoke admirably of terrorists in terms of self-sacrifice, he largely criticized
them as ineffective and disconnected from revolutionary theory (Laqueur 2009). Most
orthodox Marxist-Leninists would similarly reflect this rejection of individual terror
(Sedgwick 2007). In part, this may be why Mao is cited the most frequently among the
Marxist-Leninist groups. Similarly, the concept of the guerilla and urban guerilla would
be coopted by some groups and applied in wildly different conditions than it was
developed for (Moyano 1995).
Despite varying sizes and sociopolitical environments, most terrorist groups
would try to emulate the guerilla warfare of Mao or urban guerilla strategy created by the
Tupamaros and spread through the writings of Marighella and Guillen. Often these
imported tactics would be poorly suited for the local campaign. For example, the ERP
would try to emulate the tactics of the Vietnamese in Argentina despite this making little
sense militarily or politically (Moyano 1995). However, the parallels drawn by terrorist
groups between themselves and guerilla campaigns may be part of the reason that
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terrorism is perceived as a viable political option, since guerilla campaigns do have a
history of success (Abrahms and Lula 2012). Most terrorist groups would not participate
in a traditional, rural guerilla campaign, but instead become urban guerillas.
The Tupamaros invented the concept of the urban guerilla out of necessity.
Recognizing that eighty percent of the population lived in urban areas, the Tupamaros
would focus their attacks in cities despite prior emphasis in Marxist-Leninism-Maoism
on rural guerilla warfare. This innovation, emerging out of the local context of the
conflict in Uruguay, would be widely adopted across South American terrorist groups.
Involved with the Tupamaros, Abraham Guillen would write The Strategy of the Urban
Guerilla, however this would not be the definitive text on the urban guerilla. The founder
of the Brazilian ALN, Carlos Marighella, would write the Minimanual of the Urban
Guerilla which would be translated into many languages and referenced by groups
around the world (Chaliand and Blin 2007; Laqueur 2002; Colvin 2009). The
popularization of this text may have further facilitated the influence of other texts, with
an extensive ‘recommended reading’ section at the end of at least one edition, including a
list of technical army manuals for camouflage, survival skills, combat skills, weapons,
explosives, and other militaristic skills (Marighella 2002). The mini-manual would
espouse the virtues of the urban guerilla, enumerate the skills that the urban guerilla must
become an expert in, and describe basic tactics.
In addition to the questionable adoption and inconsistent application of the urban
guerilla strategy by many groups, many groups would similarly modify the MarxistLeninist doctrine to which they subscribed. The Communist Party of Peru-Shining Path
possessed a unique form of ‘Peruvian Marxism’ through its interpretation of Marx, Lenin,
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and Mao through a charismatic leader, a Judeo-Christian tradition of salvation, and an
adoption of urban warfare, despite criticisms that the ideology lacks any aspect of
Peruvian culture (Starn 2019). Argentinian groups would similarly synthesize the views
of a popular leader, Peronism, with traditional Marxist-Leninism. In Japan, the URA
would synthesize their Marxist ideology with the spirit of Bushido, leading to one of the
more unique terrorist attacks observed here: an airline hijacking using samurai swords
(Laqueur 2002). In contrast to many similar New Left groups, the URA would also be
focused primarily on the mass consumerism of Japanese society, while espousing many
of the other elements of Marxist-Leninist ideology (Igarashi 2007). The Weather
Underground and RAF would identify themselves in the international context, drawing
parallels between their struggles and those in Vietnam, Cuba, Palestine, Bolivia,
Uruguay, China, Guatemala, and more. However, there was little basis for this
comparison (Colvin 2009; Varon 2004). Additionally, the RAF would incorporate
Germany’s Nazi past into their ideology while the WU would emphasize elements of
Black Liberation ideology (Varon 2004). Despite the common ideological banner groups
of this era claimed, a significant amount of variation occurred in how they applied this
ideology to their local context.
In addition to these unique adaptations, many groups studied here also used
Marxism in conjunction with other ideologies such as nationalism. At times, this has led
some groups to have changing ideologies over time. In Ireland, the traditional ideology of
Irish Republicanism would incorporate Marxist ideas with the development of the pIRA
in the 1960s. The PFLP would espouse Arab Nationalism as well as Marxism, in contrast
to other Palestinian groups such as al-Fatah. The PFLP (2009) would place Palestinian
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struggle against Israel in the context of Marx, arguing that the struggle against Israel is
first a class struggle. The LTTE would initially espouse a Marxist-Leninist ideology but
would eventually evolve into a primarily separatist group (Yass 2014). The FLQ would
similarly be a nationalist group forming during the 1960’s that espoused Marxist views
(Duerr 2015). The Breton nationalist groups, incorporating Marxist ideology and
occurring during the New Left wave, would emphasize the importance and relevance of
the methods of other nationalist movements (Duerr 2015). In part, these groups illustrate
the appeal of particular authors and revolutionary icons across a century of terrorism.
6.3 TERRORISM ACROSS TIME AND SPACE
Examining the connections between terrorist groups and their premiere authors
illustrates how concepts and ideologies are developed within particular social contexts
and subsequently applied to a diverse range of social milieus. Although groups
commonly have an array of influences this study illustrates the importance of several
central actors in influencing the history of terrorism across the last century. A long
history from the French Revolution to the Irish struggles of independence and the Marxist
writers would spark the development of terrorism around the globe. The Irish struggles
would inspire anticolonial movements and influence the anarchists as well as other
Russian movements. The Russian movements, including Populism, Nihilism, and
Anarchism, would be influential in Lenin’s development, and his writings that would
subsequently inform future generations, including other central Marxists Mao and Fanon.
Anticolonial movements would build off of the template of the Irish and the anarchists as
well as directly inspiring Fanon. Lenin, Mao, and Fanon would inspire the New Left,

198

including movements in South America that would innovate the urban guerilla concept
and strategy adopted around the world by New Left terrorist groups.
6.3.1 The Jacobins
Many histories of terrorism and discussions of its definition begin with the
historical root of the word-the Jacobins and the French Revolution. These sources often
accurately describe the concept of terrorism as it existed in the French Revolution as an
instrument of the state, and it would be groups such as Narodnya Volya that would
popularize the term in reference to individual, non-state terror (Carr 2006; Laqueur
2002). Far less time is spent on the influence that the Jacobins, the French Revolution,
and, a century later, the Paris Commune would have on the one of the major genesis
points of terrorism. These would be the influences that inspired the first wave of
terrorism, from Russian Populists to global anarchists.
Carr (2006) argues that almost every terrorist group has retained some elements of
the Russian tradition in terms of tactics, organization, or morality regardless of their
specific aims. Narodnya Volya would be the ones to coin the term terrorism to refer to
their assassination of the tsar with the intent of influencing public opinion, specifically
their supporters and those within the regime (Carr 2006; Laqueur 2002). This was a direct
reference to Maximilien Robespierre’s and the Jacobins’ self-conception emphasizing
religious and political purity, and view that the world was corrupting, infested by
aristocrats that must be exterminated (Chaliand and Blin 2007; Orsini 2011). This
extermination was virtuous since it saved the world from these harmful elements and this
combination of virtue and terror would be exported worldwide and influence several
individuals and groups central to the diffusion of terrorism, including Narodnya Volya,
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Nacheav, and Lenin. An influential connection links this prehistory of terrorism to its
New Left Wave. Eldritch Cleaver of the BLA and Black Panthers would cite Robespierre
and Nacheav among his influences, and he would in turn found the BLA, influence the
Weather Underground in the US and the RAF in Germany (who consequently inspired
the founder of the French group, Action Directe). The French roots of terrorism also
appeared in the anticolonial wave, with the Young Bosnia movement reprinting article 35
of the French Declaration of the Rights of Man, which describes the right of revolution.
An additional influence came from the Paris Commune massacres in France.
Within France, many members of the anarchist movement would have direct ties to the
Paris Commune (Chaliand and Blin 2007). It would be a symbol of revolutionary martyrs
to the French anarchists and more. The violent suppression of the Paris Commune and
consequent repression of the left across Europe was a part of the motivating force for
anarchist violence (Carr 2006). It would lead anarchists and Russian Populists to view
dynamite as a great equalizer in political conflicts. This includes provoking the Russian
revolutionary movement to action, despite its initial non-violent orientation (Chaliand
and Blin 2007). After suffering through state repression and the failure of their
propaganda, this revolutionary movement would produce the second Zemlya I Volya,
precursor to Narodnya Volya, and ancestor of SRs and their most renowned member,
Vladimir Lenin. However, the impact of the Paris Commune would not be limited to the
influence of Lenin and the anarchists, since participants in the anarchist wave would
provide some inspiration and instruction for the early nationalist movements.
6.3.2 The Irish Influence
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The Irish insurrections are among the first innovations that would come to be
known as terrorism. Their influence reached fewer groups than Lenin, Mao, and Fanon
would, but that influence is foundational to the history of terrorism. The use of dynamite
campaigns by Irish revolutionaries were an innovation in a long history of armed
struggles. In part, the long running history of Irish armed struggle before and after the
advent of terrorism is a significant factor in its wide influence on the adoption of
terrorism. The initial influence of the Irish would be through their ties and influence on
early anarchists and nihilists in Russia as well as early nationalist movements occurring
in the same time period directly and indirectly through the influence on the anarchists.
Their influence would expand with their success in obtaining an independent Ireland in
1922, and this success would be influential on other nationalist movements. The Irish
model’s influence would extend beyond the primarily leftist and anticolonial groups
studied here, even inspiring the British state organization, the Special Operations
Executive [SOE]. The SOE that would employ lessons learned from fighting the Irish
against the Nazis, spreading these tactics across occupied Europe.
The Fenians of the late 19th century would derive their strategy from the 1798
rebellion that worked to transform British imperial difficulties into Irish opportunities
(Burleigh 2010). This strategy would persist through World War II, which was seen as an
opportunity for Irish Republicans due to pressure on Britain from the fight against Nazi
Germany. The Irish Republican movement is a part of a long running history of armed
struggle against British rule. Their adoption of terrorism may have emerged in their
specific national and historical context, but it would be extremely influential. The Fenians
and their descendants under the IRA banner would influence the anarchist movement as
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well as Indian, Bengali, Jewish, and Cypriot nationalist movements directly. Through
their influence on the anarchist movement the IRA is further connected to many more
anticolonial and New Left groups.
6.3.3 From Marx to Mao
The most influential writer on terrorist groups reviewed here is Lenin, both
through his direct influence through his writings as well as his indirect influence on other
central actors like Mao and Fanon. However, Lenin was explicit in his position that
individual terror (non-state terrorism) was ineffective and against Marxist philosophy.
Lenin was embedded in the context of a history of terrorism however, serving as a major
link between the early terrorism of anarchists, populists, and nihilists in Russia and the
New Left terrorism that would extend into the 1990’s as well as influencing many
nationalist and anticolonial groups.
Lenin is imbedded in the history of terrorism, emerging in the context of populist
and anarchist terrorism in Russian groups and later influencing anticolonial and New Left
movements. The work of Lenin would be informed by his involvement in populist and
socialist movements in Russia (Lenin 1973). He would contribute to the development of
Marxism especially through the incorporation of imperialism and its criticism (D’Mello
2009). Populists would be influential on Lenin’s work, teaching him that revolution was
an inner journey focused on discipline and sacrifice (Orsini 2011). Chernevysky, Lenin’s
greatest influence, emphasized revolutionary sacrifice, even renouncing love in order to
serve as the liberator of the oppressed (Orsini 2011). Among the Russian groups
connected to Lenin, Narodnya Volya would be the first to claim a lineage to the Jacobins
of the French Revolution and their ideas of purity and a corrupting world (Carr 2006,
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Orsini 2011). D’Mello (2009; 2010) describes how Lenin and Mao would develop, revise
and reinterpret Marxist theory through their experiences in the implementation of his
ideas. Specifically, Lenin, Mao, and Fanon would develop their revolutionary theories
through the practice of revolution in Russia, China, and Algeria.
Lenin’s indirect influence is just as important, inspiring other groups and writers
that would be central to the development of terrorist groups across the world and
throughout generations. Among these influences is Mao Zedong, who adopted Lenin’s
interpretation of Marxism and would add to it. Mao developed his concept of the people’s
war through his experience in the 1930s fighting the Imperial Japanese Army and
Chinese Nationalist Army using guerilla warfare (Parker and Sitter 2016). This concept
and the emphasis on guerilla warfare would later influence the activities of the
Tupamaros, RAF, Shining Path, BR, pIRA, ASALA, PFLP, and ETA, as well as Che
Guevara and Carlos Marighella whose own writings would also be highly influential. In
discussing the Shining Path, Starn (2019) notes the dominant themes of Maoism; the
necessity of violence, the need for a vanguard party, the need to combat imperialism, and
the primacy of class struggle as a right versus wrong, black and white battle.
In the anticolonial wave, Frantz Fanon (1963) would develop his own ideas on
terrorism in the course of the Algerian war for independence. His ideas would be widely
cited by other nationalist and New Left groups. Notably, Fanon (1963) would build on
Marxist analysis by incorporating ideas of colonialism and race and would strongly
emphasize the necessity of violence for social change. Fanon’s ideas of the therapeutic
value of violence would be later adopted by Eldritch Cleaver and facilitate BLA’s split
from the Black Panthers (Roseneau 2013).
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6.4 CONCLUSION
In the previous chapter the cultural aspects that accompany terrorist groups were
described, their diffusion across social networks debated, and how they connect
grievances and rational choices deliberated. The central cultural elements discussed were
the role of the Revolutionist, the morality of terror, and the value of violence. Although
there is evidence that terrorist groups possess similar cultural aspects reflecting these
themes and that these ideas are spread across the population, the international spread of
terrorism, and these cultural aspects, begs the question—where do these ideas come
from? It is possible that they are a necessary precondition for violence. Beliefs that justify
the morality of terrorism facilitate these violent actions. This study, instead, argues that
these cultural aspects are a part of a set of cultural ‘tools’, cultural elements individuals
are aware of and apply to situations, that have spread and evolved over the course of the
last century (DiMaggio 1997). This is demonstrated through the presence of these themes
across terrorist groups examined in this sample, the influential connections between these
groups, and the adaptation of these cultural aspects to the local conditions of groups.
6.4.1 The Lineage of Terrorism
The theory presented here argues the diffusion of international terrorism is the
product of groups adapting the ideas developed by other groups and individuals to their
unique circumstance. This necessarily requires that the groups within this sample are
connected in some way, and these theorized connections not only exist across waves of
international terrorism, but across the history of terrorism. The precursors to the
international spread of terrorism are the Irish Republicans, who trace their movement’s
history back centuries, and the Jacobins of the French revolution. The long running Irish
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struggles would adopt the invention of dynamite as a political tool, which would inspire
the anarchists of the time. Within the same wave, the Irish example would also directly
and indirectly influence Bengali and Indian nationalist movements that would predate
those of the anticolonial wave. At the same time, the Russian Populist movement would
draw from the Jacobins to define terrorism as acts of violence for the purpose of
influencing the people in the state as well as their supporters. This would lead to the
outbreak of the first international wave of terrorism as Russian anarchists migrate across
Europe importing translated works from the Russian experience. Immigration from
European nations would play a role in introducing the ideas of Irish republicanism as well
as violent anarchism. World travelers would introduce the works of anarchist and
socialist writers to future extremists in Japan, Australia, Armenia, Bengal, and India.
From these seeds there are historical roots of many national conflicts. Present day
Bosnia. Bengal, India, and Ireland would have anticolonial struggles that can be traced to
the earlier movements and influential connections of the anarchist wave. In the US, the
anarchist wave would be among the Old Left that would overlap and influence the New
Left of the 1960s. It is highly possible that this relationship is relevant to other nations
with significant left-wing movements during these time periods. Lenin emerges from the
anarchist wave in Russia, producing an interpretation of Marxism based on his
experience in the Russian Revolution. This interpretation, Marxist-Leninism, would
begin to appear among the anticolonial movements, including in Algeria where Fanon
would add race to the Marxist-Leninist doctrine. This innovation would persist and be
adopted by groups within the New Left.
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By the time of the New Left wave, the spread of information was increasingly
accomplished through texts, with translated pamphlets, books, and manuals being
distributed around the world and a decrease in the spread of terrorism being directly tied
to the migration of specific individuals. Lenin’s works influenced several revolutions
around the world, and members of those revolutions would contribute to the growing
literature of terrorism. Vietnam, Che Guevara, and Mao were highly influential to the
adoption of terrorism around the world, despite not being direct advocates of terrorism in
themselves. Vietnam would echo the impact of the Paris Commune on the anarchist
movement, an example of extreme and unjust government violence. Che Guevara would
make a call to action to the radicals of the world and become a revolutionary icon that
they would aspire to. Mao, however, would provide ideas that resonated with
revolutionaries in Uruguay, Argentina, Germany, France, Italy, Japan, Palestine, Iran,
Canada, and more. Further innovations would develop, and the Tupamaros of Argentina
would develop the concept of the urban guerilla which was borrowed and applied by New
Left terrorist groups around the world.
6.4.2 Localizing Terror
One of the key hypotheses examined by this study is that groups will adopt and
adapt the cultural tools of terrorism to address their particular problems and sociohistorical context. An examination of just the multiple ideological influences on the
various groups illustrates the degree to which each group actively applied and modified
the larger ideologies to their unique circumstances. Sedgwick (2007) observed that many
groups within waves and across time reflect a tendency of groups to exhibit multiple
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ideological influences, most commonly combining anticolonialism or nationalism with
Marxist-Leninism.
Although groups in the anticolonial and New Left wave claim a Marxist ideology,
they vary in the school of Marxism most central to their group’s worldviews, the
centrality of Marxism relative to other ideological influences like nationalism, and the
degree to which their local national-historical context modified, adapted, or added to the
overall doctrine. Marx and Engels, Lenin, Mao, and Fanon had differing levels of
significance to groups across this sample. In addition to this, many groups claimed
multiple ideologies, most often varying forms of nationalism. Finally, Marxist doctrine
was almost always localized in some way, with each group adding unique elements to the
ideology and adapting its analysis to their local circumstances.
For instance, Laqueur (2002) argues that although the Black Panthers would
derive their ideology from Che Guevara, Malcolm X, Lumumba, Ho Chi Minh, and Mao,
these sources were not subject to significant study and the primary focus was on
particular concepts, such as Mao’s belief that power grew out of the barrel of the gun.
Although this is inconsistent with an ideological interpretation of terrorism, it is
consistent with a subcultural explanation—parts and pieces of these sources are adopted
according to their appropriateness to the situation. This was observed early in the
development of terrorism among the Bengali nationalists who adopted Irish and anarchist
ideas piecemeal. Even among anarchists there was differentiation in terms of how the
ideology was applied, with individual attacks, groups and organizations, and various
forms of support varying across countries.
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Furthermore, these adoptions are not necessarily tactical or strategic—terrorism
was rarely adopted because of its proven success by another group. The major exception
to this is Irish independence, a partial victory that would inspire anticolonial groups,
some of which had already been influenced by the Irish Republicans prior to their
victory. However, this came after the anarchist wave and had almost no direct influential
impact on the New Left. Furthermore, it incorporated a rural guerilla campaign which has
a history of success and is far different than the tactics of the New Left urban guerillas.
Despite the emphasis by Mao on rural guerilla campaigns and Lenin on the
ineffectiveness of terrorism, New Left terrorists applied the urban guerilla concept to
varying degrees of accuracy and political success, but consistently they emphasized the
importance of being an ‘authentic’ urban guerilla.
6.4.3 The Cultural Evolution of Terrorism
Given the findings of this study, there is considerable evidence that points to the
diffusion of cultural aspects of terrorism across influential connections between groups.
Furthermore, the cultural aspects that appear to be the elements most frequently adapted
are those tightly connected to the cultural aspects most frequently found across terrorist
groups. In the context of the spread of the cultural aspects of terrorism, the influence of
the Irish is far smaller than the anarchist and Marxist writers. The Irish influence appears
to be primarily inspirational, the Irish campaigns exemplified to the potential of
terrorism’s effectiveness for terrorist groups in this sample and at least one statesponsored group.
The cultural aspects of terrorism can be traced through the history of MarxistLeninist terrorism. Robespierre and the Jacobins would be remembered for their
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subscription to a higher truth, that the world was corrupt and decadent because of the
enemy (aristocrats for the Jacobins), and only the revolutionaries could purify the world
through eliminating the enemy. Lenin’s influences include the Jacobins, Chernevysky,
and the SRs he participated in, influences that describe a morally bifurcated world in
need of salvation, a description of revolutionaries as heroes that sacrifice everything, and
describe bomb throwing as a holy act, respectively. These influences are present in his
writings and would be among the aspects terrorist groups adopt. The Italian BR would
learn from Lenin that the world was divided into two camps and adopt his Marxist
doctrine as an omnipotent source of knowledge (Orsini 2011). Despite criticizing the
methods, Lenin would recognize the terrorists of the Russian revolutionary movements as
self-sacrificial heroes that were revered among the movement.
These themes would be adapted and reproduced by Mao, reiterating their
importance. Mao’s writings maintain the Manichean struggle narrative, but instead of
terrorists as the heroes of revolution he emphasized the need for a vanguard party to lead
the way. Although Lenin may have previously discussed it, Mao would popularize the
necessity of violence among revolutionary groups while groups influenced by Fanon
would view violence as inherently beneficial. And from the Jacobins to Narodnya Volya
to Lenin to the New Left, and all of the groups on the periphery, there has been a
consistent identity to aspire to in these movements that grants one the status of a mythical
martyr, one that demands violence, the Revolutionist, also known as the urban guerilla,
terrorist, comitadjis, mujahid, Irish volunteer, brigadist, or fedayeen.
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CHAPTER 7
EXPLAINING THE INTERNATIONAL DIFFUSION OF TERRORISM
This dissertation has focused on an examination of ISIS’s international spread
through its use of the internet, placing this within the larger context of prior historical
international waves of terrorism. The proposed explanation for understanding how these
groups spread internationally has been subculture theory. Terrorism is argued to be the
product of socialization into a subculture with cultural elements that encourage and
enable violence. The international spread of terrorism, therefore, can be understood as the
result of the cultural diffusion of these elements across time and space. Specifically, it is
expected that these cultural elements are adopted by groups facing local problems.
Therefore, this dissertation must demonstrate that terrorist groups reflect the
characteristics of subcultures, that their cultural elements spread through communication
interlocks, and that they are adapted to the local circumstances of terrorist groups.
The spread and adaptation of the terrorist subculture is illustrated through the
social network demonstrating the relationships between groups and their influences
across time. This social network demonstrates that groups apart of the historical waves of
terrorism have been intricately connected through their texts and influences. ISIS
provides a minor replication of the results from the historical study, extending its
relevance to non-left wing (socialist, anarchist, communist, etc.) terrorism. This study has
observed relationships between left wing terrorism and religious, state, and right-wing
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terrorism, and prior research suggests that the national terrorism has similar international
influences.
7.1 A CULTURE FOR TERROR
The most fundamental assertion of this dissertation argues that terrorist groups
are accompanied by subcultures that inform their actions. Subcultures are defined by
three components (Fine and Kleinman 1979). First, they are a set of related cultural
elements, such as values, beliefs, norms, and style. Second, these cultural elements are
distributed across a social network, rather a social group, demographic, or organization.
Finally, subcultures include an identity component that is claimed and distinguishes
members from non-members. This study has largely affirmed the relevance of subculture
theory for terrorism, an observation that is frequently asserted by terrorist groups
themselves. An ISIS manual for the mujahidin states: “Supporting the Islamic cause is a
mentality and ideology more than anything else”. This is reminiscent of the position of
the BLA from the 1960s, that it was less of a group than a concept that realized through
any group of African Americans sharing the philosophy and engaging in violence
(Roseneau 2013).
7.1.1 The Culture of Terrorism
The related cultural elements that comprise subcultures include several forms,
despite the focus on style within subcultures (Williams 2007). These cultural elements
also include norms, roles, specialized knowledge, language, beliefs, and artifacts (Fine
and Kleinman 1979; Hunt 2008; Downing 2010; Holt 2009; Williams 2007). Within
terrorist groups, this study has found three consistent cultural elements that are widely
shared across terrorist groups: the role of the Revolutionist, the morality of terror, and the
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value of violence. However, the detailed investigation of ISIS, in conjunction with the
historical study, suggests an additional cultural element possessed by some terrorist
groups, a belief that the group possesses a sacred, or infallible, truth that informs their
actions.
Historically, the groups researched here exhibited an identity component that is
highly romanticized. Given different names across the various groups, the Revolutionist
is often described as a romantic hero by anarchist, anticolonial, and New Left groups and
writers. Revolutionists are frequently glorified by terrorist groups as romantic heroes
characterized by self-sacrifice, dedication to their cause, and highly skilled warriors. ISIS
similarly describes the mujahidin as warriors of Allah, virtuous and dedicated to their
holy cause. ISIS also emphasizes the element of self-sacrifice that is incorporated by
other groups into the Role of the Revolutionist. The mujahidin aspire to martyrdom, one
of the two final outcomes of jihad along with complete victory. The mujahidin,
particularly those in the West, would also be described as experts in revolutionary
methods, just as their predecessors. A manual for mujahidin in the West makes frequent
references to becoming a spy and a one-man army, with skills in weapons, tactics,
espionage, combat, and other necessary areas. These same skills are emphasized by other
terrorist groups in their description of the revolutionist as a professional occupation, with
writings from the Catechism of the Revolutionist to the Mini-Manual of the Urban
Guerilla emphasizing the necessity of these skills for the dedicated revolutionary.
In addition to the role of the Revolutionist, the terrorist groups reviewed here
shared a consistent set of interrelated beliefs and values that form their moral
justifications for terrorism. This morality first evaluates the violence of the state and

212

terrorist group, and always concludes that their violence is insignificant relative to the
state’s. In addition to its relatively minor scope, terrorists define their violence in
altruistic terms, as an act for the benefit of mankind. The last part of this morality system
of terrorist groups observed here is the definition of their struggle as a war between good
and evil, with no middle ground. ISIS’s worldview also exhibits these qualities of the
morality of terror observed across the historical terrorist groups. ISIS frames its violence
as insignificant when compared to the collateral damage caused by the West through the
wars in the Middle East, particularly drawing these comparisons in their discussions on
the execution of hostages. ISIS uses this violence to justify its actions, which it
continually refers to as defensive in nature. According to ISIS, the group is combating a
crusade, and is merely defending itself from the aggressions of the US and other Western
powers. ISIS also frames the conflict in Manichean terms, placing itself as the force of
good combatting the evils of the world, the West, Shiism, and tyrannical governments in
the Middle East. These forces must be defeated in order to achieve the utopian goal of the
group, which further justifies its violence, a world unified under Islam and dedicated to
the worship of Allah.
A review of terrorist groups across the first three international waves of terrorism
demonstrates a consistent valuing of violence beyond its utility as an instrument of social
change. Rooted in terrorism’s historical relationship to the French Revolution and the
Jacobins, terrorist groups have frequently shared Narodnya Volya’s glorification of
violence as holy, honorable, or an act of justice or love. Furthermore, violence was also
described by several groups as validating or therapeutic, framing it as a solution to a wide
range of personal issues independent of the tactic’s political success. ISIS similarly
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imbues violence with greater purpose, meaning, and value than its utility as an instrument
of social change. ISIS frames jihad as the greatest act one can engage in. ISIS would also
claim violence could cure the feelings of alienation the Muslim feels living in the
Western world. ISIS presents violence in many different ways, each echoing the words of
prior terrorist movements, and the possibility exists that previous groups similarly
ascribed diverse purposes to violence. This may be significant in the study of recruitment,
since it effectively presents violence as the solution to whatever problem a specific
individual faces.
7.1.2 A Final Cultural Element – The Possession of Truth
The virtual ethnography of ISIS highlights a lesser theme from the study of
historical terrorist groups regarding the beliefs of terrorist groups. At the most basic level,
ISIS emphasizes a possession of the ‘Truth’, an accurate and absolute evaluation of the
world and how it works, through its religious beliefs in Allah and the principles of Islam.
More relevant to this discussion of the ‘Truth’ and terrorism is ISIS’s claim as the sole,
true practitioners of Islam, their complaints of media distortion, and encouragement for
followers, or potential followers, to seek out knowledge and do their own research. The
claim of legitimacy as the true representatives of an ideology, the possession of the
accurate evaluation of reality, and the emphasis on seeking knowledge were observed in
terrorist groups throughout the earlier waves of terrorism. The emphasis on the
possession of a universal or absolute truth by terrorist groups is less constant than the
other themes described here, however its importance to ISIS demands a reexamination of
the concept’s importance to terrorism historically. The ‘Truth’, the importance of
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possessing it, and how to obtain it is explicitly discussed by several groups within this
analysis and is arguably among the contributions of Lenin to the ideologies of terrorism.
In India, the HRA (1925) would include a party aim to establish truth and spread
it to the world. In Ireland, the IRB would view themselves as an enlightened vanguard
(Burleigh 2010). It was only explicitly observed in a small number of the reviewed
groups, although the idea of revolutionary theory and practice by Lenin could arguably be
considered to be an implicit example that was influential in many of the groups
considered here. Orsini (2011) refers to this as revolutionary gnosticism, a superior
knowledge that only an elect few possess, often encompassing a perception that the world
is immersed in pain and sin, an obsession with purity and the end of the world, and belief
in a radical catastrophism that would lead to a perfect world.
Lenin (1973) emphasized the importance of truth and knowledge, revolutionary
theory in his words, and how it could only be achieved through action. Lenin alludes to
this special knowledge and the process to attain it in his writings, stating that “the hate of
the representative of the oppressed and exploited masses is the origin of every wisdom,
the foundation of every socialist and communist movement and victories” (Orsini
2011:5). Mao (2004) would emphasize the scientific determinism of Marx, Engels, and
Lenin. This emphasis on the scientific and authoritative knowledge of communist writers
is seen in the context of many terrorist groups among the New Left. In Argentina, the
Destacamento Montonero 17 de Octubre de las Fuerzas Armadas Peronistas (FAP) would
split between the ‘Obscure’ and the ‘Enlightened’, who argued that the group should
focus on developing adequate ideological formulations (Moyano 1995). In Peru, the
Shining Path would also emphasize the scientific authority of Marxist-Leninism (Starn
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2019). The BR and RAF both emphasized their exclusive access to knowledge of truth
and morality (Orsini 2011; Colvin 2009).
7.1.3 The Distribution of Culture Across Social Networks
Fine and Kleinman (1979) connect the boundaries of subcultures to the social
networks through which they are distributed throughout, rather than a group,
organization, or other demographic. One of the most fundamental observations based on
this review of terrorist groups is that terrorism typically is not limited to an individual,
group, or organization, but are shared across many individuals, groups, organizations,
their supporters, and sympathizers. Furthermore, terrorists, groups, and organizations do
not operate within a vacuum, but in the larger context of the social movement from which
they originate. This finding highlights that the culture of the terrorist groups are not
bound to groups or organizations, but are shared widely across several groups,
organizations, individuals, as well as supporters and sympathizers to a lesser degree.
Based on this study, focusing on terrorists, groups, and organizations in isolation
from each other is a mischaracterization of how terrorism frequently occurs. Although the
most well-known French anarchist terrorists carried out their attacks alone, they received
assistance from groups that did not directly carry out attacks themselves (Shaya 2010).
Rarely in this study did the terrorists within countries and sharing an ideology unite
underneath a single banner. It was much more common to see many groups or
organizations operating at the same time, generally for the same ends. Movano (1995)
chronicles how the New Left terrorist groups of Argentina operated independently,
cooperated, splintered, merged, shared membership, or absorbed the members of another
group. Overlapping memberships were a frequent occurrence of the smaller groups that
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shared a common area within society, such as the German underground and the
originating social movements (Aust 2009). Supporters, support groups, and sympathizers
similarly illustrate that the worldview of terrorists extends beyond group or
organizational lines. Furthermore, these domestic movements are localized parts of larger
international terrorist movements that claim solidarity to each other, claim similar
inspirations, share a collective action frame, and exhibit a great deal of similarities across
nations. This pattern of cultural elements spread across groups and individuals is
consistent with subculture theory. These shared cultural elements are shared across a
social network, which can include groups and organizations, as well as possessing
varying levels of membership and involvement based on the degree of socialization,
including the supporters and sympathizers within the explanation. It includes
international connections between groups, and the same consistency and similarities
across local scenes or nations has been observed with other subcultures (Anderson 2009;
Futrell and Simi 2004).
7.1.4 The Terrorist Identity
As discussed above, the terrorist groups reviewed here consistently possessed an
ideal role of a Revolutionist that members often aspired to emulate. The importance of
this role is not limited to its impact on behavior, but also serves to distinguish the terrorist
group from their originating social movement. Engaging in this role distinguishes
terrorists from related social movements as men and women of action, the true and
enlightened warriors of social change. Performing this role has been described frequently
as a central preoccupation of terrorists, emphasizing authenticity among the New Left
revolutionaries and sincerity among the mujahidin. Among the New Left terrorist groups
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this would be defined by the practice of criticism sessions and extreme punishment for
deviating from behavior expected of a Revolutionist. The New Left groups extended this
criticism to their non-violent counterparts within the larger social movement, arguing that
the social movement was lacking, ineffective, or merely talked of action (Colvin 2009).
ISIS also polices the boundaries of this identity, criticizing those whose behavior
does not conform with the ideal role of the mujahidin, particularly those who are boastful
or insincere. This identification is also used to distinguish members of the group from
related social movements. ISIS praises the mujahidin for their action or their observance
of Sharī’ah, criticizing related, non-violent Muslim activist groups focused on injustices
or violence against Muslims or the establishment of a unified caliphate for their inaction
(non-violence) and other jihadist groups as not truly being mujahidin due to flaws in their
practice of Sharī’ah, often referring to them as so-called jihadists or sarcastically as
“jihadists”. Although the findings of the virtual ethnography largely confirm the
mujahidin of ISIS to be consistent with the historical Role of the Revolutionist, the
detailed examination of the group demonstrates the importance of multiple roles within
groups that the historical study only alluded to, particularly the unique roles for women
and the propagandist.
7.2 INDIVIDUALS, SUBCULTURES, AND TERRORISM
Four dimensions impact an individual’s deviant behavior as a result of subcultural
socialization. The first is the individual’s social position within society, specifically
focused on those statuses through which a collective problem is shared with a wider
population. This position ties subculture theory directly to the strain and grievance
approaches through its inclusion of the strains as a motivating factor to entering a terrorist
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subculture. Second, the individual’s position relative to a subculture predisposed to
terrorism effects the interpersonal pathways to becoming involved or exposed to the
subculture. Becoming more involved within a subculture involves a varying level of
socialization of its values, beliefs, norms, and other cultural elements. The greater this
socialization, the more likely an individual is expected to engage in terrorism, or deviant
behavior generally. It is the socialization of these cultural elements that complicate
rational actor models of terrorism, since terrorist actors frequently appear to be operating
on a socially constructed understanding of the world, the effectiveness of terrorism, and
the potential outcome that strongly deviates from objective evaluations.
7.2.1 Collective Problems and Societal Position
Terrorist organizations have consistently organized around particular
demographics. The most direct population that these groups draw their membership from
is not those experiencing the strain or possessing the grievance however, but the social
movements that form around these strains and grievances. Although the terrorist groups
reviewed here appear to be largely homogenous individually, there is a great deal of
heterogeneity across groups, consistent with prior research (Victoroff 2005; Smith 1994).
Terrorist groups have drawn from the peasantry and working class, the middle class,
students, and intellectuals, as well as the lesser nobility and petit bourgeoise. Terrorist
groups have drawn from religious populations of every faith, including Christianity,
Judaism, Islam, and Hinduism. They have been minority groups that experienced
discrimination and have come from the majority group’s middle class. Depending on the
group’s gender norms, women have had a varying degree of involvement. No
demographic category has had a monopoly on terrorism, and the importance of
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demographic characteristics derives from their effect on the individual’s and groups’
experiences and relationships within society.
The role of demographic statuses is much more essential in structuring the
experiences of individuals, producing collective problems that are addressed by social
movements and terrorism. Members of the IRA shared common experiences in a
religious education and discrimination (Burleigh 2010). Members of the ETA were
connected prior to the group’s formation through religious activities that allowed them to
share the Basque language (Carr 2006). Anticolonial groups would draw from the shared
experiences facing the colonized, and the student movements of the 1960s often produced
terrorist groups in reaction to repression of the non-violent movement. The essential
observation is that the specific status is unimportant to the development of terrorism. It is
the consequences of that status for the populations in society that produce grievances that
motivate social movements and terrorism.
ISIS illustrates this point in its framing of the problems facing Muslims around
the world. The group highlights cases of prejudice and discrimination against Muslims,
and directly targets those Muslims that feel unable to fully practice their religion in the
West. The injustices highlighted by ISIS range from job discrimination to war crimes in
the Middle East but are consistently portrayed as consequences of being Muslim in a
world dominated by non-Muslim countries.
7.2.2 Personal Connections to Terrorism
These social movements, their organizations, and the areas of society from which
they draw support are the primary areas through which individuals are exposed to, and
enter, terrorist organizations. Even the lone-wolf terrorists that operate entirely
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independently emerge from the networks that comprise social movements. Terrorist
groups and organizations are not formed by a convening of random, disconnected
individuals predisposed to terrorism, but existing groups of interconnected individuals.
By definition, social movements involve many individuals sharing a collective action
frame recognizing a social problem or injustice and holding some group or entity
responsible. Social movements may therefore be among the primary pathways to
internalizing worldviews conducive to terrorism, similar to the pathways to other
subcultures such as the workplace, events, family, and other relationships (Sutherland
1955, Haynie 2002; Haynie and Osgood 2005; Schafer, Mullins and Box 2013). This is
partially substantiated by the constant presence of social movements that terrorist groups
emerge out of, drawing their membership from fellow protestors or through the
splintering of social movement organizations.
7.2.3 Positions within Subcultures
Prior research on subcultures has noted that membership is not uniform but varies
depending on the degree of involvement (Anderson 2009; Melder 2014). Although the
role of the Revolutionist is the primary position within a terrorist subculture, other
positions also exist that are defined by lesser degrees of involvement. Supporters and
sympathizers of terrorism play an instrumental role in terrorism. Sympathizers represent
the most dedicated public support for terrorist campaigns, and in many instances the
strategy of terrorist groups is oriented towards recruiting among these sympathizers.
Supporters are more directly involved in the commission of terrorist acts through
providing essential infrastructure and resources, but are not considered terrorists
themselves due to their lack of violent behavior. These positions often incorporate
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women’s supporting role in many terrorist groups, but also include groups that involve
specialized positions or support groups and positions. ISIS, however, specifically
identifies a position present in prior terrorist organizations that is not often elaborated
upon, the virtual mujahidin or propagandist of terror. These include those individuals that
do not engage in terrorism directly, but publish the texts advocating, justifying, enabling,
and encouraging terrorism. This includes the individuals that focus specifically on the
management of the underground terrorist press, and it is a role that has changed
dramatically with the introduction of the internet.
7.2.4 Rationality, Culture, and Behavior
Although the present study cannot directly observe the degree of socialization an
individual has, the impact of the values, beliefs, and norms of terrorist groups is evident
when compared to a purely rational choice-based explanation. Several observations from
this sample of terrorist groups are consistent with the rational choice explanation. All of
the groups observed here, including ISIS, emerged out of a larger social movement,
typically due to the repression of the movement, a perceived lack of success, or an
impatience with the rate of change. However, this research has found terrorist groups to
consistently aspire to utopian goals, ascribe inherent value to violence, and attach
themselves to particular interpretations of ‘The Truth’. These aspects of terrorist groups
significantly impact the basic factors in the rational decision calculus assumed by rational
actor models but can be explained as the product of the shared cultural world view a
terrorist group.
Subculture theory argues that deviant behavior, in this case terrorism, is a result of
an individual’s socialization into the subculture (Einstadter and Henry 2006). This
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socialization is argued here to contribute to values and beliefs that decisions are based
upon, connecting subculture theory to the rational actor explanations of terrorism
(Pescolido 1992; Spickard 1998). Explaining the cultural factors in rational actor
decisions to adopt terrorism can provide an explanation for the use of terrorism despite its
low rate of success (Harmon 2010; Abrahms 2008). The rational actor approach to
terrorism assumes terrorists have stable political preferences, evaluate expected political
payoffs of the available options, and only adopt terrorism because the expected benefit is
superior to alternative options (Abrahms 2008). The cultural elements present in the
terrorist groups reviewed here directly impact terrorist’s evaluations of their available
political options and the perceived benefit of terrorism.
The first challenge to the rational actor explanation is the varying degree to which
terrorists’ worldview is accurate. Frequently, this study observed terrorist groups to
possess inaccurate evaluations of their political circumstances, ranging from their degree
of public support to their evaluation of the problems in society. Narodnya Volya and the
Corsican independence movement similarly failed to recognize that the public they
claimed to represent did not support their agenda (Carr 2006; Chaliand and Blin 2007).
Groups such as the RAF and BR would hold inaccurate perceptions of the world
described as a superficial political analysis at best, and fantastical at worst (Carr 2006).
Although some terrorist groups possess concrete political goals, many more
describe a utopian vision of society. The anarchist movement lacked substantive,
achievable goals in general (Kassel 2009). Anticolonial groups, who generally possessed
the most concrete political goals, tended to include utopian goals. The HRA (1925) did
not seek only the independence of India but advocated an international agenda for world
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peace and mutual respect between nations. The pIRA argued that removing England’s
influence from Northern Ireland would solve the nation’s problems, failing to recognize
the sectarian conflict would persist (English 2004). Groups among the New Left were
largely consistent with Orsini’s (2011) observations of the Red Brigades in Italy,
possessing a utopian dream for the world that could only be achieved through mass
violence.
Historically, the terrorist groups reviewed here have often claimed that terrorism
was necessary as the only means to attain their goals. This belief is reinforced by a great
emphasis on taking action. The fracturing of terrorist groups over the use of violence
illustrates the importance and perceived necessity of terroristic violence to some groups.
This is particularly true in cases where the split comes after the original terrorist group
renounces violence, but can also be seen in the persistent use of violence despite its
questionable utility and non-violent approaches frequently being more successful.
Furthermore, groups throughout the history of terrorism have viewed violence as
far more than an instrument of social change. Since the ‘holy’ act of bomb throwing by
Russian populists, terroristic violence has been consistently imbued with grandiose
qualities by terrorist groups. The Red Brigades of Italy would understand murder as an
act of love and justice for humanity (Orsini 2011). Other groups would extend this,
ascribing curative functions to violence for the afflictions they faced. By various groups
violence has alternatively been described as liberating, inspirational, purifying,
encouraging, and emboldening. ISIS has followed this pattern, describing jihad as the
greatest deed one can undertake, one which strikes terror in the hearts of the group’s
enemies and alleviates the sense of alienation experienced by Muslims in the West.
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This valuing of violence confounds the rational choice perspectives, since it
changes violence from a means to an end to an end in itself. In addition to this, terrorist
groups have frequently exhibited utopian goals that are unachievable. This does not
discredit the rational actor explanations of terrorism, but the extremity of terrorist goals
has significant implications for modeling their behavior. Effectively, groups with these
goals will never be successful, and will never be satisfied by anything less than complete
success. This can be seen in the anarchist groups and individuals that hoped for the
abolition of state power, the anticolonial groups that envisioned an upending of the global
power structure, and the New Left groups that desired a communist future. ISIS’s
Khilafah parallels these goals, with the goal of bringing the world and humanity
underneath the Islamic State’s flag and its perverse interpretation of Islam.
7.3 COMMUNICATION INTERLOCKS AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGES
The social networks of individuals are the micro-level existence of local groups,
and the connections between these local groups comprise the internal structure of
subcultures. Specifically, subcultures exist as cultural elements that are shared across
local groups, or idiocultures, and these connections are formed through communication
interlocks. Within this research, the focus has been on the role of the mass media in
uniting the terrorist groups and organizations within nations, and national movements
internationally. Texts have played a significant role in producing a cultural uniformity to
terrorist groups, both within waves and across time through several central authors and
examples. However, ISIS’s spread through the internet and its virtual mujahidin reflect a
growing importance of propagandists of terrorism that has been present since the
anarchist wave. This is due to the ramifications of the internet for the production and
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dissemination of media, since the medium effectively lowers the threshold to broadcast a
message to a wide audience.
7.3.1 Communication Interlocks
Communication interlocks are the mechanisms of cultural diffusion that spread a
subculture beyond its local origin point (Fine and Kleinman 1979). They include multiple
group memberships, weak ties, structural roles, and media diffusion. This dissertation has
focused specifically on the role of the media in spreading and uniting terrorist subcultures
around the world. Terrorist groups around the world and throughout time have shared
significant similarities, particularly within the same waves and ideological frames, and
this pattern reflects the similarities across local communities found in subculture research
(Anderson 2009; Futrell and Simi 2004; Futrell, Simi, and Gottschalk 2006). Specifically,
the uniformity observed across subcultures in the local groups that comprise them is
made possible through the spaces and media that allow these local groups to meet and
interact with others, such as the internet.
The media consistently played a significant role within terrorist movements.
Many of the terrorist movements studied here included some degree of an underground
press, producing pamphlets, newspapers, or journals. However, until the rise of the
internet terrorists’ direct media production has been limited to print, with the single
exception of LEHI’s radio broadcasts. In addition to independently produced media
content, terrorist groups have also been able to publish their statements through
sympathetic outlets. Within waves of terrorism, the consistencies within terrorists’
worldviews can be traced to their common textual basis, from the anarchist writers to
Lenin and Mao.
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Furthermore, several central texts and authors have been influential across many
terrorist groups and time periods. The consistency of terrorist groups around the world
within and across waves can be tied to their reliance on these specific texts. The central
link between terrorist groups across time has been the writings of Lenin, connecting the
Russian movements that he and anarcho-terrorism developed from to the anticolonial and
New Left terrorist movements. Influenced by prior writers and groups, Lenin popularized
concepts that comprise the ideal type terrorist subculture presented here, including the
valorization of terrorists or a revolutionary vanguard and the necessity of violence for
social change.
Most of the groups examined here are connected by a communist inclination that
unite them. The virtual ethnography of ISIS provides an affirmation of the importance of
media in terrorist groups from a substantially different type of terrorist group. Although
this research focused on ISIS’s internet presence, it is clear from their statements that
traditional media remains important or has been converted to a digital format. A manual
that provides instructions and advice on recruiting new members states, “Get him used to
reading, because reading entertains everyone who feels lonely, and the jihadi library is
very big and filled with the books written by martyred blood, tortured screams, and
truthful and jihadi actions”. Furthermore, ISIS shares this library with the larger jihadist
movement, and the specific writings of ISIS comprise only a fraction of this larger
literature.
7.3.2 The Propagandists of Terror
The history of terrorism, from anarchism to ISIS, is circular in many ways. The
inspiration of lone wolf actors across nations is the obvious comparison, but the two
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movements also share a similarity particularly when compared to the New Left wave in
terms of the role of propagandists. In addition to the unique role of the media, these two
movements illustrate the importance of a structural role, the propagandist, that is related
to the media. The spread of the anarchist movement can be traced to several core
publishers that came to represent the movement despite not directly engaging in violence
typically. Kravchinsky introduced the ideas of Narodnya Volya to the rest of Europe,
Most would similarly spread practical and philosophical advice for terrorism, and Kotoku
would be instrumental in introducing socialism and anarchism to Japan. The influence of
migration would similarly characterize the spread of terrorism during the anticolonial
wave, although increasingly imported books became referenced as they were translated.
The anticolonial wave would retain some of the influence of migrant actors introducing
these ideas abroad, but by the 1960s, the media of terrorism shifts from the independent
and secret presses towards radical bookstores and publishers. Radical texts appear to be
increasingly available over the course of the 20th century, as the New Left movements
frequently make reference to many more texts and sources than the anticolonialists and
anarchists.
Throughout the history of terrorism, groups and movements have frequently
involved individuals, publishers, or distributors that spread the messages that advocate
terroristic violence, that do not engage in that violence themselves. Johann Most, whose
writings included calls to violence as well as instructions on the construction of bombs
and primitive chemical attacks, is possibly the best example of this role. The
propagandists of terrorism are most discussed within the anarchist wave, and by the New
Left wave the discussion of them moves from individuals to publishers and radical
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bookstores. The contemporary observations of ISIS are consistent with a shift away from
the centrality of specific propagandists that publish their own works towards a diffuse
group of cyber-propagandists, ISIS’s virtual mujahidin.
The central role of the virtual mujahidin has been to spread the materials and
propaganda of ISIS in order to facilitate support and recruitment. It is a position that is
essential to effectively spreading a message online, and the outsourcing of this role to the
wider public is consistent with changes in publishing ability that has accompanied the
internet age. Virtual mujahidin are encouraged to distribute and preserve ISIS materials
online, provide alternative news about the caliphate, and to recruit new supporters
through the internet. These behaviors are not unique to the virtual mujahidin within the
history of propagandists of terrorism, but within the digital age these pursuits take on
several unique dimensions.
7.3.3 From Print to Digital
Research on internet culture has highlighted the increasing ability of the general
population to easily publish and distribute materials to a wide audience (Jenkins 2006;
Burgess and Green 2009). Prior to the internet, the ability to widely disseminate a
message was restricted to those entities that had access, technology, or the finances to
afford it. The absence of a significant direct role of television in the distribution of
terrorist messages is a logical observation of this limitation created by gatekeepers that
limit the content published on major platforms. In contrast, the internet enables
effectively anyone to publish content, rather than only those with a printing press, a radio
transmitter, or the resources necessary to broadcast a television program. The lower
threshold to producing and disseminating content provided by the internet has created the
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conditions necessary for the propagandist of terrorism to become a viable role to a much
larger population. The virtual mujahidin represent the evolution of propagandists of
terrorism as they take advantage of the new, dominant form of the mass media.
In addition to enabling the publication and dissemination of media, the internet
differs from traditional print in the way it structures the dissemination of information and
enabling interpersonal interaction. The internet has been particularly effective at
facilitating contact between individuals involved in rare, risky, or stigmatized identities
(Griffiths and Frobish 2013; Frederick and Perrone 2014). Although frequently referred
to here as a single communication interlock, it is important to note that the internet is a
medium through which many interrelated platforms and texts, such as traditional
websites, exist. Larger platforms, such as Facebook, Youtube, and Twitter possess larger
audiences than specialized websites, and groups may exist within or across various
platforms. The virtual ethnography of ISIS illustrates the persistence a group can have
existing across multiple platforms, as well as how this creates exponentially more points
of entry to the ideas and media of the group. This is in addition to the interpersonal
connections that the group allegedly used to recruit prior to its removal from most
platforms (Erelle 2015).
7.4 REPRESSION, HISTORY, AND TERROR AS A CULTURAL TOOL
National factors condition the relationships that terrorist groups and movements
operate within, and, repression and political disenfranchisement typically accompanied
the adoption of terrorism. However, other national characteristics associated with strains
and grievances were less consistent across terrorist organizations, likely due to this
study’s focus on international terrorist movements. Instead, international or historical
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conditions that have a uniform impact across nations were the most common, underlying
problems that terrorist movements mobilized to address. These include the drastic
societal changes accompanying industrialization, the aftermath of the World Wars, and
colonialization. Similarly, international relationships influenced the spread of terrorism,
particularly through immigration within the waves examined here. In addition to national
and international factors, history has also played a significant role in the adoption of
terrorism, particularly through influencing future movements and serving as a mythical
basis and moral justification for violence.
7.4.1 National factors
One of the most important national characteristics that are related to the
development of terrorism is the distribution of collective problems through society, such
as poverty, discrimination, or political disenfranchisement. This dimension links the
macro level of analysis back to the individual experience of these collective problems.
The largest terrorist groups appear to emerge from those societies where the largest
population is experiencing these strains, particularly minority groups. The IRA, LTTE,
FLN, the Mau Mau, and other groups would emerge due to discrimination, poverty, and
colonization. This study found that limitations on legitimate political opportunities and
state repression of social movements were highly influential in the adoption of terrorism.
In contrast, groups whose grievances are vicarious have tended to be significantly
smaller. Most likely due to this study’s focus on international terrorist movements, the
strains that occurred the most in this sample are those that are shared internationally, such
as colonization or industrialization.
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The most important national factors in the development of terrorist groups are the
degree of political disenfranchisement and the repression of social movements. Many of
the terrorist groups observed here formed in response to state repression, or violence from
other non-state actors, and several were similarly inspired due to a lack of political
opportunities. Terrorist groups in this sample often formed or turned to violence as a
direct response to the violent repression of a social movement. Many of the writers and
intellectuals that argued to justify terrorism specifically used the violence of the state as
the basis of their argument (Burleigh 2010). The level of repression that produces
terrorism varies across groups, but criminalizing social movements, arresting their
leaders, and using violence to silence them is a constant precursor to terrorism. In
addition to repression, political disenfranchisement has frequently contributed to the
development of terrorism. The FLN, Shining Path, LTTE, and Argentinian groups would
develop in situations characterized by political disenfranchisement, including the refusal
of political rights, political exclusion, and a lack of political representation (Starn 2019;
Yass 2014; Movano 1995; Revere 1973).
7.4.2 Global Conditions and Terrorism
At a global level, the relationships between nations further conditions the spread
of terrorism. Immigration played a significant role in spreading anarchism. Colonialism
lead to the conditions shared across nations that produced the anticolonial wave of
terrorism. Many New Left groups were directly opposed to US imperialism and
engagement with countries around the world. The international waves of terrorism have
been strongly connected to international events that impact populations across nations
similarly. Industrialization led to drastic changes and societal upheavals that motivated
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many within the anarchist movement. The experience of colonialization produced an
experience shared by populations of many nations, and the fall out of the World Wars
would provide the opportunity for social movements within these nations to act. These
international strains contribute to the direct experiences of local populations, which
differs from the New Left movement of the 1960s. The groups that comprised the New
Left movement differed in their direct experience of strains, but they were united in their
condemnation of an international event—the Vietnam war.
The findings from the research on ISIS suggest that the larger factor may be
general violence by the state. ISIS notes discrimination and oppression against Muslims
throughout the West. This frequently includes the over-policing and repression of
Muslims by police and intelligence services globally. They also frequently point to state
violence in the Middle East, in the form of oppression by authoritarian regimes and
international wars, to justify their actions. The common problems facing Muslims
internationally, or problems that they can identify with, serves as the basis for the group’s
indictment of the current status quo.
The international strains alone did not produce terrorism in many of the cases
reviewed here. Frequently the diffusion of terrorism-related texts across nations presaged
the emergence of terrorism. Within the anarchist wave, several central publishers would
introduce terrorist concepts across Europe and the US. More minor actors, inspired by
this initial spread would introduce terroristic ideas to India, Japan, and Australia. The
anarchist wave would be intimately tied to the anticolonial wave due to this migration,
the Irish example, the example set by Narodnya Volya, and the writings of Lenin strongly
influencing these movements. The New Left of the 1960’s would similarly draw from

233

these original sources, particularly Lenin, and would be historically connected to the
earlier anarchist and socialist movements. The New Left would produce its own
contributions to terrorism, specifically the concept of the Urban Guerilla and the
integration of Mao’s writings. The diffusion of the texts that often serve as the basis for
the culture of terrorist groups has been traced here across waves and history, and these
connections through texts combined with the consistency of terrorist cultural systems
provide strong evidence for explaining terrorism in terms of cultural diffusion.
Although immigration is not necessary for ISIS to spread its message, the
experiences of Muslim immigrants in the West are among the primary grievances the
group uses to recruit. The history of Western intervention in the Middle East is used as
both, a grievance and justification for the group’s violence. These grievances are shared
globally and serve to attract followers to the group internationally. Furthermore, the
internet has effectively abolished the geographic limitations on accessing texts or
interpersonal contacts. Consequently, the direct importation of texts or ideas through
travel is largely obsolete.
The final global characteristic consistently observed here across terrorist waves is
the international orientation of the terrorist groups. Anarchism, socialism, and
communism have possessed international perspectives since their conception, and several
anticolonial groups shared these philosophies or similarly took an international stance
against colonialism, such as the HRA. Events in other nations also frequently inspired
domestically formed or acting groups. Russian groups that presaged the anarchist wave
made frequent reference to the repression of the Paris Commune, the New Left uniformly
condemned the Vietnam War, and often the New Left groups acted in solidarity with
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Palestinian groups. Similarly, the mindset of ISIS is globally oriented, unified by the
religion of Islam, This helps to extend the initial findings on the historical waves of
terrorism, since the foundation of ISIS’s global orientation is separate from the general
left-leaning ideologies of the other international waves that share an interrelated history.
7.4.3 A History of Violence
Historical events can take on a significant symbolic importance for social
movements (Armstrong and Crage 2006). Similarly, it [what] has a central role in the
narrative terrorist groups weave for themselves, their justifications for violence, and their
adoption of violence. Parallels are drawn between historical atrocities and contemporary
issues, lending a greater gravity to the terrorist group’s struggle. This is exemplified by
the comparison of Vietnam to the genocide of Native Americans by the Weather
Underground or the Holocaust by the RAF (Varon 2004). Sometimes, parallels were
unnecessary, and groups pointed to historical grievances to justify their violence,
particularly in the case of the anticolonial groups. ISIS, of example, includes within their
grievances a long history of conflict with the west, traced back to the Crusades and
particularly highlighted in the group’s discussion of the Sykes-Picot Agreement.
In addition to comparing contemporary problems to historical events, terrorist
groups also frequently tied their role of the Revolutionist to historical predecessors.
Historic social movements, protestors, fighters, and warriors are among the sources of
inspiration that terrorist groups draw on. Narodnya Volya would claim the French
Jacobins as their ancestors. The IRB and IRA would consider themselves present day
incarnations of a historical line of Irish martyrs (Burleigh 2010). ISIS similarly claims to
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be among a line of martyrs and heroes, and this comparison is frequently employed in
their propaganda.
The most direct influence of history on terrorism is the generational nature of
some terrorist movements. The IRA is perhaps the quintessential example of a
generational terrorist movement, with uprisings, guerilla campaigns, and terrorist
movements frequently developing and receding for hundreds of years (Coogan 2002; Bell
1997). However, other generational movements were observed in the course of this
research. Gupta (1997) describes the Indian nationalist movements as occurring across
three phases years apart. In the US, the New Left wave was partially a continuation of the
Old Left decades later (Parker and Sitter 2016; Grosse 2004). Prior terrorist movements
within a nation are likely the most direct way that terrorism can be available as a
historical solution with current circumstances.
7.5 CONCLUSION
Some researchers have argued that terrorism is unique to its socio-historical
context, and as such defies general explanation (Tilly 2004; Laqueur 2001). This null
hypothesis would expect minimal, coincidental similarities across terrorist groups across
time. However, this dissertation has found a significant degree of consistency across
terrorist groups compared to the subcultural explanation. Particularly, terrorist groups
consistently possessed an interrelated set of cultural elements that had a direct
relationship to the decision to engage in terrorism, which were widely shared across
individuals, groups, and organizations that exhibited varying degrees of their
internalization of these elements, and this internalization was also associated with an
identity component. These subcultures frequently addressed collective problems within
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societies, although the specific type of collective problem varied. The development of
these subcultures was strongly related to the diffusion of texts and ideas that underlie and
inform their creation, illustrating the existence of terrorism as a set of cultural elements
applied by populations to address collective problems. These cultural elements reflect the
concept of culture as a ‘toolkit’, an eclectic collection of elements that are strategically
employed by individuals (DiMaggio 1997). This spread may explain a great deal of
consistency across the subcultures within this historical sample, since the groups here are
highly connected through their common sources of inspiration and mimicry of each other.
However, this may be due to the centrality of Lenin to this sample, and the presence of
these same elements within ISIS suggests instead that these elements may simply be
essential to this form of violence, independent of international influences. The pattern of
cultural diffusion observed in prior waves of terrorism provides a substantial basis for
understanding the spread of ISIS through the internet, as well as the unique aspects of this
new technology. It particularly highlights the growing role of the internet propagandist,
exponentially increased pathways to exposure to the subculture, and the abolishment of
geographical and temporal limitations that restricted the spread of prior movements.
7.5.1 Evidence for subcultures
Subcultures are defined here as interrelated cultural elements that are distributed
across a social network that include a claim to an identity or membership. Terrorism
across the anarchist, anticolonial, and New Left waves has consistently exhibited these
characteristics. ISIS also exhibits these characteristics as a singular terrorist entity that
includes an organization, inspired groups and individuals, supporters, and sympathizers.
Not only do the terrorist groups reviewed here exhibit the characteristics of subcultures,
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but there are consistent themes across these groups. These include the role of the
Revolutionist, a morality of terror, a value of violence, and a belief in their possession
and monopoly on the ‘Truth’.
All terrorist groups exhibit an identity component referred to here as the role of
the Revolutionist, an aspirational hero figure defined by self-sacrifice, dedication, and
revolutionary expertise. This role is referred to differently across different terrorist
groups, from explicitly embracing the title of terrorist in the anarchist era to the urban
guerillas of the New Left. It is a status that is glorified and valorized, and stories, songs,
and poems praising past martyrs are common across terrorist groups. The status is
frequently described as a defining feature to individual terrorists, and there is a dedication
to espousing the behaviors expected by a Revolutionist within particular groups. This is
seen most clearly in the criticism sessions of New Left groups as well as the emphasis on
sincerity within ISIS. Finally, this identity component is the central way that terrorist
groups define themselves apart from the social movements they emerge from.
This identity component is accompanied by other cultural elements common to
the terrorist groups observed here. Terrorist groups share a common morality system
justifying violence based on comparisons to state violence, the definition of their violence
as altruistic, and their belief in a morally dichotomous society. Violence is not only
altruistic and utilitarian, but is frequently necessary, therapeutic, honorable, or
praiseworthy. Finally, a less regularly observed cultural belief of terrorist groups is their
understanding of the world. Terrorist groups argue that they possess a monopoly on the
‘Truth’ that further justifies their adoption of violence.
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These cultural elements are not distinct or limited to individuals, groups, or
organizations, but frequently are shared across a larger movement within society. This is
best exemplified by the numerous individuals, groups, and organizations engaged in
terrorism, sharing goals, ideologies, and even members, within nations. These various
groups and entities often share the general cultural elements of the terrorist subculture,
with its minor unique aspects within waves and national circumstances. Furthermore,
these cultural elements are not shared only by entities engaged in terrorism, but are also
distributed across supporters and sympathizers, mirroring the varying positions of
involvement observed in other subcultures.
7.5.2 Terrorism as a Cultural Tool
A subcultural explanation of terrorism is substantiated not only by the persistent
presence of cultural elements across terrorist organizations, but in they have spread
throughout the history of terrorism and in the contemporary case of ISIS. The shared
cultural elements of the terrorist groups reviewed in the historical part of this study, the
relationships between the groups and their influences, and the adaptation of these
influences to local conditions and collective problems is largely supportive of regarding
terrorism as a cultural tool that has spread through cultural diffusion, particularly through
media sources. This has been observed within domestic circumstances wherein current
movements draw from historical terrorist counterparts and geographically as texts and
ideas spread across the world and are introduced to new nations.
The terrorist groups observed here shared several significant cultural elements,
discussed above. This uniformity of cultural systems is common within international
subcultures, wherein local and national collectives are connected through international
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media and events. However, the differences between groups in the details of their cultural
systems are equally important as evidence of how groups adapt the larger cultural system
of terrorism to their local circumstances and collective problems. This is observed in how
groups apply concepts and draw parallels to history. It is also seen in how groups modify
these cultural systems, giving rise to new concepts, as is seen in the example of Fanon’s
contributions to Marxist-Leninism and the creation of the urban guerilla concept. The
central pillars of the terrorist subculture observed here largely remain the same despite
these variations or incorporate them.
These historical groups made frequent use of the mass media outlets available to
them to spread their message, gain support, and recruit followers. This has primarily
occurred through the extensive use of underground newspapers, magazines, pamphlets,
and manifestos. ISIS carries on this legacy, but the internet has magnified their ability to
produce and distribute their materials. These media sources also served to spread the
terrorist subculture globally, as influential texts ranging from Marxist-Leninist writings to
biographies of Irish martyrs were exported to other nations. These texts are frequently
explicitly referenced by terrorist groups as inspirational, and in turn these groups generate
new texts or examples that are chronicled and influence subsequent groups. This has
occurred throughout the history of terrorism in the course of each international wave, but
the uniformity of groups across waves can be traced to the common linkages between
these waves. The most central of these observed here was Lenin, whose writings were
connected to his experience within the Russian movements that began the anarchist wave,
inspired groups through the anticolonial and New Left waves, and also informed several
other influential writers and groups.
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The presence of the same cultural elements within ISIS challenges these
conclusions to a minor degree. The argument presented here is that the prior international
waves of terrorism share these cultural elements primarily because they integrate them to
address their local problems through their shared connections to similar textual sources
and inspirational examples. It is difficult, therefore, to disentangle the cultural elements
common to terrorism from the leftist bias within this sample of terrorist groups. ISIS has
no directly observed connections to these prior groups or sources but shares the same
cultural elements. As a result, it is unclear if these cultural elements are common to all
terrorist groups and cultural diffusion is a redundant or non-existent factor, ISIS is
influenced by these prior groups through intermediary groups such as al-Qaeda and these
connections are unobserved in this study, or ISIS, or its influences, independently arrived
at the same cultural elements which spread through cultural diffusion parallel to the leftist
movements.
7.5.3 A Brave New World
The virtual ethnography of ISIS demonstrates that the group shares many of the
qualities of prior international terrorist movements. ISIS exhibits the same cultural
elements as its ancestral precursors, similarly operates beyond the confines of a group or
organizational structure on the basis of one’s socialization of these cultural elements, as
well as spreading and being distributed across a population through communication
interlocks, specifically the internet and the platforms it provides. The internet has
abolished the geographic and temporal limitations of prior movements, exponentially
increased the pathways to recruitment and spread of its ideology, and transformed the
role of the propagandist of terrorism into a collective effort.
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Furthermore, the geographic and temporal limitations of prior groups are largely
abolished by the internet. This has enabled the group to spread further and faster than
previous groups that relied on print sources or news coverage to gain exposure in foreign
nations. Furthermore, it has introduced the ability of recruiters to engage individuals
around the world, an interaction not possible through traditional print. These
developments, along with the efforts of propagandists, have amplified the number of
pathways through which ISIS’s culture can spread and the size of the population it can
reasonable spread to. Social media platforms connect millions, and the prolific and
effective use of these platforms by ISIS effectively elevates the groups’ visibility. The
pathways of prior terrorist groups appear to be considerably more limited, particularly
focused around the originating social movement or areas of societies frequented by
terrorists, sympathizers, and supporters. This is consistent with the larger trend of the
internet in connecting disparate individuals and populations sharing controversial
identities, allowing groups to form where previously geographic and temporal limitations
would leave them isolated (Griffiths and Frobish 2013; Frederick and Perrone 2014).
The role of the propagandist is now much greater than before due to its role in the
diffusion of the terrorist subculture, and it is now a role that can and is engaged in by a
much larger portion of the movement. This is most clear in ISIS’s recruitment around the
world, but the preservation of the group’s extensive media materials and the relative ease
of accessing them may have yet unseen consequences for the group’s lasting impact. If
history repeats, the success of ISIS in its online recruitment is likely to inform future
groups, just as groups in the past have adopted the techniques of other groups that have
proven useful. The most significant of these lessons was unobserved in the course of this
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study, although it remained frequently referenced. The ubiquity of ISIS content and
followers across internet platforms, increasing the number of potential pathways towards
extremism that an individual might encounter is likely a pattern to be repeated into the
future. Unfortunately, it is likely that these new groups will be able to spread widely
without the same level of social control measures enacted by law enforcement and
internet platforms to address ISIS until they are already of significant size to warrant such
measures.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION
Since the modern conception of terrorism in the 1880s there have been four major
waves of international terrorism. These waves included the development of terrorist
groups sharing similar agendas and claiming solidarity with each other across the world.
ISIS represents another iteration of this international diffusion of terrorism, unique in its
effective use of the new mass media form, the internet. This dissertation sought to explain
the spread of ISIS through the internet through a virtual ethnography of the online
environment in which individuals become radicalized, and to distinguish the unique
dimensions of this spread by examining the prior international waves of terrorism. This
research supports a subcultural explanation of the international diffusion of terrorism by
providing evidence to support the existence of terrorist subcultures and demonstrating the
interrelationships between groups and influences that serve as the pathways for cultural
diffusion
ISIS reflects these findings in its spread through the internet, and a comparison of
the findings from the two parts of this study illustrate substantial changes to the
international diffusion of terrorism. The internet has abolished the geographic and
temporal limitations on exposure and involvement in terrorist groups, enabling otherwise
isolated individuals and groups to connect and mobilize. This general trend in the internet
is accompanied by a second practical consequence of the digital age. The widespread
ability to produce and distribute media provided by the internet has, within the context of
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ISIS, changed the face of the propagandist of terrorism role, moving it from central
writers and publishers to a task widely engaged in by supporters of terrorist causes.
8.1 IMPLICATIONS
The first major implication of this research is a fundamental observation on the
nature of appropriate level of analysis to best understand the development of terrorism.
Rather than focusing on terrorism as the behavior of individuals, groups, or
organizations, the historical review of terrorist groups and examination of ISIS
demonstrates the importance of studying terrorism as a form of social movements using a
specific means for social change. This can first be seen in the diversity of actors involved
in terrorism. Although the focus is often on the specific actors engaged in violence,
dedicated support groups, supportive populations, and sympathizers all provide essential
resources that impact the ability and magnitude of terrorist campaigns. Within nations
this is observed by the multiplicity of individuals, groups, and organizations operating
parallel to each other, using terrorism to achieve a similar goal. Across nations, this is
seen in the influence, consistency, solidarity, and cooperation between these national
movements and the entities that comprise them.
Furthermore, this is substantiated through an in-depth analysis of ISIS, which
reflects the multiplicity of actors and entities, including inspired actors carrying out terror
attacks in their native nations, international supporters that donate to the group, virtual
mujahidin that recruit and spread the groups message, the mujahidin fighting in the
Middle East, the bureaucratic structure of the Islamic State as a nation, community or
familial support within the Islamic State, and the groups from other nations that have
pledged allegiance to ISIS, carrying the group’s war to domestic front.
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The implication is that research on terrorism should focus on addressing on
explaining terrorism as a broader movement, with the specific individuals, groups, and
organizations as nested within this larger context. First, such research would more
accurately reflect the reality of terrorism. Second, this classification of terrorism has
significant implications for qualitative and quantitative research on terrorism. Treating
multiple terrorist entities within a larger movement as discrete, independent entities
artificially inflates and distorts the scope of terrorist movements, their characteristics, and
undermines the inferences that would be drawn from research using such a classification.
Regarding the international diffusion of terrorism, this research has demonstrated
the importance of international factors, particularly cultural diffusion through media
sources, on groups that are traditionally classified as domestic terrorism. Traditionally,
the international terrorism is focused on attacks across national boundaries. However,
most of the groups studied here engaged in violence primarily, or exclusively, within
their national boundaries. Despite this, international influences played a significant role
in the development of these movements. Research on other inspirational across forms of
terrorism suggests that this international impact is present for groups outside of the
limited scope of the international waves of terrorism, and the pattern of international
diffusion holds for terrorism with non-leftist ideologies (Park and Sitter 2016; Sedgwick
2007). Although this international influence appears to include the characteristics of the
global order, impacted by factors such as the World Wars, industrialization,
colonialization, and foreign interference, the most consistent explanation for terrorism
based on this research focuses on its cultural diffusion through media sources.
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This research has demonstrated the importance of understanding the cultural
systems of terrorist groups and the mechanisms that condition their spread. Based on this
research, cultural transmission through mass media avenues is of particular importance to
understanding the spread of terrorism within and between nations, as well as across time.
This has been demonstrated through the prolific use of print media by earlier terrorist
movements, their frequent citation of the sources that inspire and influence them, as well
as a detailed examination of ISIS’s online presence. The importance of the historical role
of the mass media in the cultural diffusion of terrorism highlights the need to understand
the implications of the internet as a mechanism in the cultural diffusion of terrorism
particularly, and violent, extremist, or dangerous subcultures generally.
ISIS is not alone among terrorist groups using the internet, nor is terrorism the
only potentially hazardous entities that is spreading through the medium. Incels
(Involuntary Celibate), the alt-right, conspiracy theorists and others have been among the
groups effectively coalescing online and are connected to real world violence. In addition
to potentially dangerous groups, this research can also inform the study of other
collectives and subcultures that coalesce through the internet and other forms of mass
media. White nationalists (Schafer, et al. 2013; Futrell, Simi, and Gottschalk 2006),
social movements like Anonymous, conspiracy theorists, sexual subcultures (Frederick
and Perrone 2014), criminal subcultures such as pedophile rings (Aiken 2016) and more
can benefit from this research.
The specific lessons for the further study of the internet’s role in the spread of
terrorism, ideologies, or subcultures include the importance of signifying language, the
structure of the internet, the cross-platform existence of these groups, and a tentative
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observation on the consequences of deplatforming. First, ISIS illustrates the importance
of understanding the language, meanings, and symbols to successfully navigate online
subcultures that are clandestine in nature. For researchers, it is also important to
understand the use of similar community’s language so as to not conflate two related but
distinct entities. This is best exemplified in the close relationship between ISIS and other
jihadist groups, where an intimate knowledge of the differences between the groups is
necessary to distinguish the two. Language is also important to the structural conditions
that impact the navigation of the internet, particularly the role of search engines, social
media and content sharing platforms, and recommendation algorithms that serve as
mechanical ties to new content. These factors strongly influence the content one is
exposed to, independent of their intent and interpersonal connections. This is also tied
strongly to the necessity to understand internet collectivities, such as ISIS, as possessing
a cross platform existence that increases their exposure to other populations, makes their
policing difficult, and likely has further unknown implications. Finally, this study can
tentatively conclude that deplatforming, when a community is removed from a particular
social media or content sharing platform, is effective in minimizing the group’s ability to
contact new populations but cannot fully erase these communities, as they are able to
migrate to new platforms (Johnson et. al. 2015).
Theoretically, this research has substantiated a cultural diffusion-based
explanation of terrorism generally, and finds significant support for the study of terrorism
using subculture theory. Furthermore, this study supports several of the assumptions of
prior explanations of terrorism, particularly when they are examined in conjunction with
subculture theory. Most definitively, rational actor theories’ assumption that the origins
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of terrorism in social movements that have been repressed is wholly supported by this
research. Similarly, the common underlying international strains present within the waves
of terrorism, but affecting specific nations in varying ways provides some support for the
grievance and strain explanations. However, the observed evidence raises some
inconsistencies within these explanations that are addressed within subculture theory,
which is consistently supported by the research here. There is substantial evidence that
terrorist movements meet the criteria of subcultures, that terrorism is a cultural tool
adapted to local circumstances and collective problems, that these cultural elements
spread through communication interlocks, and that subcultures provide a mediating factor
between grievances and rational choices.
8.2 LIMITATIONS
Despite the promising results of this study, there are several limitations that
condition the overall findings of this research. These are primarily the consequences of
the scope of the study, nature of the data gathered, and the availability of data. The study
on the virtual caliphate was limited in scope to the traditional internet accessed via a web
browser, and did not include the other communications platforms that the group is known
to use, such as apps and the dark web. This is particularly significant since the study
period began after the group was removed from most popular internet platforms, and
much of its content was removed (although frequently reposted in ways to avoid easy
detection). As a result of deplatforming efforts, the group shifted towards app-based
communication in addition to its presence on the dark web. As such, this study does not
encompass the entirety of the virtual caliphate, but merely its most accessible and stable
form. This also highlights the necessity to further understand the implications of the
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different types of communication platforms available in addition to traditional websites
such as apps and the dark web.
The comparative-historical study suffers from a similar limitations, restricting the
confidence with which its findings can be generalized to terrorism by groups with nonleftist agendas. The international waves of terrorism frequently incorporated a MarxistLeninist component, and with even the anarchist wave largely overlapping with socialist
and communist movements. Although Park and Sitter (2016) argue for a similar approach
to tracing the roots of terrorism and include other ideologies, it is unclear how substantial
these connections are. Furthermore, prior research has suggested that leftist movements
may be more likely to engage in terrorism due to right wing political parties increased
likelihood of implementing policies of repression or political disenfranchisement
(Danzell 2011). This raises an additional issue regarding the consistency of repression as
a factor in the adoption of terrorism. While it reaffirms the findings of Danzell (2011), it
is unclear if this finding generalizes to groups of other ideologies.
In addition to the limitations due to the scope of the historical study of terrorism,
the availability and nature of the data collected restrict the degree of confidence in these
findings, despite their general consistent support for a subcultural explanation. First, the
use of qualitative data for substantiating the theoretical arguments posed here and the
construction of a social network between terrorist groups and their influences preclude
the use of statistical controls that could uniformly demonstrate a greater level of
confidence in the findings. However, the evidence collected in the course of this study
strongly indicates that the construction of such a dataset is possible in the future. The
larger issue regarding data limitations is the limited amount of information about terrorist
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groups, the secondary nature of much of the data, and the large variation in the amount of
information available for different groups. As a result, groups that are frequently written
about make up the majority of observations across all indicators, and it is unclear how the
results would change under a condition of uniform observations across all groups.
However, this is a limitation inherent to research on clandestine groups, and no
significant outlier cases were observed. The most unique case within this study was the
Irish Republican movement, whose inclusion is primarily secondary in nature due to the
movement’s influence on other groups and the incorporation of Marxist-Leninism in the
1960s. Although the data is limited, based on the research conducted here there is no
explicit signs that the findings are misleading as a result.
8.3 FURTHER RESEARCH
Future research can extend, substantiate, and clarify many of the findings of this
research. Most directly, research into ISIS’s use of communication apps and the dark web
can provide important information regarding the different uses and presentations of the
group across these related mediums. Furthermore, research focused on the experiences of
individuals that were radicalized through interaction with the virtual caliphate can
complement the findings here, and demonstrate a direct connection between the online
environment described here and terrorist behavior. Generally, the examination of less
policed or clandestine groups can additionally provide greater details regarding the use of
the internet by extremist social movements and its implications for them.
Regarding the comparative-historical study, future research should focus on
extending these findings to non-leftist groups. Of particular interest are terrorist
organizations that represent majority groups within society as well as the organizations
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that enact state terrorism. Parker and Sitter (2016) classify these groups as Social
Exclusion terrorism, including groups such as the Ku Klux Klan [KKK] and Nazi
Sturmabteilung (Stormtroopers, or SA). In Sedgwick’s (2007) alternative waves of
terrorism, the right wing, state-organized, and fascist groups are similarly demonstrated
to have spread internationally from the Nazi Stormtroopers. These groups are of
particular interest due to their substantial differences with the groups researched here,
since they represent powerful majority groups within society or are the instruments of
repression. Furthermore, they are intimately connected to the development of leftist
terrorism through their repressive actions.
In addition to extending this research to different forms of terrorism, future
research should focus on the dynamics between terrorist groups and their originating
social movements. This avenue would clarify the findings here, particularly by
highlighting the ways terrorist groups deviate from social movements in addition to their
choice to use violence for social change. This research can also illuminate the struggles
for legitimacy between terrorist entities and social movements that were observed here,
primarily with reference to ISIS. Similar research comparing terrorist groups to guerilla
groups can clarify what substantial differences, if any exist between individuals, groups,
and organizations that engage in these behaviors.
In addition to directly extending the empirical findings of this research regarding
terrorism, future research should focus on the development of subculture theory.
Although the primary focus of this research was the explanation of terrorism, the
evidence supporting subculture theory and its relevance to internet communities
demonstrates a renewed importance for the concept in the digital age. The theoretical
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development of subculture theory has been uneven but developing the theory may be
useful for its application to the development of internet cultures and their increasing
impact on the modern world. This can be further developed through research focused on
research on internet use generally. The interconnections between online populations can
explain the growth of internet communities across platforms. Based on the observation of
competing actors in the virtual caliphate, research may further seek to understand the
effects of competing viewpoints, the oversaturation of available information, and how
individuals choose which sources and information to adopt. Such research could directly
speak to the process by which individuals enter a process of radicalization, ignoring
contrary information in favor of extremist sources such as ISIS. It is imperative to
understand this process, since there is little to suggest that ISIS is truly unique beyond
their particular perversion of Islam, and future terrorists will likely learn from their
success.
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